











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 







CHINESE SUBSIDIARIES IN THE UK:  



















In accordance with the University of Edinburgh Regulations for Research 
Degrees, the author declares that: 
(a) This thesis has been composed by the author 
(b) It is the result of the author's own original research 
(c) It has not previously been submitted for any other degree or 
professional qualification 
 
















I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Nick Oliver who has unstintingly 
given me time, ideas and support during my PhD research; without his help I would 
not be able to produce this piece of work. 
 
I also want to thank to some staff members of Edinburgh University Business 
School, in particular Dr Ling Liu (my second supervisor), Professor Markus Pudelko, 
Dr Tony Kinder, Dr Omaima Hatem, Professor Chris Carr, Dr Rick Woodward and 
Dr Stephen Harwood who have kindly shared their expertise.  I am also grateful to 
Christine Proudfoot and the PhD Support Office. 
 
Thank you to my survey informants and interviewees in Chinese MNCs, without 
their help I would not be able to conduct my research.  
 
My colleagues Yigui Ma, Christine Soh, Jia Li, Shariq Zia Sheikh, Jeong-Yang Park 
and Siriluk Prasunpangsri and Hoang Ho, shared the journey and made my PhD 
excursion less lonely.  
 
My heartfelt thanks to my parents and my husband for their unconditional love and 
unfailing support, without which I would not have succeeded or become the person 










China is one of the largest outward foreign-direct-investors (OFDIs) and is rapidly 
internationalising.  There are numerous studies about the internationalisation of 
Chinese MNCs, in particular their development, determinants, motivations and 
performance.  Many scholars in international business argue that one of the major 
reasons for firms from emerging markets such as China to invest in developed 
economies is to assimilate new knowledge and resources; exploring learning by 
Chinese MNCs in the developed countries is therefore significant.  However, there is 
little research about Chinese MNCs learning abroad and even fewer studies on the 
processes of learning.   
 
This thesis analyses these processes and the motivations of Chinese OFDI in the UK 
and explores how their subsidiaries learn, exploit knowledge, develop capabilities, 
and how they transfer knowledge and capabilities to the headquarters (HQs).  In 
order to explore the learning of Chinese subsidiaries in the UK, it is crucial to 
understand the nature and motives of their OFDI to ensure the existence of learning 
in these firms.  This dataset includes the largest survey (30 respondents) of Chinese 
subsidiaries in the UK and qualitative interviews with 40 employees in 15 
subsidiaries and seven HQs of Chinese MNCs. 
 
Based on the resource-based view of the firm, absorptive capacity, knowledge 
transfer and Andersson, Forsgren and Holm’s (2001) processes of capabilities 
development in a MNC, a conceptual framework is developed, which guides data 




This new framework suggests a unique process of capabilities development within a 
Chinese subsidiary and their HQs, two different learning circles.  The longer learning 
circle presents Chinese subsidiaries exploiting new knowledge to develop 
capabilities and transfer the new capabilities to the HQs.  The shorter learning circle 
shows Chinese subsidiaries sometimes transferring unexploited information and 
knowledge to the HQs.   
 
Whilst HQs develop capabilities through directly absorbing new knowledge created 
by subsidiaries, HQs also inhibit subsidiaries from collecting knowledge useful in 
developing new capabilities.  Therefore, the learning and knowledge transfer in the 
subsidiaries is mainly based on the HQs’ interests and requests; thus under-utilising 
the absorptive capacity of subsidiaries.   
 
There are other important findings. The scope of learning in subsidiaries is restricted 
by the scope of their operations, especially in human resources, sales and marketing. 
There is also dissonance between the intent to learn and the actions of learning, 
which arises from the majority of these Chinese MNCs not having formal and 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
1.1 Background  
 
As China’s economy rapidly develops, Chinese outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) is growing significantly; in particular with the push factor of Chinese 
government policies motivating domestic firms to invest overseas.  In 1999, the ‘Go 
Global Policy’ was initially announced, followed by a range of programmes under 
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade to encourage and support 
OFDI by Chinese companies.  Since 2004, three years after China acceded to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), indigenous firms have faced increasing 
competition from an influx of inward investment of many world leading firms, 
spurring the Chinese Government to issue a circular that can encourage domestic 
firms to establish overseas R&D centres and to utilise advanced internationally 
technologies, managerial skills and professionals. The government has also 
encouraged international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as a way of enhancing 
the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises and accelerate their entry 
into foreign markets (UNCTAD, 2006).  In late 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao formally 
announced: ‘The Chinese government encourages more enterprises to go global’ 
(Williamson and Raman, 2011), and the race to invest overseas began in earnest.   
 
According to MOFCOM in 2009, the annual OFDI flow by Chinese companies 
tripled from $ 5.5 billion in 2004 to $ 17.6 billion in 2006 and reached a peak of $ 50 
billion in 2009, and by the end of 2009, the cumulative stock of China’s OFDI 
reached $ 245.75 billion, making China the fifth largest OFDI investor worldwide.  
The number of overseas M&As made by Chinese firms also rose dramatically from 
40 in 2003 to 298 in 2008.  
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Europe has become the leading overseas investment destination for Chinese 
companies, accounting for 34% of all outbound M&A activity in 2011 (Back, 2012).  
As the number one gateway to Europe, UK has attracted FDI from 54 source 
countries, with China having the biggest project numbers among the emerging 
markets.  According to the World Bank Report ‘Doing Business 2011’, UK is the top 
easiest place in Europe and fourth easiest place in the world to do business.  An Ernst 
& Young European Attractiveness Survey 2011 reveals that UK is the most attractive 
destination for FDI.  Since Bank of China established its first overseas branch in 
London in 1929, UK has become one of the most attractive destinations for Chinese 
OFDI, and the statistics released by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
in 2009 show that the stock of Chinese OFDI in the UK ranked 17
th
 out of 177 
countries or territories (including Hong Kong and Macau).   
 
1.2 Motives for Chinese OFDI  
 
One of the main motives of these OFDI into the UK is strategic asset-seeking i.e. to 
seek advanced managerial skills, local talent and technology (Liu and Tian, 2008).  
In another words, learning new knowledge and experiences is a crucial reason for 
Chinese firms investing in the UK.  In order to discover the learning processes, it is 
important to firstly understand the pattern and motives of Chinese OFDI.  The 
resource-based view of the firm begins with the proposition that firms are not best 
viewed as land, labour and capital; rather they are social constructs of competences, 
contrived to commercially exploit knowledge.  From this perspective, what 
differentiates one firm from another and gives it strategic opportunity, is how it 
learns and exploits its learning.  
 
In addition to push motivations (i.e. Chinese government policy of Going Global), 
Buckley et al. (2008) suggest that Chinese OFDI is also driven by pull factors 
encapsulated in Dunning’s (1993 and 2000) four motivations of OFDI (i.e. natural 
 14 
 
resource-seeking, market-seeking, strategic asset-seeking and efficiency-seeking).   
Buckley et al.’s (2008) empirical results indicate that the motivation for China’s 
OFDI is explicable using at least one of the four categories.  Wu and Chen (2001) 
focus upon the geographical distribution of China’s OFDI suggesting that spatial 
distribution is mainly determined by the motives for internationalisation, for example 
the developed countries can provide Chinese OFDI with a favourable investment 
such as sound financial markets and consumer markets, highly developed technology, 
advanced management practices and superior infrastructure.   
 
It has been argued that one of the critical reasons for OFDI from emerging markets 
that invest in developed countries is to seek strategic assets i.e. to assimilate new 
knowledge, resources and capabilities (Deng, 2007).  Williamson and Raman (2011) 
support this argument by identifying the new approach of Chinese acquisition is 
looking for firms that have state-of-the-art technologies and global R&D facilities.  
Researchers have studied the nature of Chinese MNCs worldwide in terms of the 
development, motivations, overall benefits and performance (e.g. Wong and Chan, 
2003; Wu and Chen, 2001).  According to He and Lyles (2008), Chinese OFDI into 
the US develops the interplay between of China fever and China fear showing how 
the liability of foreignness has led to M&A bids being withdrawn (for example 
CNOOC’s offer for Unocal, Haier’s bid for Maytag and Huawei’s takeover bid for 
3Leaf) or delayed (like Lenovo’s bid for IBM PCs).  Under this circumstance, some 
Chinese MNCs look to other parts of the world.  For instance, when Huawei’s 
successive bids in the United State (including US server firm 3Leaf) were blocked by 
the Committee of Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) as a result of 
concerns about the national-security issues, from 2011 Huawei started to heavily 
invest in Europe and has planned to double its UK payroll to over 1,000 employees 




1.3 The Significance of This Research  
 
As China’s economy develops; research interests in Chinese MNCs’ increase, in 
particular whether Chinese OFDI follows the similar patterns to the earlier American 
and Japanese generations of OFDI.  It has been argued that one of the critical reasons 
for the OFDI from the emerging markets such as China, investing in the developed 
countries, is to assimilate new knowledge, resources and capabilities (Deng, 2007). 
However, there is little research about Chinese MNCs abroad and even less study on 
the processes of learning.  In order to fill this gap, this study collects the original 
evidence from the Chinese OFDI in the UK and their HQs.   
 
There are numerous researchers (e.g. Buckley et al., 2008; Luo et al., 2010; Peng, 
2012; Wong and Chan, 2003; Wu and Chen, 2001; Yiu, 2010) have studied the 
pattern of Chinese MNCs worldwide in particular the entry modes, motives, 
development, and performance.  There is little research about the Chinese MNCs 
investing in the UK.   As the sixth largest economy in the world, UK is recognized 
its world’s leading position in the field of creativity and innovation (including both 
commercial and academic R&D), which provides the Chinese OFDI with new 
knowledge and R&D opportunities (Liu and Tian, 2008).   In 2010, the flow of 
Chinese OFDI into the UK reached £1.36 billion ranking 4
th
 among the European 
countries (UKTI, 2012).   
 
This study investigates the attempt of Chinese companies to learn from UK practices, 
systems and technologies, to adopt these to create competitive advantages in Chinese, 
UK and other markets.  Buckley et al. (2008) have found that Chinese firms establish 
research-oriented subsidiaries in developed countries such as the US and UK to assist 
in development of high technology, knowledge intensive products manufactured at 
home.  In doing so, Chinese firms are subverting an international division of labour 
consigning them to low-cost manufacturing and instead aspiring to climb the ladder 
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of international value creation towards becoming a knowledge-based economy with 
the associated social benefits in terms of contributing to human welfare and enjoying 
high living standards.  
 
This thesis examines the pattern and motives of Chinese OFDI in the UK and 
explores how the subsidiaries learn knowledge, exploit knowledge, and develop 
capabilities and transfer knowledge and capabilities to the HQs.  The processes of 
learning and capabilities development are non-linear and give rise to qualitative and 
complex issues; therefore this research heavily upon inductive approach from 
generated research data.  Utilising Andersson, Forsgren and Holm’s (2001) work on 
the processes of competence development within a MNC, this thesis synthesises 
theories including the resource-based view of the firm, knowledge transfer, 
absorptive capacity and concepts including knowledge gaps, capabilities, motivations 
and psychic distance into an integrative conceptual framework (see figure 3.2) that is 
used to guide the empirical work and also to analyse the learning and capabilities 
development processes.   
 
All these processes, theories and concepts have been developed based on 
industrialised countries, and the extent to which these theoretical approaches and the 
synthesised framework are applicable to emerging markets such as China is 
insufficiently evidenced.  This study uses qualitative in-depth interview data to seek 
the evidence and eventually a revised framework (figure 8.1) is developed indicating 
the specific learning and capabilities development processes within Chinese MNCs.  
 
1.4 Research Questions  
 
As mentioned, there is little research about the Chinese MNCs investing in the UK, 
and even less study about learning and capabilities development undertaken by UK 
subsidiaries of Chinese firms.  Research (e.g. Andersson, Forsgren and Holm, 2002; 
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Teigland and Wasko, 2009) on learning and capabilities development undertaken by 
subsidiaries focuses on measuring the relationships between learning, capabilities 
development and relative influencers, neglects the processes on how learning occurs 
and capabilities are created.  Chinese and host country policy-makers and business 
strategists will wish to know the exact pattern of Chinese OFDI in the UK, and how 
capabilities are developed within UK subsidiaries.  This research explores these 
issues through four research questions.   
 
The motivation for this study is the desire to fill a gap in knowledge about how 
capabilities relating to learning are created in Chinese subsidiaries, and also to 
develop a theoretical framework that explains how learning occurs and capabilities 
developed in the subsidiaries.  According to Winter (2000: 983), an organisational 
capability is ‘a high level of routine that, together with its implementing input flows, 
confers upon an organisation’s management a set of decision options for producing 
significant outputs of a particular type’.  This study examines what Grant (1996b) 
termed task-specific capabilities and/or broad functional capabilities such as 
operation capability, marketing capability and HRM capability.  In order to explore 
the learning and capabilities development, it is essential to ensure the learning occurs 
in the UK-based Chinese firms.   
 
Given the very limited research (Liu and Tian (2008) being an example) about 
Chinese OFDI into the UK, the author needed to identify the existence of learning 
herself; therefore another objective is added into this study.  Therefore, this research 
does not begin by assuming that Chinese OFDI firms are learning from being located 
in the UK, but begins by seeking evidence that learning is occurring and only then 
look at why and how the learning is taking place and with what impacts on the 




The two research objectives and four concrete research questions are presented in 
table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1：Research Questions and Objectives 
 
Objectives Research Questions 
1. To identify and investigate the 
characteristics and motivations of 
Chinese OFDI in the UK, aiming 
to build foundation stones for the 
second objective.  
 
1. What is the pattern and main motivations of Chinese 
OFDI in the UK? 
2. To explore and examine the 
learning processes and 
capabilities development in 
Chinese MNCs in the UK.  
 
2. How does the learning occur in Chinese MNC’ 
subsidiaries in the UK? 
3. How do UK subsidiaries exploit learning and develop 
capabilities? 
4. How do UK subsidiaries transfer the knowledge and 
developed capabilities to the HQs? 
 
The research questions (shown in table 1.1) began by exploring the pattern of 
Chinese OFDI in the UK.  The first research question and its answer are fundamental 
to the subsequent three research questions, because it is essential to understand the 
nature of Chinese OFDI before the processes of learning are explored.  The survey 
result reveals that seeking the knowledge mainly on marketing and management is 
one of the major motivations.  This result emphasises Deng (2007) and Williamson 
and Raman’s (2011) argument of Chinese OFDI’s knowledge seeking motivation.   
 
The second research question concerns how the learning occurs in Chinese MNC’s 
subsidiaries in the UK.  The approach is processual: centring on managers and staff 
as cross-cultural learners, both as individuals and as actors at an organisational level.  
The activity of learning in organisations tends to be purposive (to commercial goal) 
and not haphazard; learning is often aligned with expectations of enhancing 
competitive advantage; therefore it is important to look at how UK subsidiaries 
exploit learning and develop capabilities.  The particular interest is in how the 
 19 
 
subsidiaries create new knowledge and develop capabilities through exploitation of 
individual learning and knowledge.   
 
In their recent study about China’s global acquisition, Williamson and Raman (2011) 
identify that Chinese MNCs use overseas resources to strengthen the firms’ 
competitive positions in the domestic market rather than in foreign market.  Their 
claim emphasises the significance of the last research question, how do UK 
subsidiaries transfer the knowledge and developed capabilities to the HQs?  There 
are no single yes or no answers; each of these research questions requires a multi-
layered answer.  These answers involve reviewing appropriate literature, referencing 
empirical data and constructing a conceptual framework to enable a full analysis.  
 
1.5 The Structure of This Thesis 
 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters, with three appendices providing 
supplementary materials (i.e. company list, questionnaire sample, and interview 
schedule).  The structure is shown in Table 1.2. 
 
The research objectives and questions are outlined in chapter one.  Chapter two is the 
first part of literature review section, which establishes a theoretical foundation for 
Chinese OFDI in the UK.  It analyses the three main theoretical frameworks (i.e. 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, Uppsala model and Mathews’ leverage-linkage-
learning framework) used to understand international business activities i.e. changing 
international and domestic drivers of internationalisation and patterns of OFDI (such 
as size, sector, entry mode, etc.), motivations, and the relationship between the HQs 
and the subsidiary.  Chapter three is the second part of literature review section and 
establishes a theoretical evidence for the processes of learning and capabilities 
development within MNCs.  The argument is based on the resource-based view of 
the firm, highlighting the MNCs’ absorptive capacity in learning and knowledge 
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transfer from both the internal (the HQs) and external networks (competitors, 
customers, consultants, local communities, etc.) in the UK to develop the firms’ 
capabilities.  It concludes with a conceptual framework (figure 3.2) that guides the 
qualitative data collection and is also used to analyse the empirical findings.   
 
Table 1.2：Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter Chapter Content 
Introduction  1.  Background information, the significance of the research, 
research objectives and questions, and the structure of the thesis. 
Literature Review 2. Literature review on Chinese OFDI 
3. Literature review on learning and capabilities development in 
MNCs 




5. Survey findings and analysis on the pattern and motivations of 
Chinese OFDI, discuss the findings with the literature to address 
research question one. 
6 Interview findings on learning and capabilities development in 
Chinese MNCs 
7. A full analysis on interview findings, discuss the findings with 
the literature to address research questions two, three and four. 
Conclusion  8. Evaluation of the study, summary of findings, answers to 
research questions, a revised framework, theoretical and 
empirical contributions, future research, and implications for 
management practices and policy. 
 
The methodology is presented in chapter four.  Chapter five is to address research 
question one through presenting and analysing the survey results from the 30 
respondents of Chinese OFDI in the UK.  Chapter six presents the qualitative data 
from empirical work in 15 subsidiaries and seven HQs.  
 
Guided by the conceptual framework (figure 3.2), it commences with identifying 
knowledge gaps, followed by Chinese subsidiaries learning from internal and 
external networks, emphasising capabilities development in the subsidiaries and 
knowledge transfer from the subsidiaries to the HQs.  In chapter seven, the interview 
data is analysed the findings are discussed in relation to the general literature and 
conceptual framework, and also answer the research question two, three and four. 
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Chapter eight begins with evaluation of the study, followed by summary of findings, 
answers to research questions, a revised conceptual framework (figure 8.1) that 
represents learning processes in Chinese MNCs. Additionally, theoretical and 
empirical contributions, future research, and implications for management practices 




Chapter Two: Literature Review - Chinese Outward 
Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) 
 
The literature review is in two chapters.  This is the first part analyses literature on 
Chinese OFDI, establishing the fundamental context for the review of a second field 
of literature relating to learning and capabilities development in MNCs.  This study 
adopts Luo and Tung’s (2007) definition of MNCs, looking at China-based 
international companies which ‘are engaged in outward FDI, where they exercise 
effective control and undertake value-adding activities in one or more foreign 
countries’, using this definition to mean subsidiaries of Chinese MNCs of overseas, 
the definition excludes joint-ventures (JVs) minority-owned by Chinese firms, 
Chinese trading companies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose roles are 
entirely to pursue political objectives designated by the Chinese government are 
excluded.  In this chapter, the applicability of the existing theories of OFDI is 
evaluated and the argument supports the resource-based view of the firms.  The 
following chapter explores the processes of MNCs creating (and/or reshaping) their 
capabilities in particular using knowledge flows between headquarters and 
subsidiaries and active learning by subsidiaries, placing learning at the centre of 




Relative to first generation OFDI players (principally from the US, Japan and EU), 
later OFDIs, also called latecomers by Mathews (2002a and 2002b), face different 
+domestic and international environment.  Patterns of OFDI have resulted in sets of 
institutional arrangements (e.g. finance, IP law, WTO regulations) established by and 
resulting from the activities of the first generation OFDI players.  In reviewing 
general frameworks about OFDI, it has been found that Dunning’s (e.g. 1980, 1988, 
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2000) eclectic paradigm (or OLI model) and Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) are less relevant to later generation 
OFDI since institutional arrangements have already been established and investing 
outwardly from emerging economies involves quite different processes and outcome 
targets than investing from developed economies.  The OLI model also underplays 
the importance of the state in supporting OFDI; for example in China’s case, 
government policy (for example ‘Go Global Policy’) and support for OFDI are 
crucial.   
 
In contrast, Mathew’s (2002a and 2002b) linkage, leverage, and learning (LLL) 
framework, better conceptualises OFDI from the perspective of late OFDI actors, 
however, it alone is inadequate to explain China’s OFDI.  This chapter begins with a 
country-level perspective of OFDI, followed by the current country-level evidence of 
OFDI from China, then a firm-level perspective of the internationalization processes 
and the evidence, finally the conclusion stresses the importance of learning in 
Chinese MNCs.  
 
2.2 Outward Foreign Direct Investment: a Country-level Perspective 
 
2.2.1 Dunning’s Eclectic (or OLI) Paradigm 
Classically, internationalisation theory argues that, OFDI presents companies with 
the opportunity to exploit the sunk costs of R&D or operational capacity by 
extending the organisation’s reach into foreign markets (Buckley and Casson 1976; 
Rugman and Verbeke 1992).  This eclectic paradigm was first introduced by 
Dunning in 1976 at a presentation to a Nobel Symposium in Stockholm on ‘The 
International Allocation of Economic Activity’.  Dunning (1980; 1988; and 2001) 
stated that internationalisation processes are determined by the configuration of three 
sets of advantages: ownership advantages (i.e. a firm’s competitive advantages 
 24 
 
should overweigh the disadvantages faced in the host country), location advantages 
(i.e. the advantages of the host country as a location are sufficiently attractive to a 
firm to invest its ownership advantages rather than to sell the advantages to the local 
firms) and internalisation advantages (i.e. internalisation of ownership and location 
advantages).  In last three decades, Dunning continued to revise the OLI framework, 
altering it from addressing static strategy tripod (Dunning, 1977) towards 
conceptualising dynamic competitiveness and the upgrading of core competencies 
(Dunning, 1995, 1998 and 2000). 
 
Dunning (1981a) developed a stages theory of investment development path (IDP) 
adding to internalisation (I) two further theoretical parameters location advantages 
(L) and ownership advantages (O) to constitute his OLI eclectic paradigm, 
explaining that following the country’s economy development, the conditions for 
domestic and foreign firms alter, affecting the flows of inward and outward FDI. 
According to Dunning’s IDP theory, a country’s investment development evolves 
through five stages (Dunning, 1981a, 1981b, 1986; Dunning and Narula, 1996, 
Buckley and Castro, 1998).  
 
According to Dunning and Narula (1996) and Buckley and Castro (1998), at the first 
stage, inward and outward FDI flows are almost negligible because the country’s 
economy is underdeveloped with small domestic market and inadequate 
infrastructure.  At the second stage, as the country’s economy develops the domestic 
market attracts more inward FDI, however its outward FDI flow remains little 
because domestic firms lack ownership advantages.  At the third stage, the domestic 
firms develop ownership advantages and become more competitive, outward FDI 
begins increasing eventually overtaking inward FDI.  The fourth stage is deepening 
the trends of third stage because both location and ownership advantages are 
superior.  The fifth stage corresponds to today’s situation in the leading developed 
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countries with permanently high stocks of both inward and outward FDIs.  In 
response to criticisms of economic determinism, Dunning later (1995 and 2000) 
revised his model to include human capital investment.   
 
To what extent this stage theory is applicable to the developing countries is criticised 
by several researchers (such as Kuada and Sorensen, 2000; Syetlicic, 2003), for 
example, Svetlicic (2003) has discovered that some leapfrogging MNCs especially 
from the transition countries have experienced an accelerated investment 
development rather than followed exactly the predicted sequence.  Stoian’s (2012) 
study of the domestic institutional determinants in explaining OFDI supports 
Dunning’s Investment Development Path’s (IDP) main propositions, whilst pointing 
out deficiencies in the IDP framework such as importance of accounting for home 
country institutional factors.  Gao, Liu and Zou’s (2012) empirical study provides 
support to Dunning’s IDP framework in terms of China’s OFDI as positively 
influenced by its domestic economy growth.  However, Gao, Liu and Zou (2012) 
have identified another weakness in Dunning’s IDP, the impact of human mobility 
on China’s OFDI, citing studies by Filatotchev et al., (2011) and Jean, Tan and 
Sinkovics, (2011), which find that human mobility has significantly influenced the 
knowledge dissemination cross borders between OECD countries and emerging 
economies like China.   
 
Gao, Liu and Zou’s (2012) conclusion is that ‘the ownership advantages of Chinese 
are based more on financial capacity than knowledge assets’.  Barnard (2010) and 
Peng (2012) support their statement pointing out that amongst the challenges faced 
by Chinese MNCs investing overseas is in the absence of superior technology and 
management capabilities.  It is found that the technologies in Chinese semiconductor 
wafer industry are ‘at least two generations behind those of Taiwan, the United 
States, Japan, and South Korea’ (BusinessWeek, 2009:42).  Some empirical research 
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(e.g. Buckley and Castro, 1998; Dunning and Narula, 1996) supports Dunning’s IDP 
in terms of a country’s OFDI is strongly associated to the level of its economic 
development, however, Gao, Liu and Zou (2012) also point out that a country’ 
economic development (nominal GDP) alone is inadequate to address OFDI.   
 
Though Dunning’s OLI model is widely used to explain internationalisation 
processes, it neglects the specific institutional issues of emerging economies, 
underplays the impact of human mobility on the development of OFDI, and is unable 
to explain the (technological/market) leapfrogging phenomenon by some MNCs 
from emerging markets.  Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that without significant 
amendments, Dunning’s (2000) framework cannot simply to be applied as a 
framework with which to analyse the internationalisation of firms from emerging 
markets.  In particular MNCs from emerging not developed markets, characterised 
by technological inferiority rather than superiority do not readily align with 
Dunning’s OLI theory.    
2.2.2 Motivations of Chinese OFDI  
Push Explanations of Chinese OFDI motivation 
 
China continues to save some 50% of its GDP, far higher than other countries 
(Kuijus 2006), in particular SOEs are dividend-averse.  Since 2007, the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission has dictated that profitable companies paying 
below 20% of net profits dividends are ineligible to seek refinancing; therefore many 
companies have announced dividends precisely equal to 20% (Witt and Lewin 2007).  
Most SOE directors continue to be appointed by the PRC Communist Party 
Organisational Department (Schipani and Liu, 2002).  Nevertheless, high savings 
rates and stocks are a push factor in seeking profitable investment outlets abroad, 
since some two-thirds of domestic company equity remains non-tradable.  The 
alternative to capital export is often corporate feather bedding, disguised 
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unemployment or corruption.  Distortion in China’s capital markets mean that its 
four large state-owned banks (Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of China), which hold over 
half of all bank deposits, make most of their loans to SOEs and government agencies.  
As Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) point out, much of the small and medium-sized 
(SME) business start-up and development is funded by private loans and informal 
capital, unsurprisingly obtaining higher returns on capital invested (as Dollar and 
Wei (2007) show) than SOEs.   
 
A survey conducted by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and the China Council 
for the Promotion of International Trade shows that The Going Out Policy has 
contributed to Chinese firms’ overseas investment and is the second most important 
motivation for the Chinese OFDI (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2005).  Since 
1997, Chinese state policy has encouraged OFDI (Lei, 2000; Lü, 2000 and Zang, 
2000) using M&As or JVs to secure extended markets, circumvent tariff barriers or 
quotas and to secure the knowledge and technologies necessary to compete with 
inward FDIs at home.  Instead of pursuing communist ideology, China’s government 
aims to provide employment and rising living standards using market solutions (Li 
and Deng, 2000).  Policies promoting OFDI are translated into preferential interest 
rates on bank facilities (Yang and Wu, 2000); special permissions to retain earning 
from OFDIs (Nie, 2000) and a flurry of inter-governmental investment protection 
agreements. 
 
Pull Explanations of Chinese OFDI motivation 
Lei (2000) argue that Chinese companies are better at finance, operations and 
continuous improvement than product innovation, marketing/branding and human 
resource management.  Additionally, Child and Rodrigues (2005) also emphasise the 
ownership advantages of Chinese firms in finance and through using financial 
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strength to secure other ownership advantages by purchase and associated 
opportunities to learn.  Kuada and Sorensen (2000) argue that OFDI provides 
emerging market companies with access to the soft management skills and company 
competences (design, HR, R&D, marketing and brand exploitation) appear 
particularly apposite in China’s case.  In summary, pull motivations for Chinese 
OFDI (see Wu and Chen 2001) include: natural resources, technology transfer, 
management experience, access to funding and market access.   
 
Buckley et al. (2008) suggest that Chinese OFDI is also driven by Dunning’s (1993 
and 2000) four basic motives, namely natural resource-seeking (i.e. to gain access to 
natural resources such as minerals, agricultural products and unskilled labour), 
market-seeking (i.e. to satisfy a particular foreign market or set of foreign markets), 
efficiency-seeking (i.e. to promote a more efficient division of labour or 
specialization of an existing portfolio of foreign and domestic assets by MNCs), and 
strategic asset-seeking motives (i.e. to protect or augment the existing ownership 
specific advantages of the investing firms, for those latecomer firms who have 
ownership disadvantages is to gain access to foreign-owned assets, both tangible like 
technological equipment and machinery and intangible such as information and 
knowledge).  
 
Some recently successful overseas M&As like Chinalco’s acquisition in Peru and 
CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen (see table 2.1) are examples showing Chinese firms 
seeking minerals, oil and other raw resources. Some studies about Chinese 
internationalisation (Buckley et al., 2008; 2007; Deng, 2004; Taylor, 2002; Zhang, 
2003) find the increase of market-seeking OFDI is the result of policy liberalisation 
in China.  Liu and Tian (2008) also find that market-seeking is the major motive for 
Chinese OFDI into the UK.  Strategic asset-seeking occurs when OFDI acquires 
advanced technology, managerial skills, brand names, local talents, etc. from the host 
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countries in order to gain competitive advantages (Buckley, 2008; Dunning, 1993).  
Scholars like Buckley et al. (2007 and 2008) have witnessed an increase of China’s 
OFDI in strategic asset-seeking.  Liu and Tian (2008) also find that local talents and 
advanced management skills seeking are the major motivations for Chinese OFDI in 
the UK, with efficiency-seeking and resource-seeking being the least important 
motivations.  Efficiency-seeking indicates OFDI seek for low cost locations, 
however, given the current domestic market situations, this factor is less important 
(Buckley et al., 2008).  
 
Table 2.1: Examples of Recent Chinese OFDI 
 
Year Value  
($ bn) 
Chinese company Product Target 
2002 $0.08.2 TCL Electronics Schneider Electronics, 
Germany 
2003 $2 Chinese Netcome Teleco PCCW, Hong-Kong mobile 
operator 
2003  TCL (Lenovo)  Thompson chip manufacturer 
2003 0.380 BOE Technology PC monitors Hydis Semiconductor, Korea 
2003 n.a Shanghai Electric Machinery Akiyama Publishing 
Machinery, Japan 
2005  TCL (Lenovo)  IBM’s PC division 
2008  Zoomlion  CIFA (Italian construction 
equipment manufacturer, 
takeover) 
2009  Sichuan Tengzhong Heavy 
Industrial Machinery 
Company 
 Hummer (GM’s off-road 
vehicle division) 
2009 $19.5 Chinalco  Australia’s Rio Tinto (18% 
share) 
2009 $1.7 Minmetals  Oz Mineral takeover 
2009 $2.2 Chinalco Copper mine Mine and logistics 
development in Peru 
2009 $10 China Development Bank 
and Sinopec (Oil) 
Refined oil Petrobras (Brasilian Oil 
Company) 
2011 $1.7 Sinopec Refined oil Australia’s APLNG 
(15% share) 
2011 $2.1 ChemChina Chemical 
products 
Elkem from OrklaASA 
2012 $15.1 CNOOC Offshore oil Nexen, Canada 





This section has investigated the applicability of Dunning’s eclectic/OLI paradigm 
(e.g. 1980; 1988; 2000) to explain Chinese OFDI.  The analysis indicates that 
Dunning’s IDP model has been criticised for its western-focus and the inability to 
explain the leapfrogging investment of Chinese firms.  Dunning’s (1993 and 2000) 
four categories of motives emphasise the pull factors of Chinese OFDI’s motivation, 
however it underestimates the importance of the specific institutional factors and 
human mobility in explaining Chinese OFDI.  Therefore, Dunning’s OLI model can 
only partly address the OFDI from China. 
 
2.3 Outward Direct Investment from China: Current Country-level Evidence 
 
2.3.1 Is China’s OFDI Unexpected? 
Rapid growth in Chinese exports (the top thirty companies grew exports by 300% 
between 1994 and 1998) compared with the more modest (117%) expansion in home 
sales (Schlevogt 2000), led an early group of commentators to predict that Chinese 
business growth would not follow earlier patterns of capital export, but rather one 
confined to product internationalisation.  Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel (1988) argued 
that Chinese internationalisation was confined to contract manufacturing and 
unlikely to create the branded goods capable of competing in developed economy 
markets; a theme supported by Leonidou and Katsikeas (1996) who argued that the 
institutional setting in China was not capable of creating the strong home base 
(Porter’s 1990) from which capital exports would flow. Young, Huang and 
McDermott’s (1996) study of major Chinese companies also concluded that OFDI 
was unlikely to significantly replace product export growth.  In an even later paper, 
Hussain and Jian (1999) continued to argue that Chinese OFDI would remain 
insignificant, citing state control over capital export institutional arrangements.  As 
late as 2002, Brouthers and Xu repeated the argument that a high growth in Chinese 
OFDI is unexpected for reasons of institutional barriers and inability to shift from a 
cost to differentiation strategy; in their case citing successful examples in the same 
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paper (Konka’s manufacturing of televisions in India and Haier’s production of 
washing machines in Europe).   
 
Just as China’s trading size and patterns have altered in the last ten years (Economist 
2007) so too is its OFDI patterns.  Despite the significant growth of China’s OFDI in 
terms of flows and stock, Nolan (2012) points out nevertheless by size China has 
many large companies, China has not yet developed competitive national champion 
MNCs with leading global technologies and brands.  Yet, large and innovative 
Chinese companies have increasing brand recognition and equity.  Examples include 
Huawei (increasingly found in telecommunications infrastructure, Lenovo laptops 
and companies such as Sinopec and China National Petroleum found in oil and gas 
projects worldwide).   
 
Table 2.2 places China’s OFDI in perspective, showing that it remains a small 
fraction of total flows and stock of FDI (3.8% and 1.7%) in 2011, however, it is 
rising at a faster rate than other emerging economies.  Figure 2.1 shows that Chinese 
OFDI flow grew slowly with two peaks in 1993 and 2001 before beginning rising 
dramatically from 2004 (US$5.5 billion) to 2011 (more than US$65 billion). 
 
Annual flows of China’s OFDI was only US$0.8 billion in 1990, rose to US$5.5 
billion in 2004 (Buckley, et al., 2008), then dramatically grew before reaching the 
peak point US$65.1billion in 2011 (MOFCOM. 2012; UNCTAD, 2012).  Figure 2.1 
graphically illustrates this trend of Chinese OFDI flows in last three decades.  In 
2006, Chinese OFDI stock remains 0.7% of total FDI and its flow at 2.3% of total 
flows (Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 2008:339), however, both flows and stock are rising 





Table 2.2: Comparison of OFDI between countries 
 
Comparison of outward FDI across countries (US$ billion) 




2008 2009 2010 2011 
Global Outward FDI 1500.5 1969.3 1175.1 1451.4 1694.4 
China OFDI total 18.6 52.2 56.5 68.8 65.1 
China OFDI % of global 1.2% 2.7% 4.8% 4.7% 3.8% 
Developed country OFDI      
Japan 56.5 128 74.7 56.3 114.4 
UK 146.5 161.1 44.4 39.5 107.1 
US 211 308.3 267 304.4 396.7 
Developing countries OFDI      
Brazil 12.6 20.5 -10 11.5 n/a 
India 12.3 19.3 15.9 13.2 14.8 
South Korea 12.4 20.3 17.2 23.3 20.4 
Singapore 22.4 6.8 17.7 21.2 25.2 
Russia 27.3 55.6 43.7 52.5 67.3 
Comparison of outward FDI across countries (US$ billion) 
 Stock of OFDI  
 1995 2000 2009 2010 2011 
Global Outward FDI 3790.1 7952.9 19325.7 20864.8 21168.5 
China OFDI total 17.8 27. 8 229.6 298.4 366 
China OFDI % of global 0.5% 0.3% 1.2% 1.4% 1.7% 
Developed country OFDI      
Japan 238.5 278.4 740.9 831.1 962.8 
UK 304.9 897.8 1674 1626.9 1731.1 
US 1363.8 2694 4287.2 4766.7 4500 
Developing countries OFDI      
Brazil 44.5 51.9 164.5 180.9 n/a 
India 0.5 1.7 80.8 96.4 111.3 
South Korea 10.2 21.5 120.4 139 159.3 
Singapore 35.1 56.8 267.9 317.9 339.1 
Russia 3.3 20.1 306.5 366.3 362.1 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), China Ministry 





Figure 2.1: Chinese OFDI Flows 




2.3.2 Chinese OFDI into the UK 
As the world’s sixth-largest economic entity (measured by nominal GDP) as well as 
a gateway to the European market, UK has maintained its strong competitive 
advantage in attracting foreign investment.  In 2010, it ranked the seventh largest 
recipient with FDI inflows of US$46 billion (UNCTAD 2011).  In the same year, the 
flow of China’s OFDI into the UK was £1.36billion ranking 4
th
 among EU market 
(UKTI, 2012).  According to table 2.3, although the stock of China’s OFDI in the 
UK was only $1.36billion; it increased 17 times from 2003 to 2010.  Since the Bank 
of China initially established its first overseas branch in London in 1929, the number 
of Chinese companies investing in the UK had risen to over 300 by 2009 (UKTI 


























Table 2.3: Stock of China’s OFDI across Countries 
 
Stock of China’s OFDI across Countries (US$ billion) 
Countries/Regions 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total  33.22 44.78 57.21 75.03 117.91 184.97 245.76 317.2 
Asia 26.60 33.48 40.95 47.98 79.22 131.32 185.55 228.1 
Hong Kong 24.63 30.39 36.51 42.27 68.78 115.85 164.50 199.06 
Macau 0.45 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.91 1.56 1.84 2.23 
Indonesia 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.23 0.68 0.54 0.80 1.15 
Japan 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.56 0.51 0.69 1.11 
Philippines 0.009 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.39 
Africa 0.49 0.90 1.60 2.56 4.46 7.80 9.33 13.04 
Europe 0.49 0.68 1.27 2.27 4.46 5.13 8.68 15.71 
Russia 0.06 0.12 0.47 0.93 1.42 1.84 2.22 2.79 
Germany 0.08 0.13 0.27 0.47 0.85 0.85 1.08 1.50 
UK 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.95 0.84 1.03 1.36 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
4.62 8.27 11.47 19.69 24.70 32.24 30.60 43.88 
Virgin Islands (UK) 0.53 1.09 1.98 4.75 6.63 10.48 15.06 23.24 
North America 0.55 0.91 1.26 1.59 3.24 3.66 5.18 7.83 
US 0.50 0.67 0.82 1.24 1.88 2.39 3.34 4.87 
Canada 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.14 1.25 1.27 1.67 2.60 
Oceania 0.47 0.54 0.65 0.94 1.83 3.82 6.42 8.61 
Australia 0.42 0.49 0.59 0.79 1.44 3.36 5.86 7.87 
 
Source: MOFCOM, 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
Numerous papers comment on overall levels of Chinese OFDI into the UK: Young et 
al. (1998), Deng (2004) and Morck, Yeung and Zhao (2008) being examples.  Only 
one piece of academic work (Liu and Tian, 2008) investigates these companies using 
an emailed questionnaire, responded to by twenty Chinese companies investigating 
motivations to internationalise.  The survey found that 45% were in logistics or 
financial services, 25% relate to engineering or textile; all were wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of large companies and entry motivations were market-seeking i.e. 
access UK and EU markets, and strategic asset-seeking i.e. to seek advanced 




2.3.3 Domestic Institutional Change Supporting Chinese OFDI 
In the past three decades, China’s OFDI has experienced a rapid growth from 
complete insignificance to today raising such a controversial question: ‘Is China 
buying the world?’ (Nolan, 2012).  One prominent reason being argued widely is the 
crucial role played by the Chinese government (Buckley et al., 2008), just as Nolan 
(2001:193) suggesting, ‘without continued state support they were most unlikely to 
be able to build on their considerable entrepreneurial achievements, and mount a 
serious challenge to the global giants in their respective sectors’.  Therefore, in order 
to understand China’s OFDI, the primary task is to explore the domestic institutional 
environment and policies change over the last three decades.    
 
Dunning’s (e.g. 1988) OLI framework, even the adjusted model taking account of 
human capital issues (Dunning, 1995 and 2000) pays little attention to the 
institutional environment in which firms operate.  Historical surveys (Mokyr 1990; 
North 1990; and Landes 1998) each emphasise the inter-relationship between firms, 
markets and institutions in explaining China’s economic development.  Recent 
studies of national systems of innovation emphasise the difference to economic 
development made by differing sets of institutional arrangements (Freeman and 
Perez 1988; and Porter 1990).   
 
Chinese government worrying about the loss of state assets over SOEs reform is 
another reason of encouraging SOEs internationalisation (Luo et al., 2010).  The 
government changed foreign exchange policy from ‘earn to use’ to ‘buy to use’ 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2010).  The introduction of a document termed 
‘Measures of Capital Support for Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises to Develop 
International Markets’ officially motivated SMEs to go global (Luo et al., 2010).  
Phase III (2001 – present), in 1999, the Chinese government announced a new ‘Go 
Out Policy’ (also referred to as the Going Global Strategy, a new policy launched in 
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1999, aiming to promote international trade and to encourage and support Chinese 
OFDI.) launching a range of programmes under the China Council for the Promotion 
of International Trade to encourage and support OFDI by Chinese companies.  For 
example, in October 2004, the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) and the Export-Import Bank of China (EIBC) jointly issued a circular to 
promote overseas investment in specific areas:  
‘(i) resource exploration projects to mitigate the domestic shortage of 
natural resources; (ii) projects that promote the export of domestic 
technologies, products, equipment and labour; (iii) overseas R&D centres to 
utilize internationally advanced technologies, managerial skills and 
professionals; and (iv) M&As that could enhance the international 
competitiveness of Chinese enterprises and accelerate their entry into 
foreign markets.’ 
Amongst the reasons cited for this policy change were exploiting WTO membership: 
increasing competitiveness in order to reshape the impact of inward FDI on China’s 
economic growth and shifting from contract manufacturing towards own-label 
branding.  At this stage, Chinese government revoked the quota of OFDI purchasing 
foreign exchange, moved its focus from amount to performance with regulations 
monitoring OFDI’s performance, and changed its role from regulating to supporting 
OFDI (Luo et al., 2010).  By 2010, Chinese OFDI reached a stock of US$317 billion 
and an annual flow of nearly US$70 billion (see table 2.2 and figure 2.1).   
 
2.3.4 Geographic and Sector Distribution 
Wu and Chen (2001) thoroughly elaborate the geographical distribution of China’s 
OFDI in a study about an assessment of China’s OFDI, a conclusion could be drawn 
from their analysis is that three factors shape the geographic distribution of Chinese 
OFDI. First, Chinese OFDI seeks natural resources and is therefore drawn to 
resource-rich countries, from 2003 to 2010 stock rising by 46 times in Russia, by 26 
times in Africa, by 18 times in Australia and by 9 times in Latin America & 
Caribbean (see table 2.3).  Second, Chinese OFDI seeks advanced technologies, 
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R&D and design knowledge and advanced managerial skills; and is therefore drawn 
to developed economies (see table 2.3, from 2003 to 2010 stock going up by 17 
times in the UK and by almost 10 times in US).  An empirical study conducted by 
Wong and Chan (2003) shows some 40% of Chinese OFDI (by value) is in 
developed economies in 2001.   
 
However, He and Lyles’ (2008) study of Chinese OFDI into the USA develops the 
interplay between of China fever and China fear showing how the liability of 
foreignness has led to M&A bids being withdrawn (CNOOC’s offer for Unocal and 
Haier’s bid for Maytag) or delayed (Lenovo’s bid for IBM PCs). Liability of 
foreignness is broadly defined as ‘all additional costs a firm operating in a market 
overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur’ (Zaheer, 1995).  They also refer to 
the industrial relations difficulties at Haier’s Carolina plant.  Third, with lower 
logistics and entry costs and psychic distance Chinese OFDI is drawn to its East 
Asian neighbours (figure 2.3 showing the stock from 2003 to 2010 rising by 23 times 
in Indonesia and by almost 44 times in the Philippines).  
 
Taylor (2002) suggests that 60% of Chinese OFDI (by numbers not value) is in 
(often trading) services, 19% in resources and 11% in manufacturing.  Growth in 
manufacturing is now most pronounced exampled by Haier in the US, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Malaysia.  Liu, Buck and Shu (2005) cite Chinese sources suggesting 
that 57% of OFDI is in trade and services, 22% manufacturing and 18% resources.  
Deng (2007) identifies what may prove to be an interesting trend: Chinese OFDI into 
R&D and design facilities citing Galanz (from Shunde) $20 million R&D labour in 
Seattle; Huawei’s $1 billion investment in over ten R&D labs in Bangalore and other 
sites and Huawei’s JV with 3Com in a Hong Kong R&D lab.  Chinese companies 
have acquired R&D facilities from IBM (Lenovo), France’s Sagem and Korea’s LG 
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(Ningbo Bird Co).  It is not clear whether any of the OFDI into the UK similarly 
targets R&D and design assets and capability.  
2.3.5 State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
Some scholars (e.g. Buckley et al., 2008) suggest that a large amount of Chinese 
SOEs are involved in OFDI is the result of the government polices’ influence in 
Chinese OFDI.  Deng Xiaoping’s landmark journey to the South in 1992 
strengthened the liberal politicians in China’s Communist Party (CCP) and 
bureaucrats in government agencies (Buckley et al., 2007).  After containing 
inflation in the early 1990s, the Chinese government encountered difficulty of 
implementing reforms among SOEs (Luo et al., 2011).  Under this circumstance, 
Zhu Rongji, the premier during 1998–2002 set up the guidelines of China’s SOEs 
reform with the purpose to ‘seize the big and free the small’, as a result, a group of 
national monopolies emerged, such as China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), China Cereals, Oils and Foods Company (COFCO), and China 
Minmetals Corp (Luo et al., 2010).  
 
SOEs with national monopolies became the most common of Chinese OFDI 
enterprises, and because they lacked strict limitations in the light industry (e.g., 
textiles, machinery, and electrical equipment), were encouraged to globalise in this 
period (Wong & Chan, 2003).  Cai (1999) also finds that most OFDI firms remain 
SOEs and their preferred model in manufacturing and resource projects is JV, since 
this circumvents local opposition and binds in local management expertise.  In 
services, 60% of OFDIs, the preferred model is wholly Chinese ownership.   
Similarly, Liu and Tian (2008) also find that nearly 60% of the subsidiaries in the 
UK are wholly owned.  In the case of resources, Cai (1999) cites three oil-related 
JVs with Kazakhstan, resource extracting and processing are often associated with 
major infrastructure development projects.  This model applies to resource-related 
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projects in South America: the Economist (2009) cites a JV with Brazil’s Petrobras 
oil company though direct acquisition (e.g. Venezuela’s YPF oil by CNOOC). 
2.3.6 Summary 
In summary, though Chinese OFDI has been considered as insignificant by many 
researchers over years, it has recently been raised significantly.  The increase mainly 
attributes to the policy support of Chinese government that particularly favours the 
internationalisation of the SOEs.  Chinese OFDI is scattered worldwide and 
geographic distribution of is apparently driven by its motives (i.e. resource-seeking, 
market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic asset-seeking).  
 
 
2.4 The Process of Internationalisation: a Firm-level Perspective 
 
2.4.1 The Uppsala Model 
An alternative perspective, the Uppsala model, was considered by Dunning (2001) as 
a useful addition to his eclectic paradigm, developed partly in response to the 
deterministic critique of Dunning by group of Scandinavian researchers (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) who studied the 
internationalisation process of a group of Swedish firms and used Beckerman’s 
(1956) idea of psychic distance to explain foreign investment patterns, Uppsala 
model suggested that a firm should begin internationalisation with entering an 
overseas market that it was most familiar with and simultaneously strengthened 
knowledge, and then moved on to less familiar markets.   
 
Assuming the internationalisation is an development path of absorbing knowledge 
and resources, Johanson and Wiedersheim (1975) divided a firm’s 
internationalisation process into four stages:  ‘1. no regular export activities; 2. 
export via independent representatives (agent); 3. sales subsidiary and 4. 
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production/manufacturing’, the latter three phases are claimed to be dependent on the 
level of the incremental increase of knowledge and the development of the 
organisational structure.  The definition of psychic distance in the original Johanson 
and Vahlne’s (1977:24) study was ‘the sum of factors (such as differences in 
language, education, culture and business practices) preventing the flow of 
information from and to the market’; later this definition was updated from a more 
learning perspective by Nordstrom and Vahlne (1992:3) as ‘factors preventing or 
disturbing firms’ learning about and understanding of a foreign environment’.    
 
Kogut and Singh (1988) and Hofstede (1991) later developed the Uppsala model to 
prominently feature culture and the idea of psychic distance as explanations for 
patterns and motivations of OFDI and they argue that empathy and shared 
understandings increase the positive outcomes from OFDI for firms.  Like Dunning’s 
IDP, Uppsala model faces similar criticism; Cantwell and Narula (2003) argue that 
this internationalisation sequence statement whereby companies first export and then 
followed by OFDI has recently been abandoned, because some firms especially in 
certain industrial sectors proceed directly into OFDI by skipping export stage.   
Furthermore, Child and Rodrigues (2005) also find that the advanced Chinese MNCs 
like Hair and Lenovo skip the other Asian countries directly invest in the developed 
economies for strategic asset-seeking. 
 
There are some critiques of the Uppsala model as it has evolved.  Young et al. 
(1996), and Liu and Tian (2008) stress the Swedish origin of the theory, arguing that 
it does not apply to latecomer firms from emerging economies.  This critique has less 
force than (for example) Gao, Liu and Zou’s (2012) criticism of Dunning, because 
the Uppsala emphasis is on belonging to networks, in particular knowledge networks 
such as M&As and JVs (Nordstrom and Vahlne, 1992); networking can overcome 
the disadvantages of lateness where new entrants can leverage the knowledge 
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resources of mature firms (Mathew, 2006a).  However, such incremental stages 
theories of entry modes and OFDI both face criticism (Liu, Buck and Shu, 2005), 
citing Luo and Tung’s (2007) argument that multinational firms from emerging 
markets pay attention to incremental learning through global experience but their 
process of internationalisation may not follow the incremental approach.   
 
Additionally, Child and Rodrigues’ (2005) case studies show the internationalisation 
of the Chinese firms leapfrog directly from export to manufacturing subsidiaries in 
high psychic distance countries like the US.  Zhao (2000) also suggests that OFDI by 
Chinese companies into Bangladesh and Turkey is a new model of skipping export 
stages and moving almost directly into OFDI manufacturing to capture emerging 
markets.  Therefore, since Uppsala model is western-focus and unable to explain the 
leapfrogging investment of Chinese firms, it still needs modification in order to 
address the internationalisation path of Chinese firms.  
2.4.2 Mathews’ Linkage, Leverage, and Learning (LLL) Framework 
Based on a resource-based view of a firm, Mathews (2002a and 2002b) developed a 
framework to explain how and why latecomer firms (such as Taiwanese PC firms) 
that lack ownership advantages can gain competitive advantage via network linkage, 
resource leverage and learning.  Linkage is the capacity of the OFDI as Mathews 
(2002a) argues to extend into new cross-border activities via inter-firm relations, 
stressing the power of strategic networking (Gulati et al., 2001) such as OEM 
contracting, local sourcing, second sourcing and technology licensing.   He gives as 
an example, (Mathews 2002b), OEM contracting which has been generalised to 
encompass the notion of global commodity chains (Gereffi, 1999) or global 
production networks (Best, 2001), or global value chains (Humphrey and Schmitz, 




Along similar lines, Child and Rodrigues (2005) suggest that OEM could be a more 
effective route than JVs allowing Chinese firms to learn about international 
production even before going abroad and to build up an independent international 
reputation.  Mathews (2002a) defines leverage as ‘the outward reach by the firm for 
resources beyond it, which may be contained in firms and institutions out there in the 
global economy and with which it must form linkages of one kind or another, and to 
the inward process of capability enhancement that the firm engages in after 
absorption of new resources’.  Mathews (2002b) claims the concept of resource 
leverage (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994) precisely matches 
the theoretical requirements of the latecomer firms.  A third notion of LLL is 
learning, ‘is the enhancement of capabilities that results from the repeated 
application of linkage and leverage strategies’ (Mathews, 2002a).  
 
Two learning related concepts absorptive capacity and combinative capabilities are 
adopted by Mathews (2002b) to explain the needs and activities of the latecomer 
firms.   According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), absorptive capacity is ‘the ability 
to evaluate and utilise outside knowledge is largely a function of the level of prior 
related knowledge…. to recognise the value of new external information, assimilate 
it, and apply it to commercial ends’.  A combinative capability is ‘the intersection of 
the capability of the firm to exploit its knowledge and the unexplored potential of the 
technology’ (Kogut and Zander, 1992).  Mathews (2002b) also finds that learning 
undertaken in the latecomer firms in East Asia such as Korea and Taiwan is 
accelerated and guided by an institutional framework.  Child and Rodrigues (2005) 
used Hair’s OFDI in the USA as an example showing that Chinese OFDI in 
developed economies is a means of learning.  
 
Mathews (2002a and 2002b) developed the linkage, leverage and learning (LLL) 
framework based upon a criticism of Dunning’s OLI as inadequately addressing the 
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particular situation of firms from emerging markets, which as latecomers of OFDI 
are unlikely to possess the ownership advantages of firms from developed countries.  
Dunning (1988) also noticed that companies in developing countries rarely have the 
superior firm-specific advantages that justify internationalisation as an explanation of 
OFDI.  Both cases that Haier’s investment in the US (Child and Rodrigues, 2005) 
and Daewoo’s acquisition of a British car design firm (Hennart, 2001) indicate that 
latecomer firms’ investment in the developed economies is to augment their 
ownership advantages not to exploit the ownership advantages.   Mathews’ (2002a 
and 2002b) LLL indicates that a latecomer firm undertakes learning principally 
through networks linkage and resources leverage, however, this statement is 
challenged by Dunning (2006) and Narula (2006), who argue that latecomer firms 
still need to develop capabilities in order to establish linkages, leverage and learn 
from the network partners of developed countries.   It shows that for the firms that 
lack of knowledge and capabilities it is difficult to establish linkage and leverage for 
learning purpose until they possess these capabilities.  Yiu (2010) suggests that such 
kinds of capabilities have not been explicitly addressed in either Mathews’ LLL 
model or Dunning’s OLI framework.  Narula (2006:149) criticises the LLL model 
for ‘a group of firms that are hard to classify either in terms of industry, technology, 
size, age or organization’.  Therefore, it may be as Narula (2006) suggests, Mathews’ 
LLL is only applicable to certain dragon MNCs rather than all MNCs from emerging 
markets. 
 
Both Dunning (2006) and Mathews (2006b) agree that the OLI and LLL are 
complementary rather than substitute to each other.  Yiu (2011) mentions: ‘the OLI 
framework emphasizing the possession of ownership advantages and the LLL 
framework emphasizing the strategic ways of mitigating the lack of ownership 
advantages’.  Yiu (2011) suggest combining Dunning’s OLI and Mathews’ LLL to 
explain China’s OFDI.  Dunning’s approach is further criticized by Alon et al. 
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(2011) who suggest that a body of theory established for the incumbent firms in the 
developed economies is not applicable to explain Chinese OFDI since Chinese 
corporate context is distinctive from the western firms, pointing out that Chinese 
firms grow in a complex institutional environment where market and state are 
interpenetrated and where firms and government are interlinked.  In contrast, Alon et 
al. (2011) go on to argue, the best practice governances of the developed countries’ 
MNCs are established by and result from a stable, lower-risk business environment 
with lesser level of government involvement).  They further argue China’s complex 
institutional environment, cultural distance and capital requirements (Morck, Yeung 
and Zhao, 2007) are unique features of Chinese internalisation should be considered 
when introducing new theory.  
 
In summary, the OLI and LLL frameworks either focus on advantages possessed 
before firms’ internationalisation or advantages augmentation through 
internationalisation but with no evaluation of how OLI advantages and LLL 
opportunities developed in the domestic market (Yiu, 2011).  Child and Rodrigues 
(2005) also point out that ‘the mainstream perspective on the internationalisation of 
the firm focuses strongly on the firm as an actor and less on its embeddedness in its 
wider society’, further highlighting the fact that context is important for all social 
activity: in this case, the context from which firms internationalise shapes the 
patterns and results of the internationalisation.  Therefore, numerous researchers 
(Alon et al., 2011; Lu et al., 2011; Luo and Tung, 2007; Yiu, 2011) suggest that the 
new theory is used to explain China’s OFDI and internationalisation should consider 
the distinctive institutional issues and domestic market environment in China.  
2.4.3 Summary 
This section has examined the applicability of the two dominant theories from a 
firm-level perspective to explain Chinese OFDI and found them wanting.  Like 
Dunning’s IDP, Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and 
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Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) has also been criticised for its western-focus and its 
inability to explain the leapfrogging investment of Chinese firms.  Although 
Mathews’ (2002a and 2002b) LLL framework was developed within the resource-
based view of the firm and stresses the emerging market firms’ abilities in learning 
and augmenting ownership advantages through linkage and leverage, many 
latecomer firms are neither able to establish linkage and leverage with advanced 
firms in the developed countries nor able to learn via the linkage and leverage.   
Thus, Mathews’ theory too does not adequately explain Chinese OFDI. 
 
2.5 The Process of Internationalisation: Current Country-level Evidence 
 
2.5.1 Evolution of Chinese OFDI 
The statement of Chinese domestic institutional change underlines that evolutionary 
stages of China’s OFDI do not happen randomly, but they occur from a particular 
time and space.  Wu and Chen’s (2001) evolution of OFDI in China features four 
stages: 1979-1983 trading companies; 1984-85 early manufacturing and processing; 
1986-1992 rapid OFDI growth in manufacturing and resources and 1993-present 
growth in services, resources and manufacturing.  They compute by value of OFDI 
and emphasise the importance of internal institutional change as enabling OFDI (Wu 
and Chen, 2001).   
 
However, Child and Rodrigues’s (2005) case studies support what Zhang and Van 
Den Bulcke’s (1996) finding that it is impossible to distinguish clear stages of 
internationalisation of Chinese multinationals.  Child and Rodrigues (2005) have 
discovered that the most China’s OFDI has gone to the low psychic distance 
locations: the other Asian countries, whilst the leading Chinese firms such as Haier, 
Galanz and Lenovo are more prone to invest in the developed countries exploiting 
long-term globally-oriented strategies.  Whilst this pattern may alter, currently only 
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the minority of Chinese MNCs target developed countries, instead they seek profit in 
Africa and other emerging economies.   
 
Considering the rapid changing pattern and government policies, Yang et al. (2009) 
classify the evolution of Chinese OFDIs into three stages: 1978-1990 transformation 
of Chinese firms; 1991-2000 first wave of initial international expansion of Chinese 
firms and 2001-present rapid internationalisation growth in the form M&As.  This 
result corresponds to a later study by Luo et al. (2010) about the evolutionary 
domestic policies on China’s OFDI. Therefore, the correlating GDP growth and 
OFDI (as OLI model presumes) just does not fit the facts: significant OFDI occurred 
prior to high levels of GDP growth (Liu, Buck and Shu, 2005).  In China’s case, 
particularities affecting the growth of OFDI include international networks of 
Chinese expatriate entrepreneurs (Yeung, 1998), the particular need for natural 
resources (Duran and Ubeda, 2001) and strategic assets-seeking (Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005) and rapidly changing institutional arrangements in China (Bevan, 
Estrin and Meyer, 2004). 
2.5.2 Size and Entry Mode 
Like other economies, China’s original OFDIs were small in size (averaging $1 
million) reflecting a sectoral focus on trading and services.  Liu and Tian (2008) find 
that 80% of the subsidiaries are small-size firms.  Taylor (2002) suggests that 80% of 
China’s OFDI are JVs, with 90% of funding being raised on international capital 
markets.  Liu and Tian (2008) find that 60% of Chinese firms establish wholly-
owned subsidiaries in the UK and the rest of 40% are JV affiliates.  More recently, as 
TCL (Lenovo), Zoomlion, Sichuan Tengzhong, Minmetals and Chinalco in table 2.1 
illustrate high profile M&As are replacing JVs as the preferred entry mode (Child 
and Rodrigues, 2005).  For example, Nanjing Automotive acquired British car 
manufacturer MG Rover in 2005.  As Wong and Chan (2003) show, the size of 
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OFDI is rising as more investments in resources are linked to infrastructure projects 
and as they target developed economies. 
2.5.3 Summary 
In summary, the analysis of evolution of Chinese OFDI indicates that the OFDI from 
China experienced the transformation of firms and the first round of international 
expansion has begun significant growth. Establishing wholly-owned and JV 
subsidiaries were found as two main entry modes of Chinese OFDI and recently 
more evidences show that M&As have become the preferred entry mode instead of 
JVs. 
 
2.6 Conclusion: the Importance of Learning in the MNCs 
 
Compared to the earlier OFDI players (such as USA and Japan), China’s 
international investment begun late, in contrary, it has developed dramatically.  
Dunning’s IDP in the OLI model is widely used to analyse countries’ investment 
development in the last forty years, however it is not readily applicable to Chinese 
internationalisation processes since as Dunning acknowledged in using it to explain 
examples of the developed economy internationalisation, the framework neglects the 
latecomer OFDI from emerging markets, who normally lack of ownership 
advantages.  His framework also neglects the influence of institutional factors which 
plays a significant role in China’s OFDI development i.e. influences such as 
government policy.  Similarly, Uppsala model established on a group of firms from 
high-income economy, which attracts criticism on, whether it is applicable to the 
latecomer firms.   
 
Additionally, as stages theories both Dunning’s and Uppsala model are criticised for 
inability to explain the phenomenon of leapfrogging OFDI.  Mathews’ LLL model 
underlines the process of latecomer OFDI from the resource-based view of the firm, 
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emphasises the significance of learning which is particularly important for China’s 
OFDI in the developed markets.  However, Mathews’ framework stresses the 
importance of network linkage and resources leverage for learning, neglects the firms 
who still need develop capabilities for establishing linkage and leverage.  The 
evolution of Chinese OFDI does not happen randomly but it follows the evolutionary 
process of China’s policy changing.  The policies such as ‘Go Out Policy’ and the 
guidelines of China’s SOEs reform have considerably affected the development of 
OFDI in particular the SOEs’ internationalisation, be considered as the second most 
important motivation for China’s OFDI.  Geographic distribution is driven by 
motivations (e.g. resource-seeking, market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking), the 
high-income countries’ advantages of advanced technology, local talent, advanced 
managerial skills etc. draws attention of China’s OFDI.  
 
In summary, both the pattern and main motivations appear different from the early 
generation of the OFDI from the developed countries.  China’s rapidly increasing 
OFDI is the result of the precipitous economic development and changing 
institutional arrangements that encourage and support the OFDI from China. 
Dunning’s OLI paradigm, Uppsala model and Mathews LLL framework that each 
neglects the distinctiveness of the Chinese institutional environment and 
inadequately explains China’s OFDI pace and patterns.  In order to explain Chinese 
firms’ internationalisation, a new framework might be in need.   The first research 
question (i.e. what is the pattern and main motivations of Chinese OFDI in the UK?) 
will be examined in chapter five via a comprehensive analysis of survey data.   
 
Generally speaking, China’s OFDI is still at early stage of internationalisation and 
the pattern of Chinese OFDI in terms of geographical and sectoral distribution and 
entry modes, is significantly influenced by the firms’ motivations.  The main 
motivation of the Chinese OFDI into the developed countries such as the UK is 
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strategic asset-seeking.  All three main theories emphasise the significance of gaining 
ownership advantages in the processes of Chinese OFDI. Additionally, Mathews 
stresses the importance of learning for possessing and augmenting ownership 
advantages: in order to gain strategic asset advantages, learning plays a significant 
role within the firms.  The next chapter analyses literature on learning and 
capabilities development in MNCs and suggests a new synthetic framework for 









This chapter critically evaluates previous research relating to learning and 
capabilities development within MNCs identifying weaknesses and inconsistencies 
that may constitute gaps requiring further research.  Dunning’s and Uppsala theories 
emphasise the importance of gaining ownership advantages within processes of firm 
internationalisation.  Mathews’ (2002a and 2002b) LLL framework, based on the 
resource-based view of the firm, developed specifically with latecomer firms in mind 
(and based upon that dataset), emphasises ownership augmentation by learning via 
network linkage and resource leverage with the incumbent firms.   
 
This chapter emphasises learning and adopts the resource-based view of the firm.  
Peng (2006) developed a strategy tripod through synthesising three leading 
perspectives (i.e. institution-based, industry-based and resource-based views) to 
explain international strategy relating to institutional issues, industry competitions 
and learning and capabilities.  This strategy tripod model of internationalisation is 
applicable to explain the internationalisation of the firms from emerging economies 
to developed countries (Yamakawa, et al., 2008) and even the characteristics of 
China’s OFDI (Cui and Jiang, 2010).  Among these three perspectives, only the 
resource-based view, as Cui and Jiang (2010), Peng (2006) and Yamakawa et al. 
(2008) argue centre-stages knowledge, learning and capabilities in the firms.  This 







3.2 How MNC Subsidiaries Learn  
 
This section (3.2) examines extant research that provides the knowledge to the 
study’s second research question: ‘How does the learning occur in Chinese MNC 
subsidiaries in the UK?’  
 
3.2.1 The Resource-Based View  
In international business studies, both the transaction cost economics (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Caves, 1996) and the eclectic perspective (Dunning, 1993) emphasise 
that MNCs need to equip their international subsidiaries with firm-specific resources 
(including capabilities) and advantages to overcome the liability of foreignness.  Lee 
and Slater (2007:245) argue: ‘outward FDI is a mode of diversification that takes 
place at international level and is an effective vehicle to absorb and generate new 
resources and capabilities, leading to improved performance’.  The resource-based 
view emphasises the OFDI’s ability to assimilate and exploit new resources.  
According to Peng (2001), the resource-based view has developed these perspectives 
by subdividing these forms of knowledge and capabilities into for example 
administrative heritage (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Collis, 1991), organisational 
practices (Tallman, 1991, 1992; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997), and 
bargaining power (Moon and Lado, 2000).  Lee and Slater (2007) further summarise 
three items particularly for MNCs: experience with product diversification (Hitt et 
al., 1997), experience of innovation and R&D (Bettis and Hitt, 1995) and 
international experience of top management teams (Sambharya, 1996).  
 
Introducing her ‘Theory of the Growth of the Firm’, Penrose (1959:1) argues that the 
neoclassical (rational economistic) model of the firm has ‘no notion of an internal 
process of development leading to cumulative movements of knowledge in any one 
direction’.  Firm growth ‘is essentially an evolutionary process and based on the 
cumulative growth of collective knowledge, in the context of a purposive firm’ 
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(Penrose 1959: xii).  Resource learning or the resource-based view of the firm takes 
the perspective that innovation affecting processes and performance is not out there, 
rather, to a certain degree are endogenous to the firm depending upon its ability to 
generate, transfer and exploit knowledge relevant to market productive opportunities. 
 
In practice, in contrast to the neo-classical view of the firm as a passive recipient of 
technology from its environment, the resource-based view enables it to substitute 
labour for capital.  The resource-based view sees the firm as an active-actor, 
deliberately seeking to learn and to exploit knowledge, therefore this study explores 
whether this narrative can be confirmed in practice.   Unlike the neoclassical view of 
firms as all similarly composed of land, labour and capital, as Barney (1991) argues 
in his classic paper, the resource-based view envisages firms as diverse and draws 
attention to what are now called dynamic capabilities.  Following Nelson and Winter 
(1982), the resource-based view considers firms as learning and evolving.   
 
Early researchers (e.g. Caves, 1980; Barney, 1991 and 2001) defined the firm’s 
resources as both ‘tangible and intangible assets’ (such as managerial skills, 
organisational processes, firm attributes and knowledge). Barney (1991) also 
categorized firm resources into ‘physical capital resources’ (Williamson, 1975), 
‘human capital resources’ (Becker, 1964) and ‘organizational capital resources’ 
(Tomer, 1987).  The strength of resources could help firms’ to build up ‘resource 
position barriers, creating a situation where its own resource position directly or 
indirectly makes it more difficult for others to catch up’ (Wernerfelt, 1984).  This 
indicates that not all resources are a source of competitive advantage.  Similarly, 
through examining the correlation between firm resources and sustained competitive 
advantage, Barney (1991) concluded that only those ‘valuable’, ‘rare’, ‘imperfectly 
imitable’ and ‘non-substitutable’ firm resources are a source of sustained competitive 




Minbaeva et al. (2003:587) argue that for MNCs the competitive advantage ‘is 
contingent upon their ability to facilitate and manage inter-subsidiary transfer of 
knowledge’.  In order to sustain competitive advantage, developing new resources is 
as important as exploiting the existing resources (Penrose, 1959; Rubin, 1973; 
Wernerfelt, 1977 and 1984).  This perspective suggests that it is crucial to acquire 
new resources and learn new knowledge to gain competitive strength (from outside 
MNCs and the different units inside MNCs).   Schlegelmilch and Chini (2003) point 
out that most researchers (such as Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Almeida, 1996; 
Lee et al., 2001) have focused on technological knowledge (including R&D) as 
resources.  However, they and Pahlberg (2001) suggest that learning can also occur 
in other functional areas (e.g. marketing, manufacturing and logistics), thus resources 
can be formed in brand names, marketing skills, trade contacts, machinery, efficient 
procedures, etc.    
 
Most research on organisational learning (for example Levitt and March, 1988; 
Huber, 1991) emphasises on the assimilation and creation of organisational 
knowledge.  Spender (1989: 185) defines ‘the organization as, in essence, a body of 
knowledge about the organization's circumstances, resources, causal mechanisms, 
objectives, attitudes, policies, and so forth’.   This perspective is challenged by 
several researchers, for example Johanson and Vahlne (1977) argued that a firm’s 
experience could be gained either through recruiting personnel with experience or 
through advice from people with experience.   
 
Later, Simon (1991:125) also observes, ‘all learning takes place inside individual 
human heads; an organization learns in only two ways: (a) by the learning of its 
members, or (b) by ingesting new members who have knowledge the organization 
didn't previously have’.  March (1991) also argues that organisations accumulate the 
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knowledge stored in their procedures, norms and forms over time learning from their 
staff.  Later, Grant (1996) also points out that individuals assimilate and create 
knowledge, and organisations only apply existing knowledge to production process.  
Therefore, this research explores to what extents to Chinese subsidiaries embed their 
learning in new procedures and routines or alternatively does learning remain 
enhanced individual competences.  
 
To connect with the research theme, the narrative in the resource-based view is that 
Chinese MNCs are longing for knowledge and to learn; this study will investigate the 
extent to which this narrative reflects actual practice.  Do Chinese subsidiaries 
systematically seek learning, pass it to the headquarters and do headquarter ensure 
that learning is exploited.  In short, is the resource-based view of the firm practiced 
by Chinese MNCs? 
3.2.2 Types of Knowledge that are Resources for MNCs 
Based on the resource-based view of the firm, numerous researchers (such as Kogut 
and Zander, 1992, 1993 and 1995; Simonin, 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; 
Becerra-Fernandez and Sabherwal, 2001; Ambos et al., 2006) argue that knowledge 
is seen as the most strategically important resource by MNCs.  Since knowledge is so 
important to firms, this section now turns to explaining more deeply what knowledge 
is and how it is created.  Knowledge encompasses ‘information’ (e.g. declarative 
knowledge) and ‘know-how’ (e.g. procedural knowledge) (e.g. Kogut and Zander, 
1992, 1993 and 1995; Simonin, 1999; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Becerra-
Fernandez and Sabherwal, 2001; Ambos et al., 2006) Kogut and Zander (1992, 1993 
and 1995) further define information is a ‘factual statement’ (e.g. factory consists of 
500 machines); and know-how as ‘a recipe describing how activities are carried out’ 




Von Hippel (1988) also offered the definition that ‘know-how is the accumulated 
practical skill or expertise that allows one to do something smoothly and efficiently’, 
which implied a dynamic process how know-how is cumulated through tacit 
learning.  Later, Grant (1996) identifies ‘knowing how as tacit knowledge’ (i.e. 
knowledge that cannot be codified, can only be revealed through application, and 
acquired through practice; learning by doing) and ‘knowing about facts as explicit 
knowledge’ (i.e. knowledge that is codified and can be articulated in formal and 
systematic language).  Spender’s (1996) argument supports his perspective by 
pointing out knowledge may be tacit or explicit and may be situated at individual or 
collective levels.  In order to absorb knowledge, China’s MNCs tend to take an 
accelerated approach through linkage and leverage, for example a contractor to an 
incumbent MNC (Mathews, 2006a) or adopt an aggressive path rather than the 
conventional joint venture approach (Cui and Jiang, 2008 and 2010; Luo and Tung, 
2007).  
 
In his classic study of US MNCs, Badaracco (1991) argues that ‘migratory’ 
knowledge is packaged (i.e. codified or embedded in technological artefacts or 
processes).  Such knowledge becomes capable of exploitation (i.e. potential users 
possess the absorptive capacity and resources to exploit the transferring knowledge); 
that users are incentivised to use the knowledge (i.e. it aligns with profit 
opportunities) and that barriers to use are less than the cost of utilisation (patents, 
psychic distance etc.).  In contrast, ‘idiosyncratic knowledge’ also termed as 
‘knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place’ by Hayek (1945:521), 
and ‘specific knowledge’ by Jensen and Meckling (1992) is difficult to transfer.  
Barney (2001) argues that ‘significant international experience by top managers 




Simonin (1999) classifies knowledge into a number of categorises, such as 
technological knowledge, market knowledge, managerial knowledge, and industry-
specific knowledge.  The evolutionary economics explicitly postulates that 
knowledge is scattered across organisations and individuals, and needs to be 
managed through routines (Becker 2004, Becker et al., 2005).  This study hopes to 
shed light on whether the knowledge learned by Chinese subsidiaries is migratory as 
Badaracco (1991) or alternatively contextually specific to particular market as 
Barney (2001).    
  
From the viewpoint of the MNC, knowledge is embedded in products, services or the 
processes for sale on international market.  This study looks at technological 
knowledge, market knowledge, managerial knowledge (including operations 
management, human resource management, etc.), and industry-specific knowledge in 
both explicit and tacit forms and also in individual and organisational levels.  Within 
a particular MNC or networks of companies (here meaning Chinese MNCs), 
knowledge is likely to be further narrowed in definition by the socio-technological 
paradigms constituting their sectoral system of innovation (Geels, 2004).  This 
means that Chinese firms are notoriously pragmatic and short-term (e.g. Chow, 
2007) and therefore they might invest in the UK only for capturing certain 
knowledge that is immediately exploitable, however this does not happen in all 
cases.   
3.2.3 Subsidiary’s Networks 
Firms, perhaps particularly MNCs, have to manage many relationships (with 
partners, competitors, suppliers and customers) both at domestic level and 
international level.  It has been widely argued that firms are embedded in social 
networks along with other actors (for example, Holm, Johanson, and Thilenius, 
1995; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer, 2000).  As Geppert (2005) 
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points out: ‘MNCs develop new organizational forms that enable knowledge sharing 
and competency development across functional and national borders’.  MNC is seen 
as ‘differentiated network’, where knowledge is created in various units of the MNC 
and transferred to inter-related parts (Hedlund, 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; 
Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997).  This argument subverts the conventional concept that 
knowledge is normally created in the headquarters and transferred to the subsidiaries. 
Viewing the MNC as a differentiated network has inspired a group of research on the 
creation, assimilation, and diffusion of internal MNC knowledge emphasising the 
role of subsidiaries in these processes (Holm and Pedersen, 2000).   
 
Later Ambos et al. (2006) also consider multinational subsidiaries as network actors.  
McEvily and Azheer (1999) argue that each subsidiary has a unique and 
idiosyncratic network, which exposes it into different new knowledge and 
opportunities.  Phene and Almeida (2008) also suggest that subsidiaries can learn 
from various sources within and outside MNC. Thus, it can be assumed that 
subsidiaries undertake learning through the interactions with network partners.   
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008b) suggests that informal, social ties between members of 
the same organisation (Hansen and Lovas 2004) or different organisations (Bell and 
Zaheer 2007) are superior channels for knowledge transfer between geographically 
distant locations and could help to alleviate (corporate or national) cultural 
differences.  In their research on possible extension of the model of the differentiated 
MNC, Nohria and Ghoshal (1997) emphasise that MNC as a differentiated network 
should include not only the internal network (e.g. HQs); it must also include its 
external network (e.g. customers, suppliers, competitors and regulators). Later, 
Andersson et al.’s (2002) empirical result confirms this perspective, and further 
explains the two primary reasons that the external network needs to be inclusive.  
First, the external network is as important as internal network for a subsidiary’s daily 
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life and competitiveness; and second, the external network is a major source of 
learning leading to subsidiary’s capabilities development.   
 
Phene and Almeida (2008) summarise six exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
learning sources (learning networks), three internal sources including the subsidiary 
itself, its HQs and the other subsidiaries (within the MNC) and three external sources 
consisting of other firms in the host country, other firms in the home country and 
firms in other countries 
 
Knowledge Transfer within Internal Networks 
An early research on MNCs, subsidiaries were often considered as ‘appendages’ in 
the MNCs from developed countries for example Japan and America (Stopford and 
Wells 1972).  According to Phene and Almeida (2008), recent studies emphasise the 
interdependent relationship between subsidiaries and the MNC.  Kogut and Zander 
(1993) argue that MNCs are social networks that specialise in knowledge transfer 
and integration.  Phene and Almeida (2008:903) further emphasise the positive 
impact of internal networks on learning by suggesting that ‘the presence of a unified 
organizational context provides a set of processes and routines within the firm that 
enable the smooth flow of knowledge from different parts of the firm and its 
utilization.  In addition, the boundaries of the firm create a common social structure, 
with the presence of shared knowledge, values and assumptions’.  Not all internal 
networks within the MNC are alike.  Internal networks of MNCs take diverse forms 
and differ in processes.  For example, Ghoshal et al. (1994) identify two types of 
internal networks: vertical form (between the subsidiary and the HQs) and horizontal 
form (between the subsidiary and other subsidiaries).   
 
Later Chini and Ambos (2005) finds three forms of knowledge flows within MNCs: 
‘forward’ (from headquarter to subsidiary), ‘reverse’ (from subsidiary to 
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headquarter) and ‘lateral’ (between subsidiaries) knowledge transfer.   This is a 
formal approach to analysing organisations, whereas Hansen et al. (2005) 
alternatively argue that differential subunits of social networks within the firm have 
different impacts on knowledge sharing i.e. informal structures are more important 
for knowledge flows.  Later Phene and Almeida (2008) suggest that the vertical ties 
are often stronger and more directly in line with the organisational structure.  This 
research centres on the subsidiary and explores the ‘forward’ and ‘reverse’ 
knowledge transfer within the ‘vertical’ form i.e. internal network between HQs 
(parent company in China) and its subsidiary in the UK, and also learning and 
knowledge codification within the subsidiaries. 
 
Hocking et al. (2004) and Harzing (2001) argue that the most important reason for 
MNCs to send expatriates is to transfer knowledge among the internal units.  
Through international assignments, expatriates can not only fulfil the task of forward 
knowledge transfer, but also implement reverse knowledge flow through learning in 
the foreign subsidiary (e.g. Dunning, 2003).  Although this argument emphasises the 
importance of expatriates’ learning to MNCs, it shows a major neglect of attention of 
non-expatriates’ learning (i.e. host country workforce).  Through examining a 
taxonomy of twelve categories of host country national learning at three primary 
employee levels (i.e. operative level, supervisory and middle management, and upper 
management), Vance and Paik (2005) found that non-expatriates’ learning makes a 
great contribution to increased absorptive capacity.  Researchers such as Takeuchi 
and Nonaka (2004); Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue that in order to gain 
competitive advantage, firms need to widely distribute knowledge to their all internal 
units and employees rather than only to relevant managers and experts.  This study 
will explore learning undertaken by both expatriates and non-expatriates, and also 





Knowledge Transfer within External Networks 
Traditionally, the MNC ‘is conceived as a device for the formation and exploitation 
of internal markets’ (Blanc and Sierra, 1999:193; Rugman, 1980:376; Schmid and 
Schurig, 2003:762).  Parent company has also been assumed the sole resources of 
critical capabilities within MNC (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw et al., 
1998; Lipparini and Fratocchi, 1999; Schmid and Schurig, 2003). This perspective 
has been challenged by several international business researchers, for example 
Andersson and Forsgren (1996) and Andersson and Pahlberg (1996) argue, external 
network partners (e.g. competitors, external market suppliers and customers) become 
increasingly significant resource for developing subsidiary’s core competences.  It 
has been argued that ‘80 per cent of the most important relationships have been 
identified as being external to the MNC’ (see Schmid and Schurig, 2003:763; also 
see Andersson, Holm and Holmstrom, 2001:186).   
 
Schmid and Schurig’s (2003) empirical work shows that relationship to internal 
network actors, particularly to the parent company is as important as the relationship 
to the external networks for the development of core competence.  Makino and 
Inkpen (2003) point out the importance of local external network is for successful 
knowledge seeking FDI: the external network is not only a source of knowledge for 
innovation (von Hippel, 1988), also enables the subsidiaries to capitalise on 
assimilated knowledge and resources for both production and commercial 
application in host country (Nobel and Birkinshaw, 1998).  This external network is 
considered as ‘linkage’ in Mathews’ (2002a) linkage-leverage-learning (LLL) model, 
the ability of the subsidiary ‘to extend into new cross-border activities via inter-firm 
relations’.  Mathews (2002b:476) further identifies the four forms of the linkage: 
‘outsourcing/OEM (original equipment manufacturers) contracting; local sourcing; 
second sourcing; and technology licensing, in the context of high technology 
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industries like semiconductors and cellular telephony’.  Child and Rodrigues (2005) 
find many Chinese companies learn from the advanced firms through OEM even 
before their overseas investment.   
 
Von Hippel (1988) argues that long-lasting and close relationships with external 
partners have a positive effect on learning process.  Closeness of relationship with 
the local network actors has a positive influence on a subsidiary’s performance (i.e. 
the expected sales growth, market share and profitability) and other MNC’s entities’ 
competence development (Andersson, Forsgren and Holm, 2002).  Bjorkman, 
Barner-Rasmussen and Li (2004), Forsgren, Johanson and Sharma (2000) and Foss 
and Pedersen (2002) classify knowledge assimilated from the interaction between 
firms and their external business environment, into ‘cluster knowledge’ (reflecting 
the general local environment such as level of education, quality of institution), and 
‘network knowledge’ (referring to the subsidiary’s interaction with specific external 
business partners).  The research is concerned with subsidiary’s learning from its 
specific external business partners (see figure 3.1). 
3.2.4 Motivations  
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) argue that knowledge transfer within MNCs 
crucially depend on the motivation of the units to acquire and share knowledge.  
Osterloh and Frey (2000) also point out that both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations 
are important for knowledge transfer, and also pointed out the interactive relationship 
between those two motivations.  Their arguments ‘place a great deal of emphasis on 
firm organization, where the incentive structure of unit managers needs to be 
carefully designed’ (Mudambi and Navarra’s, 2004).  However, there is a complex 
relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.  From the perspective of 
networked learning and change (within MNCs), this distinction is less valid since 
learning and knowing in networks requires firms to accept network learning goals 
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and at the same time pay attention to learning and knowledge that will support their 
own profit-seeking activities.  Whilst Teigland and Wasko (2009) find that intrinsic 
factors motivate individuals in knowledge-intensive and creative employment in 
MNCs, it cannot be deduced that less professionally qualified or creative staff in 
MNCs will also be so motivated. 
3.2.5 Psychic Distance and Cultural Distance  
Organisational knowledge transfer is facilitated by similarities in organisational 
structures and compensation practices, in dominant logics (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998 
and Mowery et al., 1996), and in businesses (Lane et al., 2001).  Hence the more 
similar firms are in structures, norms and style then the easier it is for them to work 
closely and engender trust. Therefore, shared vision and systems facilitate 
organisational knowledge transfer (Van Wijk, et al., 2008).  Since compatible norms 
and values can differ much more broadly (Lane et al., 2001), various studies have 
focused on cultural similarities or differences between partners.  The Uppsala model 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) stresses 
‘psychic distance’, a term later considered similar to ‘cultural distance’ by Kogut and 
Singh’s (1988), and the significant impact of ‘psychic distance’ on a firm’s 
internationalisation process.  
 
The concept of ‘psychic distance’ was first introduced by Beckerman’s (1956:38), 
explaining ‘the manner in which the purchases of raw materials by a firm are 
distributed geographically will depend partly on the extent to which foreign sources 
have been personally contacted and cultivated’.  He also used an example (i.e. 
though the transport costs remain the same, an Italian entrepreneur is more likely to 
choose to purchase a raw material from Swiss suppliers rather than Turkey firms, 
because Switzerland is closer to him in a psychic evaluation.) to describe this term.  
In Uppsala model, psychic distance was defined as ‘factors preventing or disturbing 
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the flows of information between firm and market’ (Johanson and Wiedersheim-
Paul, 1975:308).  Building on these studies, Hakansson and Ambos (2010) give 
psychic distance a full definition as ‘the sum of factors (cultural or language 
differences, geographical distance, etc.) that affect the flow and interpretation of 
information to and from a foreign country’.  
 
Using Hofstede’s (1980) four cultural dimensions (i.e. power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity/femininity and individualism), Kogut and Singh’s (1988:430) 
‘cultural distance’ index was formed based on the deviation along each of the four 
dimensions of each country from the United States ranking.  ‘The deviations were 
corrected for differences in the variances of each dimension and then arithmetically 
averaged’.  Kogut and Singh’s (1988:430) suggest that ‘cultural distance is, in most 
respects, similar to the ‘psychic distance’ used by the Uppsala school’.  Hakansson 
and Ambos (2010) also argue that in recent international business studies the 
difference between psychic distance and cultural distance becomes increasingly 
blurred.  However, Sousa and Bradley (2006) differ these two similar terms from 
each other; they argue ‘psychic’ is derived from the Greek word ‘psychikos’, which 
means the mind or soul (Simpson and Weiner, 1989), indicating something in the 
mind of individuals, therefore psychic distance is shaped by individuals’ perception 
of differences between the home country and foreign country (Sousa and Bradley, 
2005 and 2006).   
 
In contrast, cultural distance refers to the cultural level and is defined as ‘the degree 
to which cultural values in one country are different from those in another country’ 
(Sousa and Bradley, 2006:52).  Several scholars argue that cultural distance has an 
influence on psychic distance (Earley and Mosakowski 2000; Lee and Jang 1998; 
Sousa and Bradley, 2006; Swift 1999).  In addition, Sousa and Bradley (2006) have 
found that psychic distance is determined by cultural distance and also the individual 
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values of the managers, therefore it can be concluded that the key factors such as 
cultural and language differences and geographical distance are also key elements to 
cultural distance. 
 
Cultural distance increases the cost of entry, and hinders the firm’s ability to transfer 
core competencies to foreign markets (Palich and Gomez-Mejia 1999).  Cultural 
distance also increases operational difficulties that emerge from a lack of 
understanding of the norms, values, and institutions and hinder knowledge exchange 
(Mowery et al. 1996).  Van Wijk’s (2008) findings also support this argument, and 
they further suggest that units within organisations are likely to transfer knowledge 
with the familiar individuals or units, therefore differential cultural aspects may be 
more detrimental to knowledge sharing.  Cultural distance between foreign partners 
may lead to misunderstandings that can limit the sharing of important organisational 
knowledge (Lyles and Salk, 1996 and Szulanski et al., 2004). 
3.2.6 Summary and Implications for This Study 
The resource-based view of the firm highlights the firms’ (here meaning MNCs) 
ability through endogenous learning and innovation to alter its competitiveness and 
performance and thereby its relationship to its markets and competition.  Knowledge 
and its exploitation is a pivotal to this perspective on firms and markets.  The point is 
whether learning by subsidiaries and knowledge flows with commercial benefit are 
important in practice to Chinese MNCs, in short is the narrative of resource-based 
view of the firm actually applied, can it be evidenced?  As section 3.2.1 has argued, 
the resource-based view is pivotal to this research and applying to the case of 
Chinese MNCs; therefore this study hopes to reveal the degree to which Chinese 
MNCs are knowledge seeking, the extent to which the OFDI stimulates endogenous 
knowledge creation leading to capabilities development, and whether learning in 




This section has also defined and differentiated knowledge at the level of the firm’s 
capabilities, including explicit knowledge (codified knowledge, information or 
migratory knowledge) and tacit knowledge (or know-how).  The analysis will 
indicate the degree to which learning by Chinese subsidiaries is codified knowledge 
or know-how, and secondly the extent to which it is migratory or context-specific. 
The importance of these differentiations will become clearer in section 3.4, which 
explores knowledge transfer. 
 
Additionally, this section indicates how important the network partners as learning 
sources are to MNC knowledge transfer, and the internal source is as important as 
the external source to subsidiary learning.  As shown in figure 3.1, the research 
centres the UK-based Chinese subsidiary, exploring the degree to which knowledge 
transfer between subsidiary and the internal and external networks.   
 
The arrows indicate the direction of knowledge flows.  Within the external network, 
this study will explore how knowledge flows from such as customers, suppliers, 
competitors, distributors and regulators (policy makers) into the subsidiary.  For the 
internal network, the research will identify the forward and reverse knowledge flows 
between the HQs and the subsidiary, and to what degree the expatriates and non-




Figure 3.1: Knowledge Transfer in Subsidiary’s Networks 
 
Since the differentiated network perspective emphasises knowledge flows in MNCs 
between subsidiaries and HQs, this study will adopt this perspective by investigating 
knowledge absorption and exploration in the UK-based subsidiaries, knowledge 
flows between the subsidiaries and their HQs, and knowledge adaptation by the HQs.  
 
Since the research centres the UK-based Chinese subsidiary and explore the 
knowledge transfer between the subsidiary and the HQs, this research will exclude 
the other subsidiaries, the other firms in home country and other countries.  
Otherwise, it will expand the scope of this study into diverse contexts, inhibiting the 
deep understanding of relationships that the author proposes to do (UK-based study).  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the internal and external sources this research will focus on. 
 
This section has highlighted the key theory (i.e. the resource-based view) and 
concepts (i.e. types of knowledge, subsidiary’s networks, motivation and psychic 
distance), which will be adopted to address the second research question, concerning 
how MNC subsidiaries learn. 
 
External Network Internal Network
(from subsidiary viewpoint) (from subsidiary viewpoint)








3.3 How MNC Subsidiaries Exploit Learning and Develop Capabilities  
 
This section explores extant research that provides the knowledge to the study’s third 
research question: How do UK subsidiaries exploit learning and develop 
capabilities? 
 
3.3.1 Absorptive Capacity 
Many studies have emphasised on the importance of absorptive capacity for 
knowledge transfer (e.g. Lyles and Salk, 1996; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Lane et al., 
2001; Minbaeva et al., 2003).  As Cohen and Levinthal (1990:128) argue a key 
determinant of the firm’s ability to learn and exploit knowledge is its absorptive 
capacity ‘the ability to evaluate and utilise outside knowledge is largely a function of 
the level of prior related knowledge…to recognise the value of new external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends’.  They emphasise that the 
absorptive capacity is a function of prior related knowledge from two perspectives: 
first, learning is cumulative; second, learning performance is best when the object of 
learning is related to what is already learned.   
 
Later, Pavitt (1991) importantly points out that absorptive capacity is cumulatively 
causational: the more that is known, the more focused are new searches and the more 
readily new knowledge can be exploited.  ‘The notion that learning performance is 
greatest when learning extends existing knowledge, suggests that learning will be 
most difficult in novel domains’ often occurs in MNC’ international market 
expansion (Makino and Inkpen, 2003).  
 
To be useful the absorptive capacity inside the heads of managers (Nelson and 
Winter’s 1982 phrase) must link knowledge and markets, learning and customers: the 
effective use of absorptive capacity requires cognitive intervention – the learning 
moment when someone or some team says that with this knowledge, we could satisfy 
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our customers in this new way.  Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) interpretation of 
absorptive capacity explains the ability of firms (in ownership hierarchies or 
networks) to identify, transfer and cumulate useful knowledge transfers.  Since 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) introduced the concept of absorptive capacity, a number 
of studies (e.g. Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Dussauge et al., 2000; Jones and 
Craven, 2001; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Van den Bosch et al., 1999 and 2003) have 
studied absorptive capacity, the definition maintains the same, only until a decade 
later, Zahra and George (2002) reconceptualise absorptive capacity ‘as a dynamic 
capability pertaining to knowledge creation and utilisation that enhances a firm’s 
ability to gain and sustain a competitive advantage’.  This reconceptualization is 
supported by several studies (e.g. Easterby-Smith, et al., 2008; Jones, 2006).    
 
Three studies of absorptive capacity (by Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Jones, 2006; 
Zahra and George’s, 2002) have developed a process view of absorptive capacity. 
Zahra and George (2002) suggest absorptive capacity to be a dynamic capability 
embedded in an organisation’s routines and processes, and define absorptive capacity 
‘as a set of organizational routines and processes by which firms acquire, assimilate, 
transform, and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational 
capability…the four organizational capabilities of knowledge acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation, and exploitation build on each other to yield ACAP-a 
dynamic capability that influences the firm’s ability to create and deploy the 
knowledge necessary to build other organizational capabilities (e.g., marketing, 
distribution, and production)’.  These diverse capabilities give the firm a foundation 
on which to achieve a competitive advantage leading to superior performance 
(Barney, 1991; Zahra and George, 2002).   
 
Zahra and George (2002) further classify the absorptive capacity into two subsets of 
potential absorptive capacity (comprising knowledge acquisition and assimilation 
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capabilities) and realised absorptive capacity (including knowledge transformation 
and exploitation capabilities).  These two forms of absorptive capacity respectively 
indicate Szulanski’s (1996) implementation and ramp-up out of his four-stage 
process of knowledge transfer.  Potential absorptive capacity captures Cohen and 
Levinthal’s (1990) description of a firm’s capability to value and acquire external 
knowledge but does not guarantee the exploitation of this knowledge (Zahra and 
George, 2002).  Realised absorptive capacity indicates the firm’s capacity to apply 
and commercialise the knowledge that has been absorbed.  These two forms of 
absorptive capacity are linked by social integration mechanisms that facilitate 
knowledge sharing and exploitation, and other elements such as activation triggers 
(similar to motivations) can also influence the process of absorptive capacity (Zahra 
and George, 2002).   
 
Jones (2006) extended Zahra and George’s (2002) model through incorporating three 
factors from agency perspective: gatekeepers, boundary spanners and change agents. 
Building on these two studies, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) use case studies drawn 
from three distinguish sectors to identify the process of absorptive capacity and 
discover the role of power need to be inclusive.  Knowledge exploitation needs the 
sharing of relevant knowledge among members of the firm (Spender, 1996) in order 
to develop mutual understanding and comprehension (Garvin, 1993).  Zahra and 
George (2002) suggest social integration mechanisms can facilitate the sharing and 
eventual exploitation of knowledge and can be either informally (e.g. social 
networks) or formally (e.g. use of coordinators); informal mechanisms are good at 
exchanging ideas, but formal mechanisms are more systematic.  In addition, Kinder 




3.3.2 Capabilities and Core Competences  
Whereas in neoclassical thinking the building blocks of the firm are factors of 
production: land, labour and capital; the resource-based view (Penrose, 1959) or 
evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982) emphasised connectivity 
between innovativeness and markets.  In part, this is a shift in timeframe, from short-
term microeconomic models that take markets, products and processes as given, to 
one in which technologies and markets change as a result of exogenous and 
endogenous influences.  Also, as Freeman (1982) emphasised, shortening innovation 
cycles i.e. closing the time gap between science and technology embedding new 
knowledge, imposed the mantra innovate or die on firms: evolution is the only option 
when competitors are continually change competitive advantage.   
 
As Itami and Roehl (1987) pointed out, the notion of invisible assets presents a new 
way to value firms and evaluate their further value.  Prahalad and Hamel (1990) 
highlight further changes in emphasis from the neoclassical to the resource-based 
approach in their important work on core competences: the idea that longer-term 
innovation potential is supported by focused area of knowledge and skills – 
competences.  For Prahalad and Hamel (1990), firms have a basic set of 
competences, using that they create shorter-term capabilities (products, channels, 
business models), resulting at any point in a level of production capacity.  Winter 
(2000:983) defines a capability as ‘a high level of routine that, together with its 
implementing input flows, confers upon an organisation’s management a set of 
decision options for producing significant outputs of a particular type’.   
 
To be of business value, core competences must be relevant to markets that are 
substantial, growing and evolving; connect dynamically with current and novel ways 
of solving customers’ problems; and give the firm competitive advantages that are 
difficult to imitate (skills, know-how, tacit knowledge, design insight etc.). Teece 
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and Pisano (1994) support this perspective and they introduce the idea of ‘dynamic 
capabilities, emphasizing firms as appropriately adapting, integrating, and re-
configuring internal and external organizational skills, resources, and functional 
competences toward changing environment’.  They also argue that firm-specific 
capabilities and renew competences (to respond to changing business environment), 
closely linked to the firm’s business processes (i.e. the way things are done in the 
firm), market positions (i.e. current endowment of technology and intellectual 
property, customer base and relations with suppliers and competitors) and expansion 
paths (i.e. the strategic alternatives and the attractiveness of the opportunities to the 
firm).  They further argue that capabilities and competences can be found throughout 
the firm: on the factory floor, in the R&D labs, in the executive suites or the way 
things are integrated.   
 
Grant (1996b) argue that the essence of organisational capability is the integration of 
individuals’ specialised knowledge, and he has also developed a hierarchy of 
integration, showing the hierarchical levels of individual knowledge is integrated 
into lower level single-task capabilities, then the task-specific capabilities are 
integrated into broader functional capabilities such as operations capability, R&D 
and design capability, marketing and sales capability and human resource 
management (HRM) capability, and even a higher level cross-functional capability, 
for example new product development, customer support capability and quality 
management capability).  Firm-specific capabilities are difficult to acquire and need 
to be built within the firm: hence the importance of learning, since capabilities (as 
post M&A performance often shows) are difficult to purchase. In short, a core 
competence must differentiate from the competition; it must be distinctive (Leonard-
Barton, 1992).  Core competences relate to potential outputs and are not measured in 
input metrics such as expenditure on R&D, size or fixed to variable cost ratios.  Hitt 
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and Duane (1985) found a clear correlation between having distinctive core 
competences and performance.  
 
In the era of the MNCs’ networks, in which supply chains or value network consortia 
of firms compete rather than individual firms (Porter 1992); core competences are 
best evaluated at the level of the key development network(s) to which the firm 
belongs, rather than only its in-house competences.  Apple’s innovation pipeline is 
an example of such a network core competence model: relying upon innovation by 
chip and device manufacturers, whilst maintaining strict control over design and 
business model competences.   
 
Counter examples might be Sony, or more recently Toyota who have arguably lost 
core competences by (Sony) outsourcing design and (Toyota) outsourcing without 
sufficiently overseeing key component manufacture:  similar examples from earlier 
technological phases (semiconductor manufacturing) are given by Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990).  Cooper’s (1995:5) point is that there are no sustainable competitive 
advantages: competitors innovate (product innovation and continuous improvement), 
markets alter (expectations, customer discernment, new business models) and new 
technologies become available (new complementarities and barriers) and continually 
evolving.  In this sense, a key element of the core competences approach is 
alignment between the firm’s strategy and its evolving competences.  As strategy and 
opportunities evolve so must core competences: one important way of doing this is to 
continually refresh ‘deutero-learning’ (Bateson 1973) i.e. to find new ways of 
learning new things, often terms building absorptive capacity.  This emphasises the 




3.3.3 Summary and Implications for This Study 
This section indicates how important the absorptive capacity is to learning and 
knowledge exploitation, and how absorptive capacity evolves from a firm’s ability to 
become a dynamic capability in a process view.  This section is to address research 
question three (i.e. how MNC subsidiaries exploit learning and develop capabilities). 
Absorptive capacity is characterised by a learning capability and the possession of 
cognitive problem-solving skills.  Learning is the absorption of knowledge, and 
problem-solving is application to commercial effect.  These skills can equally be 
embodied within the individual or the organisation (Langlois 1997) often exploiting 
what Pavitt (1991) terms firm-specific capabilities.  To what extent absence of 
absorptive capacity inhibits the impact of knowledge transfers?   
 
This research synthesises Winter’s (2000:983) definition of organisational 
capabilities, as ‘a high level of routine that, together with its implementing input 
flows, confers upon an organisation’s management a set of decision options for 
producing significant outputs of a particular type’, and Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990), 
to explore a certain level (could be high or low) of routine that generalised from 
learning, confers upon an organisation’s management a set of decision options for 
better performance.  The organisational capabilities that this work will explore in 
Chinese MNCs are as Grant (1996b) suggested single-task capabilities and broad 
functional capabilities.  The reason why the higher level of cross-functional 
capabilities will not be included is due to the limit of the case sample, the majority of 
them are small sale organisations highly relying on their HQs for products 
development and supply.  
 
As mentioned in chapter two, a number of scholars (e.g. Buckley et al., 2007 and 
2008) have found that more and more Chinese MNCs invest overseas for strategic 
asset-seeking (e.g. advanced R&D, managerial skills, local talents).  Deng (2007) 
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argues that the main motivation of Chinese MNCs investing in advanced economies 
is to seek strategic knowledge and capabilities, and Chinese MNCs need to expand 
their international market to seek proprietary technologies and managerial know-how 
to strengthen their competitive advantages.   Liu and Tian (2008) also identify that 
both market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking are the two major motives of 
Chinese OFDI into the UK.  Therefore, the learning and capabilities development 
will occur in the areas relating to the subsidiary’s key motives, including R&D, 
HRM, operation management and marketing. 
 
 
3.4 How Subsidiary’s Learning and Capabilities are Transferred to MNCs as a 
Whole 
 
This section examines extant research that provides the knowledge to the study’s 
second fourth research question: How do UK subsidiaries transfer the knowledge and 
developed capabilities to the HQs? 
 
3.4.1 The MNC as an Agglomeration for Knowledge Transfer 
Dunning (1958) and Vernon (1966) initially emphasised the importance of 
knowledge transfer from HQs to a subsidiary.  Later, numerous researchers (e.g. 
Becerra-Fernandez and Sabherwal, 2001; Gold et al., 2001; Gupta and Govindarajan, 
2000; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Tsai, 2001) focus on knowledge flow within MNCs 
in general.  Until today there are still limited scholars (e.g. Ambos et al., 2006; Zhou 
and Frost, 2003) who study how knowledge is transferred from a subsidiary to HQs.   
 
In line with their evolutionary theory of MNCs, Kogut and Zander (1993) argue that 
the MNC can be seen as a knowledge integrating organisation that has the ability to 
integrate, combine and create new knowledge throughout its subunits (HQs and 
subsidiaries).  Doz and Santos (1997:4) later argue, ‘leveraging internationally the 
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know-how advantages derived from a home country competence cluster is no longer 
sufficient to underpin competitive advantage unless the home base remains the only 
crucible of new technologies, competencies and leading customers’. This 
conventionally interprets Ambos et al.’s (2006) argument that HQs increasingly act 
as a recipient of knowledge from their worldwide subsidiaries.  
 
 Zhou and Frost (2003:4), however, observe that reverse (from a subsidiary to HQs) 
knowledge flow is ‘a realistic and perhaps even necessary ‘stepping stone’ in the 
evolution of the multinational toward a true distributed innovation network, one that 
may not necessarily involve a coordinating centre’.  Therefore this research will seek 
evidence whether Chinese MNCs systematically gather knowledge and 
systematically seek to disseminate and exploit it in their organisations. 
 
Knowledge transfer is a non-linear process, as Minbaeva et al. (2003:587) argue: ‘the 
key element in knowledge transfer is not the underlying (original) knowledge, but 
rather the extent to which the receiver acquires potentially useful knowledge and 
utilizes this knowledge in own operations’.  Foss and Pedersen (2002:54) further 
point out that ‘transfer of knowledge is often associated with modification of the 
existing knowledge to the specific context’.  Even the simplest technological 
processes or systems require adaptation in a new social-cultural setting; the transfer 
of knowledge is necessarily linked to the generation and socialisation of knowledge.  
Such learning is likely to be continuous, for as Szulanski (1996:28) argues that ‘the 
movement of knowledge within the organization is a distinct experience, not a 
gradual process of dissemination, and depends on the characteristics of everyone 
involved’.   
 
Szulanski (1996) further identifies intra-firm knowledge transfer as an unfolding 
process consisting of initiation (i.e. the discovery of the need and search for potential 
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solution that leads to the discovery of superior knowledge), implementation (i.e. the 
physical flows of knowledge from the source to the recipients), ramp-up (i.e. the 
recipients using the transferred knowledge often ineffectively in the beginning then 
ramping up to achieve a satisfactory result) and integration (i.e. the use of transferred 
knowledge becomes routinized and eventually institutionalised.  According to Argote 
et al. (2000), in and organization knowledge is transferred through a number of 
mechanisms, and they summarise these mechanisms as personnel movement 
(Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Gruenfeld et al., 2000); training (Moreland and 
Myaskovsky, 2000; Thompson et al., 2000); communication (Levine et al., 2000; 
Rulke, et al., 2000; Stasser et al., 2000); observation (Nonaka, 1991); technology 
transfer (Galbraith, 1990); replicating routines (Szulanski, 2000b); patents, scientific 
publications, and presentations (Appleyard, 1996); interactions with suppliers and 
customers (von Hippel, 1988); and alliances and other forms of inter-organizational 
relationships (e.g. Darr, et al., 1995; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999).   
 
Later, Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) also identify some mechanisms of knowledge 
transfer from one organisation to another for example training programs, social 
events, transferring experienced personnel, providing documents, etc.  Sammarra and 
Biggiero (2008) further suggest that the more mechanisms supporting both formal 
and informal interactions between individuals and groups of the firms are adopted, 
the more likely will be knowledge transfer.  
 
Quality of knowledge flow is quite different from quantities of (raw) data or 
(unfiltered from value-addedness) information sharing.  According to Ambos and 
Ambos (2009:2), for the MNCs the value of knowledge transfer for the recipient unit 
(HQs or subsidiary) ‘should be assessed by evaluation the benefit of the received 
knowledge to the recipient unit, rather than by measuring the quantity of knowledge 
flows’.  Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) also suggest, ‘knowledge transfer can be 
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measured by changes in knowledge, levels of innovativeness, or performance of the 
recipient firm’.  They further argue that a significant amount of knowledge acquired 
by firms may be implicit (tacit) knowledge that cannot be easily measured.  This 
wider framework of knowledge transfer challenges the Simon tradition of 
understanding knowledge transfer from an information theory perspective.  This 
perspective with roots in quantitative sciences suggests that the quantity of 
information flows reflects knowledge transfer processes.   
 
Andersson et al. (2002) identify three problems that make tacit, non-codified and 
specific knowledge difficult to transfer within subsidiary’s networks.  First is the 
difficulty of separating such knowledge from the entities that the knowledge is 
embedded in and transferring to another organisation (Jensen and Meckling, 1992; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Szulanski, 1996; Zander and Kogut, 1995; Grant, 1996; 
Spender, 1996; Hansen, 1999).  Later Simonin (2004) also suggests that the 
ambiguity is related more with tacit knowledge than with explicit knowledge, and the 
ambiguity of knowledge has a direct and negative impact on knowledge transfer. 
Another two difficulties are the knowledge receivers’ ability and willingness to 
absorb new resource (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Szulanski, 1996).  The former 
refers to absorptive capacity, and Van Wijk et al. (2008) further argue that 
organisational characteristics such as size and absorptive capacity positively affect 
knowledge transfer. Some scholars (e.g. Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000; Minbaeva et al., 2003) have observed that the level of 
knowledge transfer in MNCs is positively associated with the absorptive capacity of 
the receiving units.  Szulanski’s (1996) empirical result suggests that the recipient 
lacks absorptive capacity is the most significant impediment to knowledge transfer.  
 
In addition to absorptive capacity, Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) have also 
discovered that the richness of transmission channels and motivation to absorb 
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knowledge have a positive impact on knowledge transfer.  The latter is concerned 
with a subsidiary’s motivation to learning.  Huselid (1995: 637) emphasises the 
importance of motivation by arguing, ‘the effectiveness of even highly skilled 
employees will be limited if they are not motivated to perform’.  It has also been 
argued that the recipient’s motivation to learn is a central determinant to the extent of 
knowledge transfer (Hamel 1991); the donor’s intent to teach is another key element 
(Ko et al., 2005).  Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) further identify the two factors may 
affect each other.  Many MNCs subsidiaries have the status of small to medium sized 
enterprises; therefore, codification of knowledge into standard working procedures 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) may not be the main driver of learning.  This highlights 
the importance of identifying how the three issues of subsidiary’s networks, 
absorptive capacity and motivation affect knowledge flow, particular tacit and 
specific knowledge flow.  
3.4.2 Summary and Implications for This Study 
This section indicates how important knowledge transfer is to MNC innovation 
processes and how these processes are invariably adaptable.  This research will adopt 
Szulanski’s (1996) process view, because ‘a process view allows a closer 
examination of how difficulty evolves over stages of the transfer.  It can also provide 
insight into the working of different organizational arrangements to transfer 
knowledge, inform managerial interventions and help design organizational 
mechanisms that support knowledge transfer’ (Szulanski, 2000a:10).   
 
This study hopes to give knowledge transfer concrete meaning in terms of the 
relationships between Chinese subsidiaries and HQs by exploring the questions 
highlighted in this section.  Is knowledge embedded in subsidiary routines and 
processes or does it remain an individual competence?  Does knowledge seeking 
motivate Chinese OFDIs?  If so, is knowledge systematically gathered, disseminated 
and exploited by subsidiaries and HQs?  Do Chinese HQs have systems in place to 
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consider how learning from subsidiaries may be adapted to other market contexts?  
How much of the information flowing from a subsidiary to HQs is actually 
knowledge and is there evidence that it impacts on their capabilities?  Finally, the 
analysis will explore Easterby-Smith et al.’s (2008) proposition that HQs absorptive 
capacity can limit the importance of knowledge transfer on their business.  
Invariably, the creation and adaptation of knowledge are rooted in learning 
processes.  In summary, this section has addressed the research question four (i.e. 
how subsidiary learning and capabilities are transferred to the MNCs as a whole).  
 
3.5 Learning and Developing Capabilities in MNCs: Development of the 
Conceptual Framework 
 
This section shows how learning and capabilities (affecting performance) in MNCs 
interrelate, concluding with the three gaps in literature, which have chosen as the 
study’s research questions two, three and four.   
 
Over the past twenty-five years, the role of MNC subsidiaries has been developing 
from traditional downstream activities (e.g. sales, service and assembly) to comprise 
upstream activities, for example R&D, component production and strategic 
marketing, (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Mudambi 
and Navarra, 2004).  Thus the development of learning in both subsidiary and 
headquarter levels has replaced the traditional implementation of learning solely 
happening in headquarters (e.g. Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998, Birkinshaw and Fry, 
1998, and Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008).   
 
Mudambi and Navarra (2004) later also point out that ‘as multinational corporation 
(MNC) subsidiaries have become more closely linked to international networks, their 
knowledge intensity has risen, and some of their R&D has gained a more creative 
role’.  Numerous studies (e.g. Minbaeva et al., 2003; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004; 
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Schmid and Schurig, 2003; Szulanski, 1996; Van Wijk et al., 2008; Wang et al., 
2004) on learning in MNCs emphasise measuring the correlation between learning 
with related factors, for example Minbaeva et al. (2003) study the relationship 
between HRM practices and absorptive capacity, Mudambi and Navarra (2004) use 
the high-technology subsidiaries in the UK to test the impacts of subsidiary power 
and rent-seeking within MNCs on knowledge flows.  Given the numerous studies on 
learning in MNCs emphasise the importance of learning in MNCs and the role of 
subsidiaries-to-headquarters for learning, this study into these relationships in 
Chinese companies gains importance, especially since no previous research has 
focused on knowledge flows between UK-based Chinese subsidiaries and the HQs.  
 
In their paper of knowledge flow within MNCs, Mudambi and Navarra (2004) 
emphasise four categories of knowledge flows: from subsidiary to parent, from 
location to subsidiary (from host country to subsidiary), from subsidiary to location 
(from subsidiary to host country), and from the parent (and other MNC units) to the 
subsidiary.  This study focuses on knowledge transfer within Chinese MNCs, 
therefore from subsidiary to location will be excluded.  Knowledge flows from a 
subsidiary to HQs enables a MNC to exploit locally-developed capabilities, acting as 
a knowledge integrator - locally-developed, in this context, means subsidiaries 
learning from their experiences in the foreign location.   Whilst home-based R&D 
and new product development is likely to always be important to the subsidiary, the 
important point here is that knowledge flow from the subsidiary to HQs can result 
from the subsidiary actively listening to and scanning the environment in its foreign 
location: this presumes that the subsidiary has absorptive capacity and that HQs is 
prepared to learn and innovate (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004).  From a resource-
based view, ‘subsidiary capability building facilitates more knowledge flows within 




For Cohen and Levinthal (1989), absorptive capacity is the prior related knowledge 
that enables a firm from scanning its environment to select and commercially exploit 
new knowledge that helps solve customers’ problems.  Based on their ‘experiential 
learning theory’, Kayes et al. (2005) summarise cross-cultural absorptive capacity 
into seven categories: ‘valuing different cultures, building relationships within the 
host culture, listening and observing, coping with ambiguity, translating complex 
ideas, taking action and managing others’.  They also argue that absorptive capacity 
across national boundaries and cultures becomes significantly important for MNCs 
successfully managing innovation internationally.  Minbaeva et al. (2003) found that 
the absorptive capacity of subsidiary positively correlates to the level of knowledge 
transfer within the MNCs.  Kayes (2002) and Kayes et al. (2005) point to the 
importance of language for cross-cultural absorptive capacity.  According to Kayes 
et al. (2005), learning the host country language is crucial for improving absorptive 
capacity (Dunbar, 1992) and developing meaningful relationships (Dean and Popp, 
1990). 
 
Kayes et al. (2005) have studied different cohorts of Japanese managers working in 
the US subsidiaries; the result shows that the process of development of absorptive 
capacity moves from generating competencies to action taking and organising 
competencies, which is distinctive from the US managers.  This result also supports 
Yamazaki (2004)’s theory: the development of cross-cultural competencies is always 
culturally-specific (i.e. within a specific host environment).  Wang et al.’s (2004) 
study assumes a traditional linear transfer model, the variable in which is the 
absorptive capacity of the Chinese subsidiary to receive knowledge from HQs.  
However, this approach potentially diminishes the learning ability of the Chinese 
subsidiary.  If this is the case, then the Chinese subsidiary will operate on an old 
passive model, as the recipient of knowledge from the parent company rather than 
the generator of knowledge resulting from its interaction in the foreign location.  
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This study will seek to reveal the extent to which Chinese subsidiaries are knowledge 
generating.  
 
Andersson et al. (2001) argue: ‘an MNC subsidiary often functions as a link between 
competence development in the external environment and in the corporate 
environment.’  The assimilation and commercialisation of new knowledge is carried 
out through the relationships with both external and corporate counterparts.  They 
further argue that the processes behind competence development within an MNC are 
located at three different levels - the business relationship level, the subsidiary level 
and the corporate level.   
 
This study explores knowledge transfer in Chinese MNCs at these three levels.  It 
begins with subsidiary absorption of knowledge through members’ learning and 
ingesting new members (here indicates expatriates and local talents), followed by 
subsidiary exploration of knowledge leading to capabilities development.  The third 
level, the corporate level is concerned with that subsidiary transfers the new 
knowledge and developed competences to HQs might aid developing HQs’ 
capabilities.  Derived from the resource-based view of the firm, guided by this three-
stage assumption, this study develops a conceptual framework, shown in figure 3.2, 
and uses this framework to explore learning in the UK-based Chinese subsidiaries 






Figure 3.2 The Processes of Capabilities Developments in Chinese MNCs 
 
 
Figure 3.2 depicts the conceptual framework.  It begins with knowledge sources and 
knowledge gaps.  This aligns with March’s (1999) early study of knowledge gaps, 
and Peterson et al. (2008) later definition of them as ‘knowledge gaps in foreign 
markets as discrepancies between the knowledge possessed and the knowledge 
needed for successful business ventures abroad’.    
 
This study will explore to what degree that a subsidiary identifies the knowledge (or 
sources, or capabilities) that it lacks and needs to strengthen its competitive 
advantage.  Based on the discussion about the major motivations of Chinese OFDI 
into the developed countries and even the UK, this knowledge is mainly scattered in 
four areas i.e. operational management, HRM, marketing and R&D.  Peterson et al. 
(2008) suggest that knowledge gaps motivate actions to fill up the gaps.  As 
indicated in figure 3.2, motivation links knowledge gaps to the second stage: the 
subsidiaries learn from the internal and external networks, just as Gupta and 
Govindarajan (2000) suggest that knowledge transfer crucially depends on the 
motivation of the organizations to learn.   
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Psychic distance is also emphasised at this phase, since numerous scholars in 
international business area, (such as Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Singh, 1988 and Hakansson and Ambos, 2010) 
highlight the importance of the degree psychic distance prevents the flow of 
information between the OFDI subsidiaries and the local market, sometimes referred 
to as the liability of foreignness.  As there is clearly significant psychic distance 
between the UK and China, psychic distance is likely to affect learning by Chinese 
subsidiaries.   
 
In accordance with Simon’s (1991) argument on organisational learning, the second 
phase of this study explores how subsidiaries undertake learning using existing staff 
and also through recruiting new employees who have new knowledge from their 
internal and external networks.  As figure 3.1 illustrates, knowledge networks consist 
of both internal networks (i.e. the HQs) and external networks (e.g. customers, 
competitors, business consultants and regulators/policy makers).  In practice, this 
study will analyse how the existing employees learn through the subsidiary’s internal 
and external networks, and how the subsidiaries absorb new knowledge via 
recruiting the expatriates and local talent. 
 
Deng (2007) argues that Chinese MNCs such as TCL, Huawei, Haier, Lenovo that 
have strong absorptive capacity, have a strong tendency to invest overseas targeting 
the absorption and exploitation of strategic resources.   Absorptive capacity (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002) emphasises a firm’s ability to 
recognise, assimilate and exploit the new knowledge to commercial ends.  Therefore, 
the absorptive capacity has an impact on the subsidiary’s learning and knowledge 
integration/exploitation.  The first two phases in figure 3.2 indicate the business 
relationship level introduced by Andersson, et al. (2001), which is followed by 
knowledge exploitation/integration.  To what extent explicit and implicit knowledge 
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is exploited/integrated within the subsidiaries?  For example, March (1991:85) 
argues that ‘the essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing 
competencies, technologies and paradigms’.  
 
Exploitation reflects a firm’s ability to harvest and incorporate knowledge into its 
operations.  Various researchers including Tiemessen, Lane, Crossan, and Inkpen, 
(1997); Van den Bosch et al. (1999); Peterson et al. (2008); and Zahra and George 
(2002), suggest that integration mechanisms can facilitate knowledge sharing and 
eventual exploitation of knowledge.  Grant (1996b) argues the specialised knowledge 
can be integrated into certain level of capabilities.  Therefore, knowledge 
exploitation leads to stage four, new capabilities development.  These two stages 
emphasise on the subsidiary’s ability to exploit knowledge resulting to organisational 
capabilities enhanced, which refers to Andersson, et al.’s (2001) subsidiary level.  
 
Once the subsidiary has developed new organisational capabilities, then it is able to 
share these with the HQs.  Knowledge transfer from the subsidiary to the HQs begins 
with initiation, as Szulanski (1996) illustrated ‘a transfer begins when both a need 
and the knowledge to meet that need coexist within the organization, possibly 
undiscovered.  The discovery of the need may trigger a search for potential solutions, 
a search that leads to the discovery of superior knowledge’.  Minbaeva et al. (2003) 
suggest the key outcome of knowledge transfer is not the amount of knowledge 
being transferred; rather the receiver absorbs and exploits the useful knowledge to 
improve its operations.  Thus the transferred knowledge is exploited and eventually 
becomes organisational capabilities (shown in the last stage).  The framework is a 
little mechanical and linear since the study presumes that this is how Chinese MNCs 





3.6 Overall Conclusion and Implications for This Study 
 
In summary, these arguments address the second research objective i.e. exploring 
and examining the learning and capabilities development in Chinese MNCs in the 
UK focusing upon three related research questions.  First, how does the learning 
occur in Chinese MNC’ subsidiaries in the UK?  As Andersson et al. (2001) research 
illustrates, simply measuring inputs and outputs fails to gain rich data on how 
knowledge is learned; therefore, the approach will be processual: centring managers 
and staff as the learners.  Second, how do UK subsidiaries develop the capabilities?  
The study will be identifying the process that subsidiaries commercialise learning to 
develop their capabilities.  Third, how do UK subsidiaries transfer the developed 
capabilities to their parent companies?   
 
The resource-based view emphasises that firms are able to build competitive 
advantages through learning new knowledge.  Through comprehensive analysis the 
concept of knowledge, from a business perspective, a new definition of knowledge 
has been developed (i.e. learning capable of purposive commercial deployment 
between HQs and subsidiaries over time) for MNCs, and expects to test the 
proposition via the empirical work.  The main challenges of knowledge transfer, in 
particular for tacit knowledge flows are a firm’s absorptive capacity and motivation.  
Derived from Andersson et al.’s (2001) three levels of capabilities development in 
the MNCs, this research develops a conceptual framework to demonstrate the 
learning process in Chinese MNCs.   
 
Within MNCs, Barney et al. (2001) argue that the resource-based view ‘has helped 
to specify the nature of resources required to overcome the liability of foreignness 
and provided a bridge to investigate the resources that provide the foundation for 
product and international diversification’.  It because from resource-based view, 
OFDI is an effective vehicle to assimilate and generate new resources leading to 
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improved performance (Lee and Slater, 2007), therefore MNCs overcome the 
liability through continuously absorbing and exploiting new resources.   
 
According to Zaheer (1995), the liability of foreignness is ‘broadly defined as all 
additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas incurs that a local firm would 
not incur’.  In another word, the liability of foreignness is the propensity of 
companies to trade with and relate to other firms enjoying shared culture and 
languages, what Beckerman (1956) called psychic distance.  Psychic distance was 
initially adopted in Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) and is now widely used in comparative trade (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988) and wider social comparison studies (e.g. Brouthers and Brouthers, 
2001).   
 
In order to overcome the liability of foreignness, Child and Rodrigues (2005) argue 
that leading Chinese firms tend to acquire advanced technological resources through 
internationalisation; or even assimilate knowledge (for example international 
production or quality standards) via contracts or partnerships with successful foreign 
firms before internationalising.  Deng (2009) also finds that Chinese firms adopt 
cross-border M&A to access and source strategic assets to strengthen their 
competitive advantages. 
  
This study adopts Ambos and Ambos’ (2009) and Easterby-Smith et al.’ (2008) 
qualitative measures of knowledge transfer rather than quantity of information flows.  
It looks at the impact of knowledge transfer on capabilities development in Chinese 
MNCs, not simply the accumulation of information.  The research will map the 
quantity knowledge flows from UK subsidiaries to the HQs, in order to explore the 
deeper qualitative issue of how much of the knowledge flow actually impacts upon 
the HQs’ business.  
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This research examines the pattern and the processes of learning, capabilities 
development and knowledge transfer of Chinese OFDI in the UK, from which it 
draws the methodology.  This chapter presents an account, which explains why the 
methodology is used and how it is used.  The chapter is organised into six parts: the 
next section presents the research questions drawn together at the end of the 
literature review sections (chapter 2 & 3) and derived from the conceptual 
framework.  Section 4.3 discusses the choice of the philosophical approach that 
underpins the methodological choice in this study.  Section 4.4 illustrates a detailed 
research design of the empirical work including quantitative and qualitative research 
designs, each covers questionnaire or interview schedule design, data collection, data 
presentation and data analysis.  The ethical issues are presented in section 4.5, 
followed by the conclusion chapter in section 4.6.  
 
4.2 Research Questions 
 
Since the first Chinese subsidiary established in 1920s, UK has become one of the 
most attractive overseas investment markets for Chinese MNCs.  Within the last 
decade, China’s OFDI has grown dramatically in the UK, research interest in 
Chinese MNCs increases, in particular the overall pattern of the UK-based Chinese 
subsidiaries and their operations in relating to knowledge and capabilities.  It has 
been argued that one of the critical reasons for the OFDI from the emerging markets 
such as China, investing in the developed countries is to assimilate new knowledge, 
resources and capabilities (Deng, 2007).  Researchers have studied the pattern of 
Chinese OFDI worldwide in terms of the development, motivation, overall benefits 
and performance (e.g. Wong and Chan, 2003; Wu and Chen, 2001).  However, there 
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is little research about the Chinese MNCs investing in the UK, and even fewer 
studies of learning and capabilities development undertaken by the UK-based 
subsidiaries.  Given the insights gained from the literature review, and guided by the 
conceptual framework, two research objectives and four research questions have 
been generated (shown in table 4.1).  As figure 3.2 shows, knowledge flows arising 
from knowledge gaps and capabilities development is at the heart of this research: it 
is this that informs the research design, the data and the methods for data gathering 
and analysis all of which are detailed in this chapter. 
 
Identifying the learning and capabilities development in Chinese MNCs (in the UK) 
is the main objective of this research.  The question whether learning occurs and 
capabilities are enhanced becomes a pivotal and fundamental issue; the whole 
research will be pavilion in the air if there is no learning undertaken by Chinese 
subsidiaries based in the UK.  However, there is only one piece of work (by Liu and 
Tian, 2008) that studies Chinese MNCs investments in the UK and it focuses on 
entry modes and motives for internationalisation.  In order to explore learning, it is 
crucial to understand the general pattern of Chinese OFDI, therefore another 
objective is developed: to identify and investigate the characteristics and motivations 
of Chinese OFDI in the UK, aiming to build foundation stones for the second 
objective (see figure 4.1).  In order to achieve objective one, the first research 
question (figure 4.1) is constructed to understand the overall population of Chinese 
firms in the UK.  Another three research questions (see figure 4.1) are developed to 




Figure 4.1 Research Objectives and Questions 
 
 
In order to answer these research questions, appropriate philosophical and 
methodological methods are needed, which are presented in the following sections.  
Returning to figure 3.2; the first research question establishes whether the 
presumptions in my conceptual model are correct, questions two, three and four are 
derived from figure 3.2: ‘how’ does learning occur and become exploited in the 
subsidiaries, and then (bottom left of figure 3.2) ‘how’ is learning and new 
capabilities shared with the HQs.  From the conceptual model, this study asks 
conceptual not descriptive questions, though the answers will be derived from 







4.3 Philosophical Approach 
 
For Neuman (2003:71) positivism is ‘an organized method for combining deductive 
logic with precise empirical observations of individual behaviour in order to discover 
and confirm a set of probabilistic causal laws that can be used to predict general 
patterns of human activity’.  This suggests that a positivist approach can be adopted 
to explore the context and the trend of Chinese OFDI and the processes of learning 
and capabilities development in Chinese MNCs.  Though deductive research strategy 
‘derives its ontological and epistemological assumptions from critical realism’, it 
adopts positivist ontological assumptions. Thus both inductive and deductive 
strategies are based on positivist ontology assumption (e.g. Harre and Secord 1972).    
 
According to Blaikie (2000), in order to see whether the data matches the hypotheses 
to answer the ‘why’ questions, in the ‘deductive’ strategy, data collection need to be 
guided by the hypotheses that are derived from theories.  Unlike the ‘deductive’ 
strategy, hypotheses are not required in the ‘inductive’ strategy; instead 
generalisations and even theories are developed from the data.  Blaikie (2000) 
argues, the ‘inductive’ strategy is used for two purposes: to pursue exploratory and 
descriptive objectives to answer ‘what’ questions.  Research question one (what is 
the pattern and main motivations of Chinese OFDI in the UK?) is a straightforward 
‘what’ question, thus, the ‘inductive’ strategy is appropriate.  Research question two, 
three and four are ‘how’ questions: (2) How does the learning occur in Chinese 
MNC’ subsidiaries in the UK? (3) How do UK subsidiaries exploit learning and 
develop capabilities? (4) How do UK subsidiaries transfer the knowledge and 
developed capabilities to their parent companies?), however, they can be simply 
transformed into ‘what’ questions ((2) what is the learning process in Chinese MNC 
subsidiaries in the UK? (3) What is the process of UK subsidiaries exploiting 
learning and developing capabilities? (4) What is the process of UK subsidiaries 
transferring the knowledge and developed capabilities to their parent companies?) 
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without changing the meanings.  Therefore, an ‘inductive’ strategy can be used to 
answer all the research questions.  
 
Whilst this study intends to induct conclusions from an assemblage of facts, some of 
these facts are quantitative and are therefore contrived using positivist methods, other 
qualitative material is constructed into a narrative explaining ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
Chinese subsidiaries act as they do in relation to knowledge flows.  Since chapters 
Two and Three have established no existing theory is readily applicable to the case 
of Chinese subsidiaries, it is not possible to use a conventional descriptive method of 
analysis.  Hence given the emergent nature of the subject, an exploratory approach, 
which as Bryman and Bell (2011) supports new insights and understandings, capable 
of supporting further research, is adopted.  Without greater conceptual clarity the 
author is unable to conduct confirmatory research, (in)-validating hypotheses by 
drawing strong inferences from empirical testing; rather as Jaeger and Halliday 
(1998) suggest seeking sufficient understanding to provide a platform for further 
research into Chinese subsidiary learning and Chinese MNC knowledge flows. 
 
Primarily therefore, this research aims to achieve an internal (logical, conceptual 
robustness) validity, providing the scaffolding for further research, testing these 
concepts as hypotheses in a wider array of cases for external validity using cross-
sectional analysis.  
 
4.4 Research Design 
 
In order to answer the multi-dimensional and complex research questions, a mix of 
methods is used, i.e. quantitative and qualitative methods to gather data.  Attributing 
to the nature of the two objectives, though both quantitative and qualitative methods 
are considered in the initial research design, a comprehensive research design for 
qualitative study is not completed until the survey data has been collected and 
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analysed.  Therefore, quantitative and qualitative research designs are discussed in 
two sections.  
4.4.1 Stages of Research Design 
The structure of the research design was represented in thirteen stages (see table 4.1).  
The quantitative research design constitutes stages I through IV, while the qualitative 
research design constitutes stages V through XIII.  The following two sections will 
explain these stages in detail.  
Table 4.1 The Process of Research Design 
 
Stages Description of Stages 
Stage I: Questionnaire design Designing the self-completion questionnaire 
Stage II: Identification of 
companies & constructing dataset 
for Chinese OFDI in the UK 
Firm identification from varied sources (official 
documents, websites, officers from Chinese Embassy in 
the UK, etc.); the total 100 Chinese subsidiaries 
identified in the dataset 
Stage III: Survey data collection Sending out survey, chase-up and visit some of the 
companies 
Stage IV: Data analysis  Analysis of adequacy of explanation and identification 
of gaps. SPSS as a tool being adopted. 
Stage V: Initial plan for case 
studies 
Planning to conduct 3-5 case studies 
Stage VI: Interview schedule 
design 
Designing semi-structured interview schedule 
Stage VII: Initial approach to 
potential case companies 
Contact the potential case companies to express the 
willingness for case study, being rejected 
Stage VIII: Changing plan from 
case studies to larger number of 
interviews 
Having identified the difficulties of conducting case 
studies, changing the initial plan to conduct interviews 
from all the accessible organisations (subsidiaries and 
HQs) 
Stage IX: First round interviews Average of 90 minutes interviews of 40 interviewees 
from Chinese subsidiaries and HQs 
Stage X: Data coding Coding of all data against coding categories from the 
research conceptual framework 
Stage XI: Data analysis and 
reduction  
Analysis of adequacy of explanation and identification 
of gaps. Data reduction by focusing, discarding, 
abstracting and transforming data. 
Stage XII: Second round 
interview 
Average of 90 minutes interviews of eight managers in 
the subsidiaries 
Stage XIII: Overall analysis and 
re-evaluation 





4.4.2 Quantitative Research Design 
Bryman (2004: 62) defines quantitative method ‘as entailing the collection of 
numerical data and as exhibiting a view of the relationship between theory and 
research as deductive, a predilection for a natural science approach (and of 
positivism in particular), and as having an objectivist conception of social realty’. 
Blaikie (2000) also suggests that quantitative approach generally focuses on counting 
and measuring aspects of social life.  This emphasises the superiority of quantitative 
method in identifying behavioural patterns.  In order to draw a clear pattern about 
Chinese OFDI in the UK, a self-completion questionnaire (the mostly commonly 
used quantitative method for gathering data with large sample) was chosen.  Neuman 
(2003) suggests two main stages for conducting survey: planning and collecting data; 
the stage of planning mainly includes designing questionnaire and deciding the target 
population and drawing the sample.  In summary, questionnaire design, samples and 
data collection, also data analysis is presented in this section. 
 
Questionnaire Design 
This section presents stage I: questionnaire design. Questionnaire design is 
essentially about asking questions.  Bryman (2004) believes that the issue of how to 
ask questions is a major concern for all survey researchers, and whether to ask open 
or closed questions is another significant issue.  Open questions give much freedom 
and flexibility to respondents on how to answer questions; thus, researchers will be 
able to receive unusual replies and fresh ideas.  However, coding answers of open 
questions can be very time-consuming, and great demanding of effort from 
respondents may lead to low response rates (Bryman, 2004).  Since the questions of 
overall patterns of Chinese OFDI demands a large variety of facts, open questions 
appear inappropriate, thus, the majority of questions in the survey are designed as 




This study has followed Bryman’s (2004) ‘general rules of thumb’ to design the 
survey questions, always bearing in mind the research question, being precise with 
every question and practising answering the questions.  The questionnaire was 
designed in four parts: background information of the company and participant, the 
information of the UK-based subsidiary (in the past, present and future), the parent 
company in China and the relationship between parent company and the subsidiary 
(see Appendix II for details).  Design of the background information of the company 
and participant aimed at gaining the contacts in for the subsequent qualitative 
interviews.   
 
Guided by objective one, the survey questions were designed in two themes.  Given 
the insights of the first part of the literature review, derived from the work of Liu and 
Tian (2008) and Wu and Chen (2001), first set of descriptive questions were 
developed related to the pattern of Chinese OFDI: the questions covering the 
characteristics of the subsidiary such as its size, sector, entry year, entry mode, 
ownership and target markets.  Guided by objective two, and inspired by the work 
from Liu and Tian (2008), Edwards et al.’ (2002), Taggart and Hood’s (1999), Wu 
and Chen (2001) and Witt and Lewin (2007), the second set questions were designed 
to cover firm’s motives, overall benefits, recruitment methods, and also the 
relationship between the subsidiary and the HQs.  
 
Drawing upon Dunning’s (1988 and 1993) classification of the OLI advantages and 
four motivation categories, and also Liu and Tian’s (2008) survey about entry modes 
and motives of Chinese MNCs investment in the UK, 16 variables were identified to 
examine the motivations for Chinese OFDI into the UK.  These were two variables 
related to market-seeking i.e. more expansion opportunities in the UK and access to 
EU markets; four variables related to strategic asset-seeking i.e. to seek 
technology/R&D capabilities, to seek or advance managerial skills, to seek local 
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talent and to seek renowned brands; two variables related to efficiency-seeking i.e. 
lower operation cost in the UK and increasing production cost in the home country; 
one variable related to resources-seeking i.e. to see raw materials; three variables 
related to British local advantages i.e. lower political risks in the UK, easier access to 
financial markets in the UK and cultural and languages proximity; and also four 
other variables of Chinese government’s policy support, sufficient capital to be 
invested, competitive pressure at home and investment incentives in the UK.  These 
variables are adopted on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 represents not important and 
5 very important.  
 
Building upon Wu and Chen’s (2001) work of an assessment of outward foreign 
direct investment from China’s transitional economy, and also Liu and Tian’s (2008) 
motivation variables, 10 variables were identified with which to investigate the 
overall benefits of Chinese OFDI into the UK.  These include two variables related 
to market access i.e. new market and export market; three variables related to 
strategic asset access i.e. managerial skills, advanced technology, advance 
equipment; one variable related to efficiency access i.e. lower operational cost in the 
UK; one variable related to resource access i.e. natural resources; and also the other 
three variables of overseas funding, securing foreign exchange and contributing to 
stronger economic ties with the UK.  Like the variables used for motivation, these 
variables are also used on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 represents not important and 
5 very important.   
  
Taking inspiration from Taggart and Hood’s (1999) decision-making approach and 
Edwards et al.’ (2002) autonomy variables, 13 variables were identified to examine 
UK-based Chinese subsidiary’s degree of decision autonomy.  These are three 
variables related to financial management i.e. annual budget, monthly expenditure 
and long term investment; three variables related to recruitment i.e. choice of hiring 
 97 
 
new staff, permission about recruitment of staff, and replacement of senior 
managers; four variables related to management of products and services i.e. control 
of products or services quality, introduction of new products or services, 
establishment of new department, and pricing of products or services; and three 
variables related to market and investment i.e. choice of markets, choice of sales 
channels, and choice of investment projects.  Similar to the variables of motives and 
overall benefits, these variables are also adopted on a scale from 0 to 5, 0 being ‘not 
a consideration’, 1 being very weak and 5 being very strong.  
 
Samples and Data Collection 
This section represents stages II (identification of companies & constructing dataset 
for Chinese OFDI in the UK) and III (survey data collection).  To date, there is no 
database on Chinese OFDI in the UK, a view that was confirmed by two senior 
officers from Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of Chinese Embassy in 
the UK and Asian Department of London and Partners (the official promotional 
organisation for London).  Therefore several public sources were used to identify 
UK-based subsidiaries of mainland Chinese MNCs.  Most firms were identified 
through using the varied published business resources: the websites of Chinese 
Embassy in London, UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), ‘Think London’ (the 
predecessor of London and Partners), in addition to documents from China 
Enterprises Association in Britain.  Using the same resources and also the homepage 
of UK Business Directory, some Chinese MNCs’ webpage and business press such 
as Financial Times, augmented company contact details.  From these sources, 145 
subsidiaries of mainland Chinese MNCs in the UK were identified operational in 
2009.  This number was subsequently reduced to 121 as dissolved, dormant and 
liquidated firms were excluded from the database.  The database was further reduced 
to 102 companies after removing those companies without a valid postal address.  
The returned mails and the telephone calls led to the exclusion of a further two 
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companies for the reasons that they originated from Hong Kong (that is not in the 
scope of this research).  Therefore, the total identifiable population of Chinese 
subsidiaries is 100.  
 
The remaining 100 UK-based subsidiaries received the questionnaires and cover 
letters (explaining the objectives of the research) in English and Chinese, as well as 
the support letter from the author’s supervisor, Professor Nick Oliver (Head of the 
school) and a prepaid return envelope with the return address by post.  The mails 
were sent to the senior managers of the UK-based subsidiaries.  The first round of 
questionnaire was sent out in the beginning of October 2009 and chased up with 
telephone calls and even some visits (in November 2009) by the author.  Eighteen 
completed questionnaires were returned before the second round of reminding 
questionnaires being sent out in the beginning of December 2009.  In some cases, the 
questionnaires were re-sent either by mail or email, depending on the participant’s 
request.  Twenty-six completed questionnaires were received by February 2010; 
another four responses were received in the following four months by June 2010.  In 
total, 30 useable responses were received, giving a response rate of 30%.  
 
Data Presentation 
Survey data (see chapter five) was presented in a similar structure as the first part of 
literature review (in chapter two) i.e. beginning with matters of fact (i.e. descriptive 
factors about subsidiary’s size, year of subsidiary’s establishment, entry mode, 
sector, ownership and geographic markets); followed by the factors of opinions and 
interpretations including expectations for subsidiary’s future development, 
recruitment methods, motives and overall benefits.  Figures and tables were used to 






This section presents stage IV: data analysis. Blaikie (2000:236) argues that 
quantitative analysis methods contain four main categories: description, association, 
causation, and inference.  The main quantitative data analysis approach was 
distribution frequencies (including means and deviations), range analysis, variables, 
correlations and cross-correlations, which were presented using qualitative statistical 
methods.  SPSS was adopted to assist in quantitative data analysis.  When using 
SPSS toolkit, variables were divided into four groups: nominal variables, ordinal 
variables, interval variables and dichotomous variables; different approaches were 
also adopted for various types of analysis, for example, frequency tables and 
diagrams were highly used for univariate analysis.  Means and deviations were 
adopted to explore the degree of recruitment methods (tables 5.13 and 5.14), motives 
(see tables 5.15 and 5.16), and overall benefits (refer to tables 5.17 and 5.18). 
4.4.3 Qualitative Research Design 
Eisner (1979) defined qualitative research as concerned with processes rather than 
consequences: the researcher aimed to discover the whole situation rather than 
analysed reality by designing an independent-dependent variable model, whilst 
carefully choosing samples the hold variables.  Burns (2000) argues that qualitative 
research approaches have a tendency to be based on recognition of the significance 
of the subjective and to ‘understand events from the viewpoint of the participants’.  
In other words, qualitative interviewers pay attention to the interviewee's viewpoint; 
in order to gain rich and detailed data, encouraging the informants to talk about what 
they believe is relevant and important, guided by the interview schedule.  This study 
emphasised on exploring the processes of learning, knowledge transfer and 
capabilities development in Chinese MNCs, using recorded conversations to identify 
emergent theory.  The methodological approach to questions two, three and four was 
essentially qualitative, since quantitative approaches failed to differentiate between 
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the weight attaching to data arising from its source (important in Chinese companies) 
paying more attention to the size then typicality of the data and emphasised 
consequence rather than processes, to test rather than generate theory.   
 
The Process of Changing Initial Plan of Case Studies to Interviews 
This section states the stages of V (initial plan for case studies), VII (initial approach 
to potential case companies) and VIII (changing plan from case studies to larger 
number of interviews).  According to Hartley (1994:208), a case study was ‘a 
detailed investigation, often with data collected over a period of time, of one or more 
organisations, or groups within organisations, with a view to providing an analysis of 
the context and processes involved in the phenomenon under study’.  In line with the 
qualitative research method, a small number of in-depth case studies were considered 
initially.  As mentioned, the data collection and analysis of survey were completed 
before the qualitative research design, which allowed the author to be able to identify 
the potential firms for case study.  The number of respondents was restricted to 30, 
across 14 industrial sectors (see table 5.4).  Only the sector of transport had five 
subsidiaries (including two subsidiaries belonging to one parent company).   
 
It rapidly became clear that identifying a cross section of sectors, each with 
subsidiaries and HQs granting research access would be difficult.  This was 
especially so since in sectors such as transport learning and knowledge innovation 
levels were relatively lower than more high-tech industries such as electronics, 
telecommunication, and pharmaceuticals.  The second criterion for case selection 
was the existence of extensive operational functions, particularly R&D activity.  
Whilst six subsidiaries claimed to be involved in R&D activity (see table 5.5) most 
had only a limited range of operational functions.  It was therefore decided to 
interview HQ and subsidiaries most of whom were not connected.  Gaining access to 
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Chinese companies, especially to investigate deeply into their processes, remains 
difficult.   
 
Once the potential firms were chosen, the survey respondents were contacted and 
using personal ‘Guanxi’, five of these six companies were solicited for in-depth 
study in both the subsidiaries and their headquarters, but without success, even with 
less restricted criteria, such as only focusing the size of the subsidiaries.  The major 
difficulty was gaining access to the HQs to conduct observations.  Thirteen 
subsidiaries agreed to be interviewed; personal contacts introduced another two 
subsidiaries.  Two interviewees from the subsidiaries helped interviews to be 
conducted at their HQs, however the majority interviewees from the subsidiaries 
indicated unwillingness to help, or that they were in too low status to have Guanxi 
(connection) with the managers in the HQs.  It was therefore decided to deviate from 
the original plan and to conduct a larger number of interviews with semi-structured 
and in-depth interviews and without observations.   
 
Interview schedule design 
This section presents stage VI: interview schedule design.  According to Bryman 
(2004), a semi-structured interview is characterised by the researcher having a list of 
questions based on their research topics, allowing the interviewees freedom in how 
they respond to the questions; although all questions should be covered, questions 
may not follow on precisely in the sequence outlined in the guide and supplementary 
questions or requests for examples will be made.  The interview schedule became a 
guideline rather than a rigid script.  In contrast to a self-completion questionnaire, the 
semi-structured interview offered more freedom to both interviewers and 
interviewees; for example, the interviewer had opportunities to gain more extensive 





At the stage of preparing for semi-structured interview, Lofland and Lofland (1995) 
suggested researchers to ask themselves the question: ‘Just what about this thing is 
puzzling me?’  According to Bryman (2004), the puzzling factor can come from 
random thoughts in various contexts; from discussion with supervisors, peers, and 
relatives; and also from the relevant literature.  Following his guide on how to 
prepare a good interview, the topic areas were ordered and interview questions 
formulated, using comprehensive and familiar languages but avoiding leading 
questions.  In addition, background information such as name, gender and position 
were also recorded.  At the preparation stage, once the interview topics have been 
decided, the issue of designing questions turn to be important.  Based on Charmaz’s 
(2002) different phases of qualitative interview, three different types of questions 
were developed, initial open-ended questions such as interviews in UK subsidiaries, 
started with questions like ‘what knowledge gaps (between your own company and 
local companies) have you seen?’, intermediate questions such as ‘does the whole 
company encourage staff to learn? If yes, how?’, and ending questions such as ‘can 
you give me an example (a story) of your learning to improve your work?’ 
 
Referring back to the conceptual framework in figure 3.2, from the upper left of the 
diagram the connections between knowledge gaps and learning from internal and 
external networks were mediated via the psychic distance of the subsidiary to its host 
environment and its motivation to learn.  Gaps and motivation were therefore 
identified in the early phase of the interviews with the subsidiaries, linking then via 
questions on absorptive capacity to the extent to which new knowledge could be 
integration, especially in the form of developed capabilities by the subsidiary.  Only 
then was it possible to inquire if and how knowledge was transferred to the HQ (the 
mid-point in the bottom line of figure 3.2), and after that, whether from the transfer 




Conscious of the distinctive of background context and knowledge between 
subsidiaries and HQs and guided again by the conceptual framework (see figure 3.2), 
two different sets of interview schedules for the interviewees in the headquarters and 
the subsidiaries respectively were designed (see Appendix III for details).   
 
The interview schedule designed for the subsidiary focused on Andersson et al.’s 
(2001) first two levels of the processes of capabilities development in a MNC: the 
business relationship level and the subsidiary level.  Guided by the conceptual 
framework (figure 3.2) the interview schedule included themes such as identifying 
knowledge gaps, learning from internal and external networks, subsidiary learning 
via existing staff’s learning and/or through recruiting new employees with specific 
new knowledge, using absorptive capacity to absorb exploit and commercialise 
knowledge to develop new capabilities, and transferring knowledge and capabilities 
to the HQs.  The interview schedule developed for the HQs emphasised Andersson et 
al.’ (2001) third level of capabilities development: the corporate level: investigating 
knowledge dissemination, exploitation, and motivations by the HQs enabled to 
strengthen the capabilities within the MNC, with both ‘forward’ and ‘reverse’ 
knowledge transfer between the headquarters and the subsidiary.  
 
Interviews 
This section illustrates stage IX (first round interviews) and XI (second round 
interviews).  Lofland and Lofland (1984:25) suggested that when negotiating access 
to a research setting it was necessary to be ‘armed with connection, accounts, 
knowledge and courtesy’.  The issue of accessing informants was particularly crucial 
in this study due to specific culture issue of Guanxi (i.e. Chinese approach of 
networking), which played a significant role in relation to gaining trust and further 
connections.  The quantitative approach was intended to establish an empirical 
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platform for the study (were Chinese subsidiaries learning from their location and 
activities in the UK); it was hoped that this it would open doors to an interview 
sample for the qualitative study, as well contacts with the UK-based subsidiaries.   
 
All 30 companies that responded with questionnaires were contacted through phone 
and/or email (depending on the contact details) to arrange interviews.  Eleven of the 
UK-based subsidiaries agreed to be interviewed, and through the introduction of the 
survey participants, 23 managers within these 11 firms were interviewed.  Later, five 
further managers from another four subsidiaries were introduced to the study by the 
interviewees.  Thus, interviews were undertaken with 28 people including 22 
expatriate managers, two expatriate staff, three local Chinese employees and one 
local British employee from the UK-based Chinese subsidiaries.  Through the 
introduction of two subsidiaries’ Managing Directors, four managerial staff from two 
HQs based in China were interviewed. 
 
The main difficulty for qualitative data collection was obtaining access to the HQs.  
After accessing the 15 subsidiaries, it was hoped to enter HQs through the 
introduction these subsidiaries, since these subsidiaries supported the survey; 
however only two subsidiaries did this.  It was interesting that even with a 
recommendation from inside the company (subsidiary or HQs); other parts of these 
companies remained inaccessible for this study.   
 
In order to interview more HQs, other approaches were used.  Through personal 
contacts, a further eight interviewees from another five HQs, so 12 people (all 
Chinese) from seven Chinese HQs were interviewed in total.  In summary, four 
Chinese MNCs (with both HQs and their UK subsidiaries), three Chinese MNCs 
(HQs only) and 15 UK Chinese MNCs (subsidiaries only) were interviewed (see 
table I in chapter six for details).  Therefore, 40 interviews in total were conducted, 
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39 in Chinese and one in English.  Interviews lasted one and a half hours on average, 
although some lasted up to two and half-hours. 
 
Arksey and Knight (1999) suggested: ‘the better we know or understand an area, 
whether through sensitive reading or from our own experience, the better we can 
connect with the interviewee’.  The result of the survey provided deep information 
and knowledge of the companies.  Additionally, the company’s websites and 
brochures were examined, as well as case studies of the successful Chinese MNCs. 
These all assisted better communication with interviewees.  Interviews were face-to-
face and business-like in form.  Interviews at HQs in China were in July, August and 
November 2010.  Interviews in subsidiaries in England were in October and 
December 2010.  Follow-up interviews were undertaken to gain deeper and more in-
depth data in a second round of interviews with eight managers in the subsidiaries in 
August and September 2011.  
 
Qualitative research interview is usually audio-recorded and transcribed afterwards. 
Recording helped interviewers to fully review the process and content of the 
interview afterwards, allowing her to focus on conducting the interview whilst it was 
taking place.  In this case, 23 out of 40 interviewees refused to be recorded.  
Bryman’s (2004) advice was followed, conducting the interview as usual, striking a 
balance between note taking and conducting the interview.  The pace of the 
interviews was inevitably slowed, and immediately after their conclusion, 
recollections were further dictated.  Although recording made the process of 
interview easier, subsequent transcription was time consuming and problematic.  
Typically a one-hour interview recording took six hours of work to transcribe.  
Transcription errors can also happen; Bryman (2004) argues that even experienced 
transcriptionists make mistakes.  Since only one interview was done in English, 
translation was another challenge.  The richest 15 interview transcripts were 
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translated into English, and for the other 25 transcripts only those parts cited in the 
thesis i.e. significant stories or quotations were translated.  
 
Data Coding and Presentation 
This section presents stage X: data coding.  Data coding involved content analysis of 
interview notes, the themes were represented in the tables shown in chapter six. 
Guided by the literature and the conceptual framework (figure 3.2) the transcripts 
were continually revisited until few new insights occur (Yin, 2009).  The interview 
data presentation was again based upon the flow in the conceptual framework (figure 
3.2).   It begins by identifying knowledge gaps in the subsidiary, followed by 
exploring learning from internal and external sources.  Then motivations and 
mechanisms for learning in the organisation were discussed.  The next was 
knowledge transformation and exploitation (realised absorptive capacity) at the 
subsidiary level, leading to organisational capabilities development.  The process and 
mechanisms of knowledge transfer was also presented in the chapter, and eventually 
the capabilities development in the HQs.  
   
Data Analysis 
This section presents stage XI (data analysis and reduction) and XIII (overall 
analysis and re-evaluation).  From both qualitative and quantitative data this study 
generated conceptual categories that were outlined in chapters five and six.  These 
concepts looked back to the information from which they were generated and looked 
forward to re-integration with general theory (Dretske, 1981:214).   
 
In line with the ‘inductive’ strategy, this exploratory research identified themes and 
patterns from the data.  Following Easterby-Smith et al.’s (1991) seven main steps 
for such analysis, after completing the transcripts and translation the documents were 
re-read in order to obtain ‘familiarisation’; a process of evaluation and critique was 
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then implemented for ‘reflection’; at conceptualisation stage, a set of concepts or 
variables were generated from the data; ‘cataloguing concepts’ was a crucial follow-
up step; as all the references to particular concepts were know, it was time to refining 
and ‘recoding’ the concepts; when the analytical framework and explanations 
became clearer, it began linking the empirical data with the general theories and the 
first draft was also produced; based on the comments of the supervisors, some re-
evaluation was implemented in some areas.   
 
As Miles and Huberman (1994: 11) indicated: ‘Data reduction is not something 
separate from analysis… (It) is a form of analysis that sharpens, sorts, focuses, 
discards, and organizes data in such a way that “final” conclusions can be drawn and 
verified’. The whole process is of familiarisation, reflection, re-conceptualising, 
cataloguing, re-coding and re-evaluation in the light of the exploratory nature of this 
research (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991).  
 
4.5 Ethical Issues 
 
Neuman (2003) argues that social researchers should follow ‘the ethical principle of 
voluntary consent: never force anyone to participate in research, and do not lie unless 
it is required for legitimate research reasons’.  As Bryman (2004) suggests, in this 
study all participants were given full information on the use and dissemination of the 
data and publications either in paper or verbally.  Data collection was conducted in 
accordance to the ethical guidelines adopted by the Association of Social 
Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth (ASA 1999).  The confidentiality of 
the participants and their companies were protected, and the collected data were only 
used for research purpose.  According to Bryman (2004), the issues about ensuring 
anonymity and confidentiality in relation to the recording of information and the 
maintenance of records relates to all methods of social research, interviewees’ wish 







This chapter presented a methodological procedure starting with two objectives and 
four research questions, guided by the conceptual framework derived from the 
comprehensive analysis of literature review.  In line with the nature of the research 
questions, the inductive philosophical approach was selected.  The evolution of 
research design experienced difficulty when the original plan (case studies) was 
unable to implemented, an alternative large number of interviews approach was 
adopted.  The process of data collection was not smooth, second-round interviews 
were undertaken to gather greater depth on learning processes.  Cultural and 
language issues were often confronted in international business research; the fact that 
the majority of the interviewees were Chinese reduced the barriers.  The author’s 
ability with Chinese language contributed to the interviews however increased the 
workload of translation.  Cultural and ethical issues were also raised.  Research data 
presentation will be presented in the following two chapters: survey data in Chapter 














This chapter is to address research question one.  It forms a context of Chinese OFDI 
into the UK (size, sector, patterns) and in particular the motivations of the firm and 
the degree to which learning is an important motive.  Analysis and discussion of the 
data that is reintegrated with the literature are presented to answer research question 
one. 
 
Chapter two investigates that earlier generation of OFDI from high-income 
economies had strong ownership advantages (i.e. strategic assets) and exported 
superior technologies to other advanced economies.  Being latecomers Chinese 
OFDI do not have strong ownership advantages, and often the Chinese technologies 
are inferior.  This chapter asks why Chinese firms are establishing subsidiaries in the 
UK.  This study gathers the largest dataset from UK-based Chinese subsidiaries and 
also tests the applicability of these dominant theories on internationalisation to the 
Chinese case.  Its central finding is that whilst the subsidiaries are market-seeking, a 
major motivation and result of China’s OFDI into the UK is knowledge-seeking.  
 
As section 4.4.2 above explained, the original research design was to interview UK 
subsidiaries and then cross reference their perspective on knowledge flows with that 
of their HQs.  Since the response rate was poor, the study was altered to obtain rich 





5.2 Initial Survey of Chinese OFDI Companies in the UK 
  
5.2.1 Introduction  
This Chapter presents the results of the survey of Chinese OFDI subsidiaries in the 
UK.  As mentioned in Chapter Four, the main objective of this research is to analyse 
the learning and capabilities development of Chinese MNCs in the UK.  In order to 
identify the processes of learning and capabilities development, it is crucial to ensure 
the existence of learning and developing capabilities within the China’s OFDI in the 
UK, otherwise the whole research becomes a pavilion in the air.  The four research 
questions, reflecting the conceptual framework (figure 3.2) is developed based on the 
two research objectives, and build on one another: the first research question (i.e. 
what is the pattern and main motivations of Chinese OFDI in the UK?) is the 
fundamental one for the whole research since pattern and motivation of Chinese 
OFDI into the UK shapes the learning and knowledge transfer that the other research 
questions address.  It is important to understand the nature of the Chinese OFDI in 
the UK and the reasons for their investment.  The entire research design is explained 
in chapter four; here in short the self-administered questionnaire is used to collect 
data to answer research question one.   
 
Developed on the literature review, the questionnaire (see appendix II for details) is 
designed in four parts:  emphasis on the details of the OFDI into the UK and some 
information about background information of the respondents, the parent company in 
China and the relationship between the subsidiary and the parent company.   
 
The questions are designed around two themes.  First, according to chapter two, 
questions were asked that were relevant to Chinese OFDI patterns: these include the 
characteristics of the subsidiary, its size, entry year and entry mode, ownership and 
target markets.  This follows the work of Wu and Chen (2001) and Liu and Tian 
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(2008) to give the results comparability with theirs.  Given this study’s focus 
(chapter 3) on learning and capabilities development, the second set of themes from 
the survey took inspiration from the work of Liu and Tian (2008), Schipani and Liu 
(2002) and Witt and Lewin (2007) exploring company motivations for OFDI and 
future prospects.  Questions are also added relating to the overall benefits to HQs of 
OFDI (seeking data on learning) and staff recruitment an indivisible factor to 
learning.   
 
This section is organised into two parts.  The first part addresses Chinese OFDI in 
the UK including section 5.2.2 to 5.2.8 present the survey findings on patterns of the 
OFDI into the UK (i.e. size, established year, entry mode, sector, ownership 
geographic markets, expected development in future and recruitment methods); 
followed by section 5.2.9 and 5.2.10, which present findings on the motives and 
overall benefits of Chinese OFDI in the UK. 
5.2.2 Size 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the original OFDI from China is small in size 
worldwide, and the majority of OFDI in the UK is also small-sized organisations 
(Liu and Tian, 2008).   
 
Table 5.1: Number of Employees in Survey Responses 
 
No. of employees No. of companies Percentage Cumulative 
percentage 
0- 9 13 43.3 43.3 
10- 49 10 33.3 76.7 
50- 99 2 6.7 83.3 
100- 249 3 10.0 93.3 
250+ 2 6.7 100.0 




Table 5.1 shows the 30 respondent companies by numbers of employees, noting that 
83% of UK subsidiaries have got less than 100 employees, with 77% less than 50 
and 43% less than 10. 
 
Murphy et al. (2004) suggest that a company can be termed ‘large’ with above 250 
employees: tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that 93% of Chinese subsidiaries in the UK are 
SMEs and not large companies, with an average of 49 staff.  This is similar to the 
findings of the survey conducted by Wu and Chen (2001), revealing that Chinese 
outward investment was dominated by SMEs and the scale of Chinese overseas 
investment was relatively small.  
 
Table 5.2: Average of Employees’ Number, Chinese Employees’  
Percentage, Sites and Turnover 
 
 Minimum Maximum Average 
No. of employees in UK 
subsidiary 
2 500 49 
% of Chinese employees 
in UK subsidiary 
0 100 50.3 
Sites in UK subsidiary 1 5 1.3 
UK subsidiary’s turnover 
in £ million  
0 1220.0 94.0 
 
 
Chinese enterprises in the UK have high percentage of Chinese employees (represent 
those who are originally from China and able to speak Chinese language) averaging 
50%.  This might show that Chinese employees who have language and cultural 
advantages could better link back to the HQs than Non-Chinese.  Average turnover is 




5.2.3 Entry Year and Entry Mode 
Chapter two has discussed that subsequent to the ‘Go Out policy’ in 1999, Chinese 
OFDI began second wave of internationalisation growth, the entry mode is 
comprised of wholly-owned, JV and M&A, however recently the dominant form is 
M&A.  Figure 5.1 shows the number of Chinese investments in the UK.  Prior to 
1980 such investment did not exist.  Before 2005, there was one subsidiary 
established per annum in the most years, except year 1986, 1995, 2002 and 2003 
with two subsidiary establishments in each year.   
 
Chinese OFDI activity became more significant between 2005 and 2010 with a peak 
of five subsidiary establishments in 2007.  Forty-three per cent subsidiaries were 
established between 1980 and 2000, 57% company establishments occur after year 
2000 and the general trend is increasing dramatically after 2000, although there was 
a little drawback at 2004.  In 2009 and 2010, the number of China’s OFDI 
establishment dropped back to one per annum might be the result of global financial 
crisis of 2007-2008.  Another reason could be that the survey data was collected 
between October 2009 and June 2010, some newly established subsidiaries were not 
yet published on the resources (i.e. the websites of Chinese Embassy in London, UK 
Trade and Investment (UKTI), ‘Think London’ (the predecessor of London and 
Partners), the documents from China Enterprises Association in Britain) that this 
study accessed.   
 
Table 2.3 (in chapter two) shows a continuously rapid growth in stock of China’s 
OFDI into the UK between 2003 and 2010 though it was a little drawback in 2008, 
and figure 2.1 (in chapter two) indicates the dramatic increase of China’s OFDI 





Figure 5.1: Chinese Enterprises in the UK: Dates of Establishment of Survey 
Finding 1980- 2010 
 
These imply the global financial crisis had little impact on the growth of Chinese 
OFDI into the UK by 2010.  This result is supported by the latest Knoerich’s (2012) 
finding that the number of China’s OFDI into the EU has not been substantially 
influenced by EU recession.   
 
As Deng (2004:14) argues, (the) ‘Chinese government has, to a great extent, played a 
crucial role in shaping the structure of China’s approved outward investment’.  This 
pattern is strongly influenced by China’s rapidly changing institutional arrangement, 
just one year after the ‘Open Door Policy’ being launched in December 1978, 
Chinese enterprises started to invest in the UK.  The continuous increase in number 
of establishments after 2000 could be the result of the ‘Go Out Policy’.  Furthermore, 
China’s entry into World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 also plays a significant 
role in China’s economic international expansion.  Chinese government’s statistics 
reveals that the globally average growth rate in stock of Chinese OFDI is 60% each 
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year (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2007).  Additionally, this pattern may prove 
some recent findings showing UK is one of the largest recipients of Chinese OFDI in 
Europe and China is the seventh largest investor in the UK (UKTI, 2012).  This 
pattern also corresponds to the table 2.3 (see chapter two) showing the stock of 
Chinese OFDI into the UK grows 17 times between 2003 and 2010.   
 
Seventy per cent of Chinese enterprises have entered into UK market through setting 
up their new wholly owned companies (see table 5.3), which corresponds to Luo et 
al.’s (1993) result of 78% wholly owned subsidiaries.  Wholly-owned subsidiaries 
comprise 70% of the sample, with 17% JVs and 13% M&As respectively.  This is 
similar to the findings of the survey conducted by Liu and Tian (2008), showing that 
in the UK nearly 60% Chinese subsidiaries are wholly Chinese owned.  However, 
Liu and Tian (2008) identify 40% JVs with local partners, which are much more than 
17% JVs in the current survey.  This phenomena may be explained by Child and 
Rodrigues’s (2005) statement that M&A as a replacement of JV becomes a preferred 
entry mode for China’s OFDI; some recent successful examples of M&A are also 
shown in table 2.2 (see chapter two).   
 
Table 5.3: Entry Mode of Survey Findings  
 
 No. of companies Percentage 
New wholly-owned 21 70.0 
Joint Venture (JV) 5 16.7 
Merger and Acquisition 
(M&A) 
4 13.3 
Total 30 100.0 
 
 
Zhao’s (1998) finding uncovered a different pattern:  with two third of Chinese 
enterprises choosing JV to reduce risks and market dominance, which may indicate 
pattern of Chinese OFDI entry mode has changed in last decade.  Seventy-five per 
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cent of M&As happened after 2000, which may reflect the 2001-present increasing 
trend of Chinese MNC’s international M&A (Yang et al., 2009).  
5.2.4 Sector 
The Chinese subsidiaries are spread across 14 industrial sectors (banking, 
construction, consumer goods, food and drink, insurance, IT, motor industry, oil and 
gas, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, publications, telecoms, transport and trade) 
(see table 5.4).   
 
Table 5.4: Sectors of Subsidiaries of Survey Findings 
Sectors Number of companies Percentage 
Banking/Finance 1 3.3 
Construction/Engineering 1 3.3 
Consumer Goods 1 3.3 
Food & Drink 2 6.7 
Insurance 3 10.0 
IT/Computers/Software 2 6.7 
Motor Industry 2 6.7 
Oil & Gas 2 6.7 
Petrochemicals 1 3.3 
Pharmaceuticals/Medical 2 6.7 
Printing/Paper/Publications 2 6.7 
Telecoms/Communications 4 13.3 
Transport 5 16.7 
Trade 2 6.7 
Total 30 100.0 
 
 
Overall, 50% of responding firms come from manufacturing sectors in the home 
market and 50% are from service sectors.  Again this is similar to Liu and Tian’s 
(2008) findings of 55% responding companies are from manufacturing industry and 
45% of which in service sectors.  However, according to this sole information, it is 
insufficient to conclude half of the Chinese subsidiaries are manufacturers.   
 
Table 5.5 indicates the activities pursued by these Chinese subsidiaries: note some 
companies perform more than one activity.  Seventy per cent of these subsidiaries are 
sale organisations, 43% are active in marketing, 37% undertake purchasing, 33% 
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perform logistics, 27% have service, and 20% undertake R&D activity and 3% have 
legal and manufacturing activities.  Those six companies committed with R&D are 
scattered in five varied sectors (i.e. banking, printing, telecoms, consuming goods 
and motor industry). There is only one company that is a manufacturer, an 
acquisition.  
 
One explanation could be that comparably high operational cost has made Chinese 
enterprises to choose to export manufacturing goods into UK rather than construct 
new manufactories in the host country.  It can also be concluded that the majority of 
these Chinese subsidiaries are sale organisations; this corresponds to high average 
turnover per capita of £ 2 million (see table 5.2).  
 
Table 5.5: Activities Performed in the UK 
 
Activities No. of the companies Percentage of the 
companies 
Sales 21 70.0 
Marketing 13 43.3 
Purchasing 11 36.7 
Logistics 10 33.3 
Services 8 26.7 
R&D 6 20.0 
Legal 1 3.3 
Manufacturing 1 3.3 
(Note: might be more than 1 activity per company) 
 
5.2.5 Ownership 
It has been discussed in Chapter Two, though there is OFDI by state-owned, private 
and collective firms, the majority members of OFDI are from SOEs; this 
phenomenon is significantly related to the guidelines of China’s SOEs reform.  Table 
5.7 shows that 73% parent companies are state owned, followed by 23% private 
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companies and 3% collective enterprises, defined as ‘owned by a group of 
individuals, who sometimes (but not always) work in a common work unit or live in 
the same neighbourhood’ (Chao and Yang, 1985).   
 
This result supports the findings of earlier researchers, named that Chinese state-
owned enterprises dominate the international economic expansion (e.g., Child and 
Rodrigues, 2005; Wu and Chen, 2001; Young et al., 1998).  The fact of that private 
companies are the second largest group of Chinese MNC’s internationalisation, 
supports Hou’s (1998) argument, following the state-owned enterprises, Chinese 
private companies became active in global economic expansion in the 1990s. 
 
Table 5.6: Ownership of Parent Company of Survey Findings 
 
Ownership of companies No. of companies Percentage 
State-owned 22 73.3 
Private 7 23.3 
Collective 1 3.3 
Total 30 100.0 
 
Chapter Two discusses the ownership advantages in Dunning’s (e.g. 1980, 1988, and 
2001) term.  Numerous scholars (for example, Barnard, 2010; Gao, Liu and Zou, 
2012; Peng, 2012) have found the ownership advantages of Chinese firms are mainly 
based on financial capability i.e. Chinese firms have sufficient finance to invest 
overseas, which is also considered as a push factor of OFDI motives.  Therefore it is 
important to know the financial methods of these OFDI into the UK.  Table 5.7 
shows 87% of the UK subsidiaries have raised the capital from their parent company; 
this corresponds to the high percentage of state-owned parent companies having got 
sufficient capital to support their subsidiaries.  Kuijus’ (2006) finding shows that 
Chinese SOEs are dividend-averse and have saved 20% of net profit.  To support this 
assertion, Deng (2004) argued ‘with its sustainable high economic growth, China not 
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only has substantial foreign capital inflows but also a big current account surplus, 
huge foreign reserves, and a high level of domestic savings’. 
 
Table 5.7: Main Financial Structure 
 
Financial methods No. of companies Percentage 
Capital from parent company 26 86.7 
Overseas enterprise loans 1 3.3 
International financial rental 1 3.3 
Secured loans 1 3.3 
Secured loans & capital from parent company 1 3.3 
Total  30 100.0 
 
5.2.6 Geographical Markets 
Chapter two has shown that geographical distribution of Chinese OFDI is mainly 
driven by their investment motives; although the most of Chinese firms begin the 
OFDI at nearer psychic distance locations such as other Asian countries, there are 
still number of OFDI leapfrog directly to the developed countries such as US and the 
UK.  
 
Table 5.8 indicates that 30% of these Chinese companies consider the UK as their 
sole target market with 70% of Chinese subsidiaries mainly targeting UK or EU 
markets.  Given that the EU is the largest trading partner of China in 2010 (DG 
Trade, 2011; Knoerich, 2012), this may imply that operation within EU tariff barriers 
are important to these companies.  43% mainly target beyond the sole UK and China 
and 20% also consider Africa as their main target market, which indicates UK is 
considered as an ideal springboard for international expansion (UKIT, 2009 and 
2012).  Only 17% Chinese subsidiaries mainly target Chinese markets, might 
indicate these firms have just recently started to invest overseas, or may also imply 





Table 5.8: Geographical Markets 
 
Geographical markets No. of companies Percentage 
UK 9 30.0 
UK & Ireland 3 10.0 
Europe 3 10.0 
Europe & Africa 2 6.7 
Europe, Africa & Middle East (EMEA) 2 6.7 
China 2 6.7 
China & UK 1 3.3 
China & Europe 1 3.3 
Asia & Africa 1 3.3 
Worldwide 1 3.3 
No answers 5 16.7 
Total 30 100.0 
 
Table 5.9 is the summary of table 5.8, indicating two third parent companies consider 
the worldwide as their main target market, and only 23% mainly target the Chinese 
market.  This shows the majority of the firms are involved in international trade and 
even investment, which could be the influence of internationalisation of Chinese 
economy and Chinese government policies.  
 
Table 5.9: Parent Company’s Geographical Markets of Survey Findings 
 
Geographical markets No. of companies Percentage 
China 7 23.3 
Asia 3 10.0 
Worldwide 20 66.7 
Total 30 100.0 
5.2.7 Expected Development in Future 
Table 5.10 shows the function of Chinese-owned UK companies (i.e. the 
organisation functions as a subsidiary or a regional headquarter). There is little 
change in the company’s function since they were established.  The percentage of 
HQs located in the UK has increased 3.3%, i.e. one affiliated organisation has been 
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promoted from a subsidiary to a regional headquarter, indicating little expansion in 
terms of functions in the UK companies since 1980.  
 
Table 5.10: Chinese-Owned UK Company’s Function of Survey Findings 
 
Company’s function Percentage 
When established Now Change 
Subsidiary 93.3 90.0 3.3 
Regional Headquarter 6.7 10.0 3.3 
Total 100.0 100.0  
 
Interestingly, with an average company annual turnover of £92 million (table 5.2), 
only one third of these companies (table 5.11) plan to extend their range of activities: 
in short the other two thirds, will in most cases, remain sale organisations.  One 
explanation could be the high operational cost in the UK restricts the further 
investment, the parent firms continue to manufacture products in low cost countries 
and sell them to the high-income economies like Britain.   
 
Table 5.11: Plans to Extend Range of Activities of Survey Findings 
 
 No. of companies Percentage 
Yes 10 33.3 
No  15 50.0 
No answers  5 16.7 
Total  30 100.0 
 
 
As table 5.12 illustrates, these companies do anticipate significant expansion of their 
sales activities and numbers of staff; the table shows the maximum, minimum and 
average expected increases.  Rates of expansion range from a factor of 25% times to 
100, with the average of 12 times.  The Chinese enterprises expect to increase in 
















Expected increase in sales in 5 
years 
x 25% x 100 x 12 
Expected increase in No. of 
employees in 5 years 
0 x 12 x 3 
 
Fifty per cent of subsidiaries have no plan to extend their range of activities (see 
table 5.12), however majority of them expect to increase their sales in 5 years.  They 
expect that average increase in sales is four times the average increase in employees’ 
number.  This indicates the majority of Chinese enterprises expect to increase sales 
through maintaining sale organisations in future.  The fact that little change in the 
functions of Chinese companies (table 5.10) in the UK in the past three decades has 
strengthened this argument.   
5.2.8 Recruitment Methods 
Table 5.13 shows five types of recruitment methods (i.e. expatriates, recruitment 
agency, pubic advertisement, family connection/recommendation and word-of-
mouth).  
 
The recruitment method of word-of mouth (SM mean = 1.71, MM mean = 2.20, NM 
mean = 2.14) is rarely used for all staff recruitment.  Expatriation (SM mean = 4.82) 
is a method mostly used for senior managers, only sometimes via a recruitment 
agency (SM mean = 2.79).  This indicates the subsidiaries are heavily controlled by 
parent companies.  Public advertisement (SM mean = 2.47) and family connection/ 
recommendation (SM mean = 2.40) are rarely used for choosing senior managers.  
Expatriation (MM mean = 3.82) is highly used for recruiting middle managers; 
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public advertisement (MM mean = 2.95) and recruitment agency (MM mean = 3.00) 
are sometimes used.  
 
Table 5.13: Recruitment Methods of Survey Findings 
 
 Recruitment methods Mean Std. deviation 
SM Expatriates 4.82 .53 
Recruitment agency 2.79 1.32 
Public advertisement 2.26 1.24 
Family connection/recommendation 2.40 1.14 
Word-of-mouth 1.71 .77 
MM Expatriates 3.82 1.54 
Recruitment agency 3.00 1.12 
Public advertisement 2.95 1.40 
Family connection/recommendation 2.60 1.10 
Word-of-mouth 2.20 .86 
NM Recruitment agency 3.15 1.39 
Public advertisement 2.95 1.50 
Expatriates 2.86 1.86 
Family connection/recommendation 2.77 1.07 
Word-of-mouth 2.14 1.03 
(Note: SM: Senior Managers; MM: Middle Managers; NM: Non-managerial Staff.) 
(Scored on a scale of 1-5 where 1= ‘Not used’ and 5= ‘Always used’) 
 
There are no recruitment methods that are always used for recruiting non-managerial 
staff; recruitment agency (NM mean = 3.15), public advertisement (NM mean = 2.95) 
and expatriates (NM mean = 2.86) are used sometimes.  According to table 5.14, 
expatriation is the most often used method for all types of recruitment; 
simultaneously agency and advertisement are sometimes adopted.  Therefore it is 
clear that Chinese MNCs are in favour of sending expatriates overseas as well 
adopting UK methods of recruiting and not continuing to apply the methods (family 







Table 5.14: Recruitment Methods Summary of Survey Findings 
 
Recruitment methods Average mean Std. deviation 
Expatriates 3.83 1.31 
Recruitment agency 2.98 1.28 
Public advertisement 2.72 1.38 
Family connection/recommendation 2.59 1.10 
Word-of-mouth 1.84 .89 
 
5.2.9 Motivations 
Chapter two discusses the push and pull explanations of China’s OFDI motivations.  
These push factors emphasise that the Chinese firms have sufficient finance to invest 
overseas and that the changing institutional policies encourage and support China’s 
OFDI.  The pull factors focus on Dunning’s (1993) four motivations of OFDI i.e. 
market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, natural resources-seeking and strategic asset-
seeking.  Based on the push and pull factors of motivation, 16 variables in table 5.15 
are adopted to investigate the motives of China’s OFDI in the UK.  Table 5.15 shows 
the investment motivations that can attract Chinese enterprises to invest in the UK.   
 
More expansion opportunities in the UK and access to EU markets are the most 
important motivations, with average scores of 3.55 and 3.69 respectively.   To seek 
or advance managerial skills is the third important motivation, with a mean of 3.00, 
followed by lower political risks in the UK (mean = 2.89), to seek local talent (mean 
= 2.75) and Chinese government’s policy support (mean = 2.74).   
 
The least important motivation is increasing production cost in the home country 
(mean = .92).  Chinese investors do not tend to seek raw materials (mean = .96), they 
do not consider operation cost in the UK lower than in China (mean = 1.15) and they 
also do not find British investment incentives attractive (mean = 1.42).  Although 
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both competitive pressure and production cost have been increasing recently at home, 
Chinese enterprises do not consider them as a big challenge.  Britain is well known 
for its strong R&D capabilities (Liu and Tian, 2008); however, the companies do not 
consider it as an important motivation of investment (mean = 1.96).   
 
Table 5.15: Investment Motivations of Survey Findings 
(Categories adapted from Liu and Tian, 2008) 
 
Motivations Mean Std. deviation 
Access to EU markets 3.69 1.26 
More expansion opportunities in the UK 3.55 1.24 
To seek or advance managerial skills 3.00 1.07 
Lower political risks in the UK 2.89 1.45 
To seek local talent 2.75 1.27 
Chinese government's policy support 2.70 1.35 
Easier access to financial markets in the UK 2.55 1.55 
Sufficient capital to be invested 2.19 1.44 
Cultural and languages proximity 2.18 1.68 
To seek R&D capabilities 1.96 1.51 
Competitive pressure at home 1.92 1.35 
To seek renowned brands 1.70 1.56 
Investment incentives in the UK 1.42 1.14 
Lower operation cost in the UK 1.15 1.03 
To seek raw materials .96 1.34 
Increasing production cost in the home country .92 .93 
(Scored on a scale of 1-5 where 1= ‘Not important’ and 5= ‘Very important’) 
 
Table 5.16 summarises table 5.15, 16 variables (in table 5.15) are classified into 7 
categories (see table 5.16).  As table 5.16 indicates, Chinese investors’ main 
motivation is market-seeking (i.e. more expansion opportunities in the UK and 
access to EU markets), followed by the government’s policy support.  This is 
supported by some earlier findings that political and diplomatic factors form crucial 
motives for Chinese overseas investors (Qiao, 1996 and Qi, 1999).  Some later 
findings also show that market-seeking is the most important motivation (Wu and 
Chen, 2001; Liu and Tian, 2008).  Deng (2004) argues that in some industries, 
‘Chinese markets have reached the limits of effective demand and even significant 
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excess production capacity in such industries as textiles and clothing…’ therefore, 
Chinese companies need to seek overseas markets.   
 




Mean Std. deviation 
Market-seeking                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                3.62 1.25
Chinese government’s policy support 2.70 1.35 
British location advantages 2.54 1.56 
Strategic asset-seeking 2.35 1.35 
Sufficient capital to be invested 2.19 1.44 
Efficiency-seeking 1.04 .98 
Resources-seeking .96 1.34 
 
British location advantages (i.e. lower political risks in the UK, easier access to 
financial markets in the UK and Cultural and languages proximity) are the third 
important motivation. Liu and Tian’s (2008) result also indicates the great 
importance of location advantages in the UK.   
 
Strategic asset-seeking (i.e. to seek technology/R&D capabilities, to seek or advance 
managerial skills, to seek local talent and to seek renowned brands) is ranked in 
fourth place.  Dunning (1998) commented on the change of FDI in general is that the 
most significant change in the motives for FDI over the last two decades has been the 
rapid growth of strategic asset-seeking FDI.  Deng (2004) also argues that Chinese 
overseas investment was interested in obtaining advanced technology in developed 
countries.  Firms having sufficient capital to be invested are slightly less important.   
Efficiency-seeking (i.e. lower operation cost in the UK and increasing production 
cost in the home country) Resources seeking (i.e. to seek raw materials) is 
considered as the two least important motivations.  This result corresponds to the 
findings of Liu and Tian (2008).  Deng (2004) and Buckley et al. (2008) have also 




5.2.10 Overall Benefits 
Based on Wu and Chen’s (2001) work and Liu and Tian’s (2008) variables of 
motives, 10 overall benefits perceived by Chinese firms are identified and are shown 
in table 5.17.  
 




Mean Std. Deviation 
New market 4.07 1.11 
Contributing to stronger economic ties with the UK 3.22 1.40 
Managerial skills 3.04 1.46 
Export market 2.68 1.91 
Advanced technology 1.88 1.64 
Overseas funding 1.73 1.40 
Securing foreign exchange 1.54 1.48 
Advanced equipment 1.52 1.45 
Lower operational cost in the UK 1.20 1.22 
Natural resources 1.11 1.28 
(Scored on a scale of 1-5 where 1= ‘Not important’ and 5= ‘Very important’) 
 
Overall benefits correspond to investing motivations.  New market (mean = 4.07) is 
the most important overall benefit.  Chinese investors believe that contributing to 
stronger economic ties with the UK (mean = 3.22) is as important as acquiring 
managerial skills (mean = 3.04), and export market (mean = 2.68) is also an 
important overall benefit.  Corresponding to investing motivations, Chinese 
companies have not received many overall benefits from natural resources (mean = 
1.11), operational cost (mean = 1.20) and R&D capabilities (mean = 1.88). 
 
Table 5.18 is a summary of table 5.17.  Perhaps, given the similarity of mean scores 
for contributing to stronger economic ties (mean = 3.22) with the UK and market-
seeking (mean = 3.34) (see table 5.18), it is fair to conclude that market access is the 
main overall benefits for Chinese OFDI into the UK, at the level of the firm, though 
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at a wider Chinese economic development level, stronger ties are also important to 
Chinese firms in general.   
 
Table 5.18: Investment Overall Benefits Categories 
 
Overall benefits categories 
 
Mean Std. deviation 
Market access  3.34 1.52 
Contributing to stronger economic ties with the UK 3.22 1.40 
Strategic asset access 2.15 1.51 
British location advantages 1.49 1.37 
Efficiency access 1.20 1.22 
Resources access 1.11 1.28 
 
 
Supporting this assertion, Deng (2007) noted that Chinese state-owned enterprises 
focus not entirely on economic objectives, but also on policy support for the 
government, particularly in terms of its long-range development plans.  Strategic 
asset access (mean = 2.15) appears as the second significant benefits – a category 
requiring further qualitative and interpretative research.  Location advantages (mean 
= 1.49) and resources access (mean = 1.11) are lower order overall benefits for OFDI 
from China into the UK.  Wu and Chen (2001) reveal that market access and 
strategic asset access are crucial benefits that Chinese overseas investors obtained.  
 
 
5.3 Discussion and Conclusion 
5.3.1 The General Pattern of Chinese OFDI in the UK 
China’s earliest OFDI in the UK began in the 1920s; however, large-scale 
development started from 1980 after launching of ‘Open Door Policy’ and the 
significant growth has occurred after 2000 - after the announcement of ‘Go Out 
Policy’.  In addition, Chinese government policy’s support is widely considered as 
one of the major drivers of investment.  Contributing to stronger economic ties with 
the local is also the significant overall benefit for the subsidiaries in the UK.  This 
pattern illustrates that the development of China’s OFDI in Britain is heavily 
 129 
 
influenced by Chinese government policies and changing institutional arrangement.  
The majority of parent companies are state-owned; they have sufficient capital to 
invest in the UK tending not to borrow money.   
 
In China, the state-owned firms often play a pioneering role in policy 
implementation processes; therefore this fact also stresses the institutional issue.  
Chinese outward investment into the UK has largely taken the form of creating 
SMEs and sale subsidiaries – most of which are wholly-owned.  Though establishing 
wholly-owned subsidiaries is still the dominant entry mode in Britain, the data shows 
the number of international M&A is increasing currently, which might imply the 
strategic asset-seeking (through M&A) motivation of China’s OFDI is strengthened.   
 
Although recently operational costs in China have increased, Chinese investors still 
choose to manufacture in China, seeking to sell in the UK markets, rather than 
establishing manufacturing plants in the UK.  Additionally, the majority of Chinese 
enterprises do not plan to construct plants; they expect to increase sales through 
continuing importing goods into UK and also consider Britain as a springboard of 
global expansion.  This phenomenon cannot illustrate that Chinese MNCs do not 
tend to establish manufactures in developed countries, in fact there are examples (e.g. 
Haier setting up a manufacture in US) that show the Chinese firms have 
manufacturing in America, Australia, Germany, etc.  In contrast, this might indicate 
the UK’s limitations (e.g. lack of natural recourses, high cost of labour) for 
manufacturing establishment.      
 
The overall benefits that Chinese investors are achieving correspond to their entry 
motivations.  Chinese enterprises invest in the UK mainly to expand their markets, to 
seek strategic asset and to support China’s government (internationalisation) policies. 
Chinese parent companies tend to tightly control the subsidiaries by sending 
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expatriates staff in particular the senior management staff; however, they adopt the 
UK recruitment methods mainly for hiring middle managerial staff and non-
managerial ones.  In summary, compared with previous generations of (more 
technologically sophisticated) US and Japanese overseas investment, Chinese OFDI 
is still in its early stages in terms of size and sophistication.  As a latecomer in global 
economy, Chinese MNCs’ investment in the UK is expected to gradually develop 
through increasing their sales and strengthen the international competitive 
advantages through absorbing local intelligence and learning new knowledge and 
skills, especially managerial skills and marketing practices.  
 
The data supports part of Dunning’s stages argument (Dunning, 1981a, 1981b, 1986; 
Dunning and Narula, 1996a, Buckley and Castro, 1998); having become a major 
recipient of IFDI, China is now beginning to grow its OFDI.  The findings indicate 
that the majority of the Chinese MNCs are large firms with sufficient capital to 
invest overseas, whilst most of their OFDI into the UK are small sale organisations, 
thus the evidence from the UK suggests that China’s internationalisation remains in 
stage-two of Dunning’s investment development path i.e. early excursions into 
OFDI.  
 
The data also illustrates that Chinese subsidiaries do not seek for international loans 
because their parent companies have sufficient capital to invest overseas; rather they 
seek for knowledge and resources.  This may imply Gao et al.’s (2012) research 
finding that ‘the ownership advantages of Chinese are based more on financial 
capacity than knowledge assets’.  These Chinese MNCs are expanding into the UK 
because they have the capacity (mainly their financial strength and also the 
government support) to do so and intend to acquire knowledge and market share in 
long-term.  Given market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking are their main motives, 
pragmatic Chinese firms are unlikely to internationalise simply because they have 
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the financial ability to do so, which supports Gao, Liu and Zou’s (2012) argument 
that a country’s OFDI process cannot be addressed by its economic development 
alone.   
5.3.2 The Main Motivations for Chinese OFDI into the UK 
With the data showing 57% of the Chinese subsidiaries being established after the 
Chinese Government announced the ‘Go Out Policy’, this push factor appears to be 
of great importance as a motivation for investment into the UK, a fact acknowledged 
by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (2005).  The survey result shows 73% of 
Chinese OFDI is state-owned companies.  Calling attention to internationalisation by 
state-owned enterprises, Deng (2007) notes a ‘focus not entirely on economic 
objectives, but also on policy support for the government, particularly in terms of its 
long-range development plans’.  Therefore, Dunning’s (e.g. 1993 and 2000) four 
category motives (i.e. natural resource-seeking, strategic asset-seeking, market-
seeking and efficiency-seeking) are insufficient to explain the motivations of Chinese 
OFDI, since the push factor of the government policy support that is neglected by 
Dunning plays a significant role in driving these OFDI into the UK.  
 
Market-seeking, British location advantages and strategic asset-seeking are the most 
important pull motive factors, with efficiency-seeking and natural resources-seeking 
as the least important pull factors; these results support the findings of Liu and Tian 
(2008).   Given the current domestic market situations, Deng (2004) and Buckley et 
al. (2008) establish that efficiency-seeking is the least important pull factor, with 
strategic asset-seeking i.e. seeking advanced managerial skills and local talent being 
much more important.  For British location advantages, lower political risks in the 
UK and cultural and languages proximity are considered important, though the UK 
market is relatively smaller than some other EU markets such as Germany, the UK is 
still one of the most attractive markets in EU.  The fact that natural resource-seeking 
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is considered the least important motives, supports Wu and Chen’s (2001) finding 
that the natural resource-seeking OFDI is drawn to resource-rich countries like 
Russia, Australia and Africa.  Efficiency-seeking including lower operation cost in 
the UK and increasing production cost in the home country is also unimportant to the 
Chinese investors, might also explain the low percentage (only 3%) of manufacturing 
OFDI.    
 
The findings in investment overall benefits align with Wu and Chen (2001)’s result 
that market access and strategic assets access are the two major benefits gained by 
Chinese OFDI.  The fact that the overall benefits correspond to the major motives 
indicates that the expectation of the firms have been met in certain level and also 
implies some ways of learning such as absorbing advanced managerial skills, 
recruiting local talent occurs in the subsidiaries.  
 
The fact that the ownership advantages of Chinese firms are primarily based on 
financial capacity rather than strategic asset-seeking drives the OFDI to augment 
their ownership advantages through seeking resources (or strategic assets) in the host 
country.  The data shows strategic asset-seeking is one of the main motives of 
Chinese OFDI into the UK.  The currently increasing trend of M&A in Britain also 
strengthens the finding of strategic asset-seeking being one of main motives.  This 
strategic asset-seeking is principally to seek advanced managerial skills and local 
talent.  Given the argument by Simon (1991) that organisations learn through the 
learning of its existing staff and through recruiting new employees who have the 
knowledge unknown to the organisation, it can be concluded that the Chinese OFDI 
intends to learn in these two ways.   
 
The next chapter explains the qualitative empirical findings on how the subsidiaries 
undertake learning and develop capabilities.   
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Chapter Six: Findings of Interviews to Address Research 




This chapter is the second empirical chapter follows and builds on the survey 
chapter.  Taking inspiration from the Andersson et al.’s (2001) three-level processes 
of capabilities development in a MNC (i.e. the business relationship level, the 
subsidiary level, and the corporate level), the conceptual (figure 3.2) framework is 
developed through synthesising the concepts of knowledge gaps, learning from 
internal and external networks, absorptive capacity indicating a subsidiary absorbs 
and exploits knowledge and commercialises it to develop new capabilities, 
knowledge transfer and capabilities development in the HQs to explore the learning 
and capabilities development in Chinese MNCs.  This chapter is in three sections, 
which address the research question two, three and four respectively.  
 
6.2 Chinese Subsidiaries Learn from the UK: to Address Research Question 
Two 
 
This section addresses research question two (e.g. how does the learning occur in 
Chinese MNC subsidiaries in the UK), starting with identifying knowledge gaps in 
the subsidiary (in section 6.2.1), as Peterson et al. (2008) suggest, knowledge gaps 
show the current knowledge is not sufficient to achieve the expected performance 
and motivate actions to remove and diminish the gaps.  Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 then 
focus upon how Chinese subsidiaries acquire and assimilate knowledge from the 
internal and external network actors in the UK.  
 
Research (in Chapter Three) emphasises the importance of both internal and external 
networks as knowledge sources for subsidiary’s learning.  Section 6.2.2 articulates 
how Chinese subsidiaries in the UK undertake learning through interactions with 
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their internal network mainly their HQs.  As mentioned in the literature review of 
chapter three, expatriates staff play an essential role in organisational learning in the 
subsidiaries, are emphasised in this chapter.   
 
Following Simon’s (1991) argument: an organisation learns either through the 
learning of its employees or through recruiting new staff who have the knowledge 
that the firm does not have, section 6.2.3 describes how the subsidiaries learn 
through recruiting local talents and the employee’s learning from their external 
network that consists of local customers, local competitors, local consultants, local 
policy makers, local business and industrial communities in the UK.  As discussed in 
the literature review, motivations to acquire and share knowledge have a positive 
influence on organisational learning in a subsidiary, and knowledge transfer within 
the MNC, therefore section 6.2.4 introduces motivations. 
6.2.1 Identifying Knowledge Gaps 
During the interviews, the interviewees were required to identify knowledge gaps in 
their organisations.  In data presentation stage, guided by Simon’s (1999) identified 
types of knowledge in international strategic alliances, the knowledge is classified 
into four categories.  Table 6.1 lists the four types of knowledge (including 
operations management knowledge, market knowledge, HRM knowledge, and R&D 
knowledge) in descending order.  According to Hendry (2011), the interviewees 
were asked what knowledge gaps (between their companies and the local companies) 
that they have seen and how they can identify these knowledge gaps; only people (in 
particular the expatriates) from the UK subsidiaries were required to answer this 
question because the expatriates in the UK subsidiaries have worked both at home 













UK subsidiary sector UK subsidiary operations Interviews 
1 B1 Banking R&D, sales, purchasing, marketing and 
service 
Subsidiary 
2 B2 Banking R&D, sales, purchasing and marketing Subsidiary & HQs 
3 B3 Banking R&D, sales, purchasing and marketing Subsidiary & HQs 
4 C Construction Sales and construction Subsidiary & HQs 
5 CO Consuming goods Sales, purchasing and marketing Subsidiary 
6 E Electronic Sales and service Subsidiary 
7 IC1 Information and communications technology 
(ICT) 
Sales, purchasing and marketing Subsidiary 
8 IC2 Information and communications technology 
(ICT) 
R&D, sales, purchasing, marketing and 
service 
Subsidiary 
9 IC3 Information and communications technology 
(ICT) 
Sales and marketing Subsidiary 
10 P1 Publishing Sales and purchasing Subsidiary & HQs 
11 P2 Publishing Sales and marketing Subsidiary 
12 TD1 Trading Sales Subsidiary 
13 TD2 Trading Sales and marketing, Subsidiary 
14 T1 Transport Logistics Subsidiary 
15 T2 Transport Logistics Subsidiary 
16 O1 Oil & Gas Sales and purchasing HQs 
17 O2 Oil & Gas Sales and purchasing HQs 
18 IC4 Information and communications technology 
(ICT) 
Sales, marketing and service HQs 
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For each subsidiary, the knowledge categories that were directly mentioned by its 
interviewees are marked as ‘Y’ in the corresponding cells in table 1, and this study 
sums all the ‘Y’s for each category and then calculate the percentage.   
 
Eighty per cent of Chinese affiliates directly mentioned that they have witnessed the 
knowledge gaps in operations management (see table 1), and they think that western 
(including UK leading companies’) operations management practices tend to be 
more meticulous and systematic.  The Managing Director from E subsidiary 
describes an anecdote.  When he worked in the US subsidiary, E’s HQs were an 
OEM (original equipment manufacturer) and ODM (original design manufacturer) 
for GE (General Electric).  Once GE required E to produce a batch of microwaves, E 
initially wanted to use its own developed PCB (printed circuit board), however E was 
unable to pass GE’s PCB testing, at last E had to purchase PCB from Samsung.  The 
Managing Director explains:  
GE had about 200 pages testing only for the PCB of a microwave; it was like 
the requirement of manufacturing an aircraft engine, so I can tell that’s why 
GE’s products have good quality. GE has rigorous and complete quality 
assurance systems that we did not have and still need to catch up with. At that 
time, it was even a big project to translate the 200 pages test. 
 
Four expatriate staff from four sectors point out that unlike British companies, 
Chinese enterprises emphasise the consequences rather than the processes.  This 
means they do not pay much attention to the process so long as they achieve the 
result.  For example, a senior manager from IC2 subsidiary mentions that British 
people might not reach solutions after a few hours long meeting, in contrast Chinese 
people need to reach a conclusion at the end of each meeting otherwise the meeting 
might be considered meaningless.  In addition, company B3 subsidiary’s Managing 
Director says: 
… our management focus on results, in contrast our local peers emphasise on 
the processes in terms of how to achieve the consequences. Through working in 
the subsidiary we have been gradually aware that a refined process can 
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prevent us from many risks such as that the cost for reaching a result 
significantly exceeds the payback. 
 
Five Managing Directors in the subsidiaries point out that their local counterparts 
manage the organisations using more sophisticated and effective systems, solidifying 
individual capacities in the systems through long-term finely preserving the 
individuals’ written documents and files: therefore these companies may be able to 
avoid HR issues when replacing staff which otherwise might mean changes in 
processes or could effect on the business development and even cause chaos.  
Chinese companies tend to be more dependent on people than systems.  Similarly a 
senior manager IC2 subsidiary explains:  
Chinese tend to record things in our brains, in contrast western tend to record 
things in files that is good for heritage.   
 
Five managers in the subsidiaries from banking, publication and ICT sectors 
illustrate another problem that their firms lack technology support and systems 
compatibility.  An IC1 subsidiary’s senior manager says:  
our HQs have some operational and management systems, but we are lack 
effectively integration of these systems.  For example, our customer data, 
billing and financial systems cannot be effectively integrated.  Some other 
Chinese enterprises also face the similar problems. 
 
The Managing Director of P1 subsidiary encountered difficulty when he was asked 
about the budget of the Bookshop Open Ceremony by the consultants, because he 
normally did not have the budget until he considered the individual item’s price and 
then aggregated them into an overall budget when he worked in the HQs.   
 
Additionally, the managers from the subsidiaries of three banks think that unlike the 
UK leading banks, their HQs do not consider the legal and compliance department as 









Table 6.1: Knowledge Gaps in UK Subsidiaries 
 
Company names B1 B2 B3 C CO E IC1 IC2 IC3 P1 P2 TD1 TD2 T1 T2 Sum Percentage 
Sector B B B C Cos E ICT ICT ICT Pb Pb Td Td Tp Tp N/A N/A 
Types of companies S S S P P P S P P S S S S S S N/A N/A 
Knowledge gap in operations 
management 
Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 12Y 80% 
Knowledge gap in marketing Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y 11Y 73% 
Knowledge gap in HRM Y N Y Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N N N 7Y 46% 
Knowledge gap in R&D Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N N N N N 6Y 40% 
Note. For sector, B=Banking, C = Construction, Cos = Consuming goods, E = Electronic, ICT = Information and Communications 
Technology, Pb = Publishing, Td = Trading, Tp = Transport. For types of companies, S = State-owned, P = Private. HRM = Human 




As shown in table 6.1, 73% of subsidiaries have pointed out that they have identified 
the knowledge gaps in marketing between in the UK and in China.  It appears mainly 
in marketing strategy, tendering, signing contracts and customers.  Six Chinese 
expatriates believe that their local peers have more mature marketing strategies 
because they understand their products and services and their main competitors, and 
have a clear marketing positioning allowing them to adopt appropriate strategies to 
compete, and simultaneously they pay relatively more attention to market research 
than Chinese enterprises.   
 
The Managing Director of IC1 mentioned that his company paid little attention to 
market research, once they bid for a big telecommunication project and they lost to 
the biggest competitor who they underestimated due to their lack of systematic 
market research.  Signing contracts with British partners has become another 
significant challenge, company TD1 subsidiary’s Managing Director explained:  
… sometimes we operate in a Chinese way to deal with issues, this means we 
only talk about general issues initially and discuss the details during 
implementation.  This does not work in Europe.  In the UK, contracts are legal 
documents, cannot be changed easily unless the two parties both agree to do 
so.  However, in China even if we have signed a contract, we can discuss new 
solutions if the contract cannot be completed.  Therefore, here we must take all 
the potential and possible problems into account to avoid losses before we sign 
contracts.  
 
The majority of interviewees in the subsidiaries think that UK companies treat the 
contract strictly and carefully, with literal scrutiny, having a dedicated legal team to 
discuss contractual matters.  The Managing Director from P1 subsidiary says: 
Tender management and procedures in China are far less standard and 
disciplined, and the bidding results are often influenced by other factors for 
instance Guanxi....... When we lost the bidding in the UK, we identified our 





Four expatriates have pointed out that there are many things such as the tender 
regulations, rules and procedures, which Chinese subsidiaries need to learn.  Another 
marketing issue is that the majority of customers of some subsidiaries (in particular 
the three banks) are Chinese companies and local Chinese.  The three banks believe 
that following their domestic corporate clients and providing them financial services 
overseas is one of their main objectives to establish subsidiaries in the UK.   
Therefore these banks already had these Chinese companies as their customers when 
they invested in the UK.  However, in order to survive and develop, they need to 
compete to win local clients.  In addition, most of the interviewees from subsidiaries 
have mentioned that compared to the Chinese market, the UK market is more 
standardised and disciplined.  For example, company T2 subsidiary’s Managing 
Director says that gas and electricity are monopolies in China, but in the UK there 
are many utilities companies that compete with one another, which lead to a good 
market environment that is conducive to technology innovation and consumers’ 
interests. 
 
According to table 6.1, 46 per cent of subsidiaries directly point out their knowledge 
gap in HRM.  The UK subsidiaries’ managers encounter significantly different HRM 
rules and procedures including recruitment, distribution, training and development.  
A senior manager in C subsidiary mentions, his subsidiary previously did not have a 
clear division of labour (i.e. one employee may be responsible for several different 
jobs), for example, he used to take responsible of procurements, tenders and daily 
communication with HQs, working seven days a week and his work efficiency was 
very low.  This situation still occurs in the majority of small sized subsidiaries, 
because of having a limited budget and limited manpower. In addition, he was 
prosecuted for dismissing staff several times because he was unfamiliar with British 
employment law.  Company E subsidiary’s Managing Director and two senior 
managers from B1 and IC2’s subsidiaries point out a significant Chinese 
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‘management orientated’ style, i.e. it is technical staff in China who tend to move 
from the technical positions into management after working for a period: managerial 
positions are considered more advanced than technical posts.  These two senior 
managers from B1 and IC2 believe this phenomenon is a cultural issue, not limited to 
certain sectors and companies.  In these circumstances, technical employees in 
Chinese companies and even in many leading high-tech companies are relatively 
young and less experienced.  The senior manager from company IC2’s subsidiary 
also provides a descriptive episode.  
Western companies normally have specialised technical writers who are 
experienced technical staff.  In Chinese companies experienced technical staffs 
prefer to take management positions rather than writing technical 
documents…, writing technical documents is considered a futureless job……. 
In the beginning, we asked HQs’ staffs to translate technical documents; it 
results in translations so bad that our clients cannot understand them. 
 
Company E has different pay structures between technical staff and sales and 
managerial staff.  Technical staff has relatively stable salaries and benefits including 
housing and car allowance.  In contrast, sales and managerial staff do not have this 
kind of benefits; their income depends on their sales.  Over last decade, company E’s 
sales have grown rapidly, therefore, the sales and managerial staff’ income are much 
higher than the engineers.  This has led to many technical staff moving to sales and 
managerial positions.  In addition, the most of executives are promoted from sales 
and managerial staff; some engineers switch to sales and managerial positions with 
hope of more opportunities for promotion. 
 
According to table I, the minority of subsidiaries that have ever involved R&D, 
however, there are still 40 per cent of the organisations that have directly pointed out 
their knowledge gaps in R&D (refer to table 6.1).  This R&D complementary mainly 
appears lack of product diversification.  The three banks’ subsidiaries have found 
that their local counterparts are more advanced and diversified with their products 
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either in traditional deposit and loan products or latest derivative products, which is 
based on the advanced and long-term R&D capability.  A senior manager from B1 
subsidiary said:  
We have found that local peers are more flexible and diversified with their 
products including individual deposit and loan products as well as personal 
finance products.  In contrast we only sell basic products.  Local banks have 
advanced R&D capability, regularly offering new independent R&D products.  
Our bank sells the products that are copied mature products from the HQs in 
the domestic market. 
 
Additionally the three banks also encounter many unfamiliar products in the UK and 
have a very clear objective to learn about these new products and relevant 
knowledge. C subsidiary has also witnessed the knowledge gap in R&D and one of 
its senior managers said: 
in order to compete in the local market, we may develop only one or two new 
products, but we do not focus on the sustainability of new products 
development. Our western peers normally have a sustainable plan, for 
example, the first generation to achieve thermal insulation, second generation 
to achieve energy conservation, the third generation to achieve humanity.  
 
Many HQs (e.g. manufacturers and publishing companies) had involved in exporting 
their products to western countries for many years before they established their 
subsidiaries, and simultaneously the majority subsidiaries have been evolved from 
the representative offices to the subsidiaries.  In the circumstances, it is reasonable to 
hear that the majority of expatriates perceived the knowledge gaps even before they 
started to work in the UK, in addition some knowledge gaps have become more 
obvious and severe during their working in the UK. 
6.2.2 Subsidiaries Learn from Their Internal Networks  
In chapter two, both the Uppsala model and the Mathews’ LLL framework 
emphasise the importance of networks for a subsidiary’s learning.  Chapter three has 
discussed that internal and external networks play significant roles as the learning 
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sources to a subsidiary.  This section presents the interview findings on how the 
subsidiaries in the UK learn from their internal network (here mean their HQs).  
Derived from Easterby-Smith et al.’s (2008) mechanisms of knowledge transfer from 
one organisation to another organisation such as training programs, social events, 
and transferring experienced personnel, the key codes in table 6.2 (i.e. recruitment of 
expatriates in the subsidiary; existence of regular interactions between UK subsidiary 
and its HQs; existence of regular interactions between UK subsidiary and its 
company’s other subsidiaries; arrangement of training, seminars, conferences within 
the HQs; UK subsidiary sending staff to attend the HQs’ training, seminars, 
conferences; arrangement of training, seminars, conferences within the subsidiary)  
are generated.   
 
Derived from Simon’s (1991) statement, the work looks at the subsidiaries learn 
through both recruitment of the expatriates and employees’ interactions with the HQs 
and the companies’ other subsidiaries.  Besides transferring information via the 
regular (even daily) interactions with the subsidiaries, all the HQs also organise 
activities (here means training programs, seminars and conferences), which provide 




Table 6.2 indicates that all Chinese enterprises send expatriates to work in their UK 
subsidiaries.  They tend to send experienced staff and also believe that expatriate 
staffs play positive and important roles in the UK subsidiaries, expatriates bridge 
communication between the HQs and subsidiaries.  If there are no expatriates, it is 
difficult to implement the HQs policies, culture and requirements in the subsidiary; it 
is also difficult for HQs to understand the subsidiary’s demands and difficulties.  As 
the Managing Director from T2 subsidiary says: 
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As expatriates from HQs, we know our company’s culture and vision, so we 
can better understand and implement HQs’ instructions. Sometimes we need to 
explain HQs’ instructions to local staff if they cannot understand them. For 
example, once I received a new inland containers transport procedure 
document written in Chinese from the EU HQs, I read through it and found a 
few sentences written unclear, and I called the EU HQs for explanation, and 
then explained the procedure in English to the general manager and 
supervisors face to face. I believe that oral communication is more direct and 
flexible than written communication. The local employees did not understand 
Chinese, thus they would not complete the task without my help.   
 
When subsidiaries are first established, expatriates play an essential role in adopting 
the HQs’ model for establishing the UK organisation and business start-up: as a 
senior manager from B1 points out:  
As an overseas subsidiary, we first replicated HQs’ mechanisms and then 
adjusted ourselves through comparing with the local peers.   
 
Expatriates are also assigned in various departments, and tend to take vital positions.  
Simultaneously, most of expatriate managers are responsible for mentoring new 
employees and/or providing training courses for their fellow employees.  All the 15 
subsidiaries’ Managing Directors are Chinese expatriates who at least had five year 
work experiences before taking the post.  Each HQ has a mechanism for expatriate’s 
selection and rotation of expatriates every three to five years, many expatriates often 
stay in the subsidiaries longer than this rotation. 
 
As the subsidiaries expand and develop, expatriates continue to play an important 
role in implementing HQs’ policies, demands and targets and also assisting local 
employees.  In addition to selling products, the majority of interviewed subsidiaries 
aim to promote their brands and expand their market in Britain. Therefore the 
expatriates’ professional techniques and an understanding of brands and companies 
bring a positive impact.  Simultaneously, several interviewees in the subsidiaries 










Table 6.2: UK Subsidiaries’ Internal Network and Learning 
 
Note. For sector, B=Banking, C = Construction, Cos = Consuming goods, E = Electronic, ICT = Information and communications 
technology, Pb = Publishing, Td = Trading, Tp = Transport. For types of companies, S = State-owned, P = Private. 
 
Company names B1 B2 B3 C CO E IC1 IC2 IC3 P1 P2 TD1 TD2 T1 T2 Sum Percentage 
Sector B B B C Cos E ICT ICT ICT Pb Pb Td Td Tp Tp N/A N/A 
Types of companies S S S P P P S P P S S S S S S N/A N/A 
Recruitment of expatriates in the 
subsidiary 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
Existence of regular interactions 
between UK subsidiary and its 
HQs 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
Existence of regular interactions 
between UK subsidiary and its 
company’s other subsidiaries 
Y Y Y N N N Y Y N Y N N N Y Y 8Y 53% 
Arrangement of training, 
seminars, conferences within the 
HQs 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
UK subsidiary sending staff to 
attend the HQs’ training, 
seminars, conferences 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
Arrangement of training, 
seminars, conferences within the 
subsidiary 
Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N N N Y Y 8Y 53% 
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As a Chinese leading ICT company, IC2 responds clients’ demand faster than local 
EU companies.  When a client proposes a modification to an EU company, it 
normally takes one year and even longer to complete amendment.  In contrast, IC2 
only takes one or two months. A senior manager from IC2 subsidiary explains the 
reason as follows.  
 
When I first started to work in IC2 HQs, I saw my mentors and supervisors’ 
dedication to work; all department managers do not take marriage leave, 
working very hard and diligently.  Dedication and diligence make IC2 a unique 
culture.  Thirty per cent of our employees are Chinese in the subsidiary.  Staff 
from China occupy many key positions, especially management positions, 
because many cases have proved that Chinese employees play key roles in the 
important moment.  Local employees do not want to work overtime and during 
vacations. 
 
Several expatriate managers directly claim that as foreign companies it is difficult to 
fully rely on local employees.  A senior manager from C subsidiary says:  
 
we have local staff in many positions such as Health and Safety officers and 
commercial managers, simultaneously each of these positions have Chinese 
assistants, both conducive to learning and to ensure the relative stability of 
these positions (i.e. each position has a reserve staff). Though the cost is 
relatively high, it is worth it.   
  
Expatriates take the responsibility of daily communication between subsidiary and 
HQs, especially when the reports from the HQs are written in Chinese.  The majority 
of reports from the HQs are written in Chinese.  As mentioned, the three banks have 
numerous Chinese clients locally for whom the expatriates have an advantage over 
the local employees in dealing with the Chinese.  In B1’s banking department, only 
one out of fifty employees is not from Chinese ethical group, who cannot speak 
Chinese. 
 
Learning from the HQs  
 
As shown in table 6.2, all the 15 subsidiaries have regular interactions with their HQs 
that all arrange training programs, seminars and conferences, and the subsidiaries 
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also send the staff to attend these activities online or/and in the HQs.  The HQs from 
the three banks and also company IC1 and IC2 have a relative well-developed 
training centre (some are called ‘University’) regularly providing training programs 
and seminars.  For example, a senior manager from IC1 subsidiary says:  
HQs have an IC1 University, mainly providing internal training courses and 
seminars.  The UK subsidiary’s main objective is selling ICT products and 
services, so it sends staff to attend the training courses mainly about products 
and services both online and in the HQs 
 
The Managing Director of B3 subsidiary has also mentioned that the HQs regularly 
organise training programs and particularly arrange some specific courses (e.g. anti-
money laundering, insider trading, etc.) for the UK subsidiary; the HQs review all 
the training programs every year.  In addition, three subsidiaries’ Managing 
Directors have also pointed out, their HQs have designed specialised training 
programs for overseas’ employees.  A deputy manager from B2 subsidiary says: 
From 2009, the HQs have started to organize training courses and seminars 
for all overseas subsidiaries.  Every year, HQs invite overseas local staff to 
participate in a one-week training program in China.  At the moment, the 
program is quite general, mainly introducing the company’s overall business 
situations, visiting the various branches to enhance perceptual knowledge. But 
I believe HQs will gradually arrange more business-related training courses.   
 
According to table 6.2, 53 per cent of the UK subsidiaries have regular interactions 
with other subsidiaries in the companies.   
6.2.3 Subsidiaries Learn from Their External Network 
Chapter two and three have discussed that the external network is seen as linkage in 
Mathews’ LLL framework, some other researchers (for example Andersson and 
Forsgren, 1996; Andersson and Pahlverg, 1996) have also stressed the significance 
of external network partners for developing a subsidiary’s capabilities.  This section 
presents the qualitative research findings on how the UK subsidiaries learn from the 
external networks.  Like section 6.2, subsidiaries learn from their internal network, 
 148 
 
some factors (i.e. recruitment of local talent in UK subsidiary; recruitment of merely 
local Chinese talent in the UK subsidiary; existence of local talent in management 
positions in the UK subsidiary; UK subsidiary uses local consultants to help with 
solving problems; UK subsidiary sending staff to attend training, seminars, 
conferences at local) in table 6.3 are also developed based on Easterby-Smith’s 
(2008) mechanisms of knowledge transfer.   
 
Other factors (i.e. UK subsidiary learns from its local competitors; UK subsidiary 
learns from its local customers; UK subsidiary is the member of China Enterprises 
Association in Britain; and UK subsidiary joins other local industrial or/and business 
associations.) fall in line with Nohria and Ghoshal’s (1997) external network (e.g. 
competitors, customers).  Guided by Simon’s (1991) argument, the subsidiaries learn 
through both recruitment of the local talent (here including both local Chinese and 
local non-Chinese) and their members’ interactions with their local consultants, local 
customers, local competitors, local policy makers, local business and industrial 
communities.  Next, the four types of external sources of learning are considered in 
turn, these being local talent, local consultants, local competitors/customers and local 




As show in table 6.3, 93 per cent of UK subsidiaries recruit employees at local (only 
company IC3 has no local staff at all).  Local staff have the advantages in UK 
languages and culture over the expatriates, thus they are normally assigned in the 
departments (such as legal department, commercial department and customer 






Table 6.3: UK Subsidiaries’ External Network and Learning 
 
Note. For sector, B=Banking, C = Construction, Cos = Consuming goods, E = Electronic, ICT = Information and communications 
technology, Pb = Publishing, Td = Trading, Tp = Transport. For types of companies, S = State-owned, P = Private. 
Company names B1 B2 B3 C CO E IC1 IC2 IC3 P1 P2 TD1 TD2 T1 T2 Sum Percentage 
Sector B B B C Cos E ICT ICT ICT Pb Pb Td Td Tp Tp N/A N/A 
Types of companies S S S P P P S P P S S S S S S N/A N/A 
Recruitment of local talent in UK 
subsidiary 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 14Y 93% 
Recruitment of merely local Chinese 
talent 
in UK subsidiary 
N N N N N N Y N Y Y Y N N N N 4Y 27% 
Existence of local talent in management 
positions in UK subsidiary 
Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N N N N N Y Y 8Y 53% 
UK subsidiary uses Local consultants to 
help with solving problems 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
UK subsidiary merely uses the 
consultants of lawyers and accountants 
N N N N N Y N N N N Y N Y N Y 4Y 26% 
UK subsidiary learns from its local 
competitors 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
UK subsidiary learns from its local 
customers 
N N N N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N Y 8Y 53% 
UK subsidiary sending staff to attend 
training, seminars, conferences at local 
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N 12Y 80% 
UK subsidiary is the member of China 
Enterprises Association in Britain 
Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 12Y 80% 
UK subsidiary joins other local 
industrial or/and business associations 
Y Y Y Y N N Y Y N N N N N Y Y 8Y 53% 
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For example, E subsidiary employed an experienced English marketing manager 
who helped to improve its induction cookers’ design to increase sales.  E subsidiary 
is a sales organisation; the HQs take the responsibility of products R&D, design and 
manufacturing.  When the marketing manager saw the original design that was 
typical Asian style with floral patterns and cool touch buttons, the manager noticed 
that it would not meet the UK customers’ demand and recommended changing to 
black colour with knobs.  Based on his experience, the Managing Director agreed 
with the suggestion and reported this suggestion to the product manager in the HQs 
via phone.  Finally the HQs accepted this suggestion and changed the design.  The 
Managing Director explains:  
The whole process was quite straightforward. I told the product manager that 
if we did not change the design the local customers would not buy our 
products. The induction cookers are relatively high profit products and the cost 
of designing a new model is not very high, therefore the HQs accepted our 
suggestion quickly.  If the cost of design were very high, the HQs would not 
easily decide to change the model.  
 
When T2 subsidiary’s Managing Director (who was a senior manager in Italy 
subsidiary of T2 MNC) took over the subsidiary, its operational capability was 
limited to inland transport Full Container Load (FCL) and no one within the 
organisation was capable of expanding its scope of business.  When the Managing 
Director studied the company’s business scope, he found many gaps.  After the 
previous General Manager retired, the Managing Director looked for someone who 
can be helpful with filling up these gaps and expanding the scope of business.  
Through words of mouth recruitment, also screening resumes and interviewing the 
candidates eventually recruited the new General Manager who is a local expert (local 
talent) in inland container transport and forwarding business.  The reasons why the 
company recruits a local talent instead of sending an expatriate is explained by the 
Managing Director,  
If the company sent an expatriate, the cost would be higher than recruiting one 
at local. We have already had two expatriate managers (Managing Director 
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and Financial Manager), so there is no need to have the third one. In addition, 
the expatriates cannot know everything and things in great detail. In the 
beginning I spent two months working together with the operators (the 
frontline workers who are all British), however after two months I found I 
cannot do the job as good as they do. We must have local staff who are very 
familiar with the local business and local situation (English language, culture 
and geography). Even if the western MNCs invest in China, they also must 
have local employees.  
 
He also mentions that the HQs only focus on shipping business and has no experts on 
Non Vessel Operating Common Carrier (NVOCC), so it is unlikely to find someone 
who has the same expertise as the new General Manager has.  After the company 
recruited the new General Manager, the Managing Director began to discuss the 
possibility of developing new business opportunities with him who proposed a few 
recommendations (e.g. forwarding business especially Less than one Container Load 
(LCL), construction of warehouse) and they discussed about the proposal, 
considering construction of warehouse would be a high-risk and long-term 
investment and it will take a long time to get approval from the HQs (based on the 
government policy, the stated-owned companies have a quite strict control of fixed 
assets investment in order to prevent the loss of state assets), therefore they decided 
to start with forwarding business that requires very little investment.  Afterwards, the 
Managing Director called the CEO of the EU HQs to discuss about the need of 
developing new business and the idea of forwarding business, and immediately 
obtained the approval of the CEO. The Managing Director explains how he 
persuaded the CEO: 
After I took over the subsidiary, I began to read the organization’s archived 
documents (including company constitution, registration documents, historical 
business data, financial statements, etc.), through calculation and analysis I 
found that the subsidiary’s market share declined year-over-year. If the market 
share continues to decline, our profit might drop to zero in future. Therefore, 
in order to maintain the sustainable development, we need start to expand our 




The General Manager spent one month drafting a document called LCL Working 
Procedure (including the whole LCL procedure from accepting clients’ orders to the 
final delivery) and discussed it with the Managing Director, after several discussions 
and modifications they reached a detailed procedure and started to test out.  First, the 
General Manager chose two operators who have the relevant background knowledge 
and experiences about import and export business and distributed the procedure 
document to them and let them to read it on their own.  Second, both the Managing 
Director and General Manager worked together with the operators and explained and 
demonstrated them the procedure. During this period, they encountered the 
interoperability problem between the business system and accounting system.  
 
After investigation they diagnosed the problem that they did not input the clients’ 
data into the accounting system before inputting the data into business system.  This 
resulted as the clients data cannot be directly transmitted from the business system to 
accounting system.  They immediately modified the procedure.  Simultaneously they 
encountered the difficulty of the computing system (i.e. part of the computing system 
did not support the procedure) and then asked a computer technology development 
company to modify and upgrade its computer system.  After they solved all these 
problems and successfully completed 10 orders, the subsidiary finalised the LCL 
Working Procedure.  The Managing Director points out:  
This finalised operational procedure has shown the employees the detailed 
steps of completing the task and has also ensured the task run smoothly. 
Following the procedure, someone who is unfamiliar with the task can still 
understand how to complete the task. 
 
Now the two relevant staff have learned how to complete the tasks based on the 
procedure, and this business has already brought the subsidiary profit though the 
profit only counts three per cent of the total profit.  This business has been gradually 
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developing; therefore the company expects it to make increased profits in the 
following years.  As a forwarder, it takes a long time to build customer relationships.  
 
The Managing Director mentions the company will share the experience with the 
HQs and other subsidiaries within the company when this business becomes fully 
sophisticated (i.e. having a large number of stable clients and making a good profit), 
and its long-term objective is to become Non Vessel Operating Common Carrier 
(NVOCC).  LCL and NVOCC are unfamiliar to the HQs, thus UK subsidiary’s 
knowledge and experience about LCL can help the whole company to develop this 
business when they are transferred back to the HQs. 
 
Local hired site supervisors have helped C subsidiary solve the difficulty that some 
frontline workers did not work effectively and efficiently. In the beginning, the 
projects cannot be completed on time and the company received rectification notice 
and even had to pay compensation to the clients.  After a few projects, the company 
began to investigate the causes: it sent the project manager to the building sites to 
meet the frontline workers and collect some feedback (e.g. some workers complained 
about the heavy workload).  Simultaneously the company required the experienced 
site supervisors to analyse and calculate the exact time for completing a project, and 
then a meeting was arranged to discuss and analyse the causes and the conclusion 
was that ‘daily pay mechanism’ cannot motivate the frontline staff to work 
effectively and efficiently.  
 
Later, the managing director organised the senior expatriate managers and local site 
supervisors to meet and discuss solutions, they proposed a few recommendations and 
eventually decided to adopt the site supervisors’ solution (i.e. to allocate tasks to a 
group of construction workers, if they complete the tasks earlier, they can freely 
dispose the remaining hours.)  It has been proved this solution is very effective: the 
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projects are always completed on time, and even before the deadline.  The whole 
process of change including investigation of the causes and implement of the 
solution took two weeks in 2004.   
 
Other subsidiaries have also experienced the positive impacts of the local talent: a 
risk officer who had worked in a large local bank brought knowledge and experience 
about financial risk management which are found helpful in B1 subsidiary.  A local 
Chinese staff member who had worked in the local publication sector for many years 
helped the P1 subsidiary to effectively operate claim notices. 
 
The majority of the affiliated organisations consider their local talent to be an 
important channel to understanding the local market, local peers’ products, 
management and even R&D and they tend to exploit their knowledge through 
assigning them in appropriate positions.  In addition, 53 per cent of subsidiaries have 
local staff in managerial positions.  Twenty seven per cent of subsidiaries that are all 
small size organisations and have only recruited local Chinese.  The managers 
explain that it is difficult for non-Chinese (in particular those who cannot speak 
Chinese) to adjust to their organisation’s environment.  A senior manager from IC1 
subsidiary mentions that its subsidiary once recruited a British employee; however 
he left soon due to the cultural and language issues.  Five senior managers in B1, B2, 
B3, T1 and T2 subsidiaries mention that the organisations purposely assign one or 
two local high skilled management staff under each senior expatriate manager and 
expect them to assist in the senior managers’ daily work (providing valuable 




In China, enterprises traditionally do not use external consultants, for example each 
company has its own internal legal and accounting departments that can manage all 
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relevant issues.  In contrast, all Chinese subsidiaries in the UK tend to adopt British 
business model and use local consultants, especially when the company employs 
only expatriates, they depend on local consultants to learn about the local business 
environment.  Two-thirds of interviewed subsidiaries are small in size, are mainly 
sales organisations, are not autonomous free-standing business units and depend on 
HQs’ financial and accounting departments to help with daily business.  However, 
the HQs’ accountants are unfamiliar with British accounting and tax policies and 
norms because there are significant differences between the two norms, the UK 
affiliates need to use local accountants mainly for taxation, accounting statements, 
annual audit reports.  The other one-third of subsidiaries employ local accounting 
firms even where they have accounting staff.  Like British enterprises, all 
subsidiaries tend to invite legal advisers to deal with the legislative issues and 
prepare some legal documents.  The majority interviewees believe that China and 
UK are different legal and cultural environments and as foreign firms, it is important 
to operate in compliance with the applicable legal requirements.  For example, E 
subsidiary uses a local law firm to deal with intellectual property rights issues in 
order to avoid infringement.  
 
As seen in table 6.3, only 27 per cent of subsidiaries that are all small size 
organisations use only lawyers and accountants, the rest also use other types of 
consultants to help with their business and they hire various consultants to help with 
solving varied problems such as human resource management, technical and 
computing aspects, marketing and promotion issues.  Several managers encountered 
difficulties in hiring and firing local employees, due to their lack of knowledge in 
UK labour law; they manage the similar issues more sophisticatedly after seeking for 
advice.  For example, a senior manager in C subsidiary says: 
I was taken to court several times because of firing employees, and was 
sentenced to pay lots of compensation to the dismissed employees, a waste of 
money and time. Now we have consultants who can help us to dismiss staff in 
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accordance with the employment law. We have a systematic process: first we 
must send the information of dismissal to all employees and collect feedback, 
and then we have to face-to-face talk to the related employees and also need to 
prove the company has made great efforts but have to dismiss them; we also 
need have a rating criterion and provide a complaint channel to them. 
  
Four managers from the subsidiaries point out that though consulting fees are a 
relatively large expense especially for those small organisations, they believe that the 
consultants have helped them smoothly and securely run the business in a foreign 
country, so it is worth it.  
  
Besides hiring the basic accounting and legal consultants, the rest 73 per cent of 
affiliates are prone to invite their industries related consulting firms to solve some 
specialised professional issues.  For example, B2 subsidiary once hired the 
consultants to conduct liquidity evaluation in order to meet UK FIC’s requirement of 
self-evaluation.  An ICT consulting company successfully guided IC2 subsidiary to 
prepare the bidding documents and design the projects to win the tender and also left 
the work documents that can be very important learning materials. 
 
All interviewees claim that they and their organisations have learned useful 
knowledge and experience from the consultants.  Examples include local tax policy, 
UK labour law, some business related provisions and norms, how to reasonably 
avoid tax, how to use the convenience of local policy and regulation to expand the 
business.  Accounting firms are found helpful, because they not only deal with 
taxation, statements and audit, also can solve other problems for example 
implementation of Basel II.   
 
There are some episodes that show what the subsidiaries have learned from their 
consultants and how they learn.  When a publication company prepared for its new 
bookstore’s opening ceremony, it used public relations (PR) consultants who gave 
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them numerous good advice (including advertising in the important newspapers that 
cover publishing sector concerns, inviting relevant officials from the local 
community, issuing a charitable activity statement for example, giving free books to 
local schools, in a local community newspaper, etc.) and helped with the whole 
preparation and ceremony processes and also left a complete report.  Through 
cooperation with the PR consultants and reviewing the report, the participants not 
only have learned useful marketing and promotion techniques also have been able to 
put into practice: they adopted some practices to successfully organise a ‘Spring 
Festival Event’ (cooperating with a London centre located Chinese library to hold a 
book fair near Trafalgar square) and promoted the brand.   
 
The top contractor was responsible for reinforced concrete; C subsidiary was 
responsible for attaching the glass wall to the structure.  Because the building is very 
high, security is very important, the top contractor required C to write an assessment 
report; they had no experience so they hired a consultant.  The company sent a 
technical staff and a site supervisor to assist in the consultant’s work, and they also 
collected all the technical data (material strength, size, performance indicators, etc.) 
for the consultant, based on this data combined with local wind pressure, air pressure 
etc. the consultant form a complete assessment, in an approximately one hundred-
page report and submitted this report to the building control department of the 
council.  Eight weeks later the report was approved, and then the company can begin 
its work.  As the company grew and projects amount increased, the company began 
to recruit some experienced qualified professionals (e.g. H&S officers, site 
managers), they read and analysed the archived assessment reports and then can 
write the similar assessment reports as the consultant did.  Therefore, the company 
can complete some small and middle size projects on their own. 
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The affiliated organisations tend to assign specific personnel to liaison and even 
cooperate with the consultants and carefully archive the documents for future use.   
Although the subsidiaries have learned useful knowledge from their accountants and 
legal advisors and other types of consultants, they still rely on those consultants in 
particular in accounting and legal issues.  The reason is explained by a bank’s 
Managing Director and he said: 
we have learned many useful things from our consultants whilst we deal with 
and cooperate with them. However, even if the consultants have helped solving 
the existing problems, as our business develops we might encounter any new 




Local Competitors/ Customers 
 
As seen in table 6.3, 80 per cent of subsidiaries actively participate in local seminars, 
conferences, events and fairs, etc., in particularly organised by their industrial 
societies or counterparts.  They consider these activities as not only learning sources 
also a social platform for meeting competitors and potential clients.  T2 subsidiary’s 
Managing Director says:  
our management staff participates in some business events and shows locally.  
The main aim is to meet local peers and to closely understand local market and 
market trends.   These events are organized by our clients and peers, e.g. 
terminals, railway companies, etc.  It is very good, because we can meet and 
exchange information and ideas with many peers in a relaxed environment.  
 
People from the publishing sector regularly visit local book fairs such as London 
Book Fair in April and the Online Information Fair in December and get to know 
both local stakeholders and domestic peers.  The interviewees from banking, ICT and 
other industries also believe this sort of events provide them opportunities to meet 
and communicate with and even learn from the local counterparts.   
 
According to table 6.3, all the subsidiaries have learned from their local competitors, 
and 53 per cent of which directly point out they have also learned a lot through 
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dealing with customers and they have become more confident and better 
understanding their customers’ demands and expectations.  TD1 subsidiary supplies 
the metal equipment for oil industry, the Managing Director explains:  
… the oil industry has high risks so oil companies carefully select suppliers: 
carefully reviewing suppliers’ information and visiting suppliers’ 
manufacturing.   Communicating with customers is a major way of learning for 
us.  The more we understand our customers and their needs, the better we can 
help them to solve their problems.  The UK subsidiary’s primary responsibility 
is to communicate with customers, building bridges between the HQs and the 
customers.   If the UK subsidiary has found a potential customer, we initially 
introduce ourselves and get to know their needs, and then transfer this 
information back to HQs.  
 
Those ICT sector’ managers find that they have noticed the knowledge gaps and 
have learned from their operators (clients) through meetings, cooperation and 
observations.  One senior manager from IC2 subsidiary said:  
… there is a big gap between us.  Now we want to learn x company’s VSI 
system to improve our own evaluation mechanism.  We cannot put the system 
directly into practice, we need to translate, analyse and understand it before 
we use it.   
 
As he mentioned, the interviewed subsidiaries are prone to change their counterparts’ 
advanced practices to adjust to their own situations rather than directly copy and 
paste.  Through closely dealing with customers some managers even can distinguish 
the sophisticated organisations from the bad ones and both types of companies 
inevitably influence them.  The Managing Director from E subsidiary explains: 
not all local companies that we deal with have good corporate governance, 
operation and management.  We can tell the differences between the ‘good’ 
companies and ‘bad’ companies.  The ‘good’ companies always provide us an 
appropriate forecast, and then we could prepare for the potential orders in 
advance, therefore we always manage to deliver them products on time. 
 
In addition to directly meeting and exchange ideas with local peers, competitors and 
customers, many subsidiaries have indirectly learned from the local peers, such as 
the local staff bring information about the peers because those staff have contact with 
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their peers’ employees or they were former employees of the local peers.  All the 
senior managers of the subsidiaries have certain level of personal connects with 
employees in local peer firms; through this personal informal networking they gain 
subtle understandings of conduct and mores.   
 
The Chinese affiliated organisations also tend to study the local counterparts (their 
products, services, operation and management practices and all aspects) and then 
could adopt some helpful practices or record the advanced practices and transfer 
them to the HQs.  Previously B1 did not have mortgage business, when it observed 
and studied its local competitor’s mortgage product; it started the mortgage business 
with lower interest rate, which has attracted many customers.  A senior manager 
from IC2 subsidiary said once he adapted its industry peers’ templates to develop his 
own customer report template and found it good and useful.  Furthermore, the 
Managing Director from TD1 subsidiary mentions that he reads local daily news and 
professional industry journals and this reading has helped him to get to know the 
latest industry news, new pricing mechanism, competitors, business and product 
categories, products R&D and marketing trends, etc. 
 
Local Policy Makers/ Local Business Communities/ Local Industrial Communities 
 
As shown in table 6.3, 80 per cent of the organisations are the members of China 
Enterprises Association (CEA) in Britain.  CEA regularly organises seminars and 
events not only to introduce the latest business related issues such as the updated 
immigration policies, local tax policies and recent market trends, also to provide a 
social platform for its members.  Though its events and seminars are not systemic 
and coherent, all participative enterprises have found them helpful.  
 
Fifty three per cent of the subsidiaries have joined the local industrial and/or business 
associations and actively attend their training and events.  Industry associations tend 
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to offer more professional and specialised training, seminars and conferences.  For 
example, CITB provides such as CICS, NVQ2, 3, 4 training programs for 
constructive companies, a C subsidiary’s senior manager says:  
.. as a CITB member, we submit a list of training program to CITB in April 
each year; soon we receive a check for fee waivers.  
 
As world financial centre, London provides advanced banking knowledge and 
sophisticated learning environment for Chinese banks that aim to seek advanced 
knowledge and experiences.  They join in various banking associations and actively 
participate in both free and chargeable training courses and events.  Sometimes their 
local counterparts also arrange some seminars (such as the financial situation in 
emerging market, the UK financial market, etc.) and invite them to attend.  In 
addition, the three banks’ HQs regularly send delegations to London for research 
purpose.  For example, B1 HQs recently sent a delegation (five people including the 
Head of Strategic Planning Department and other HQs’ middle level managers) to 
overseas to conduct research about Carbon Finance.  The delegation first visited the 
HQs of European Union in Brussels, and then spent four days in London. UK 
subsidiary arranged some meetings with European Climate Exchange, The 
Department of energy and climate change, and a few local leading banks. The 
delegation prepared a series of questions and discussed them with counterparts.  
With the permission, all the meetings were recorded. The delegation also visited 
Washington, DC, New York and San Francisco after they left London, when they 
completed the tour they wrote a research report and submitted it to the HQs’ 
President Office.  A senior manager from B1 subsidiary says: 
China has not formed an effective carbon market yet, in contrast, UK carbon 
market is very mature, and that is why the HQs sent the delegation to London 
to learn. UK government controls carbon emissions in two ways: increasing 
taxes and licensing. Our HQs want to know which way is more effective in the 
UK and want to learn UK’s experience…. This carbon finance research report 
will also be submitted to The General Office of the State Council and China 
Banking Regulatory Commission, and these government institutions expect to 
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receive this sort of advanced research reports that might be beneficial to their 
work.   
 
Due to the budget limit, some small size organisations can only attend free events, 
some of which is organised by local consultant companies, local peers and other 
organizations tend to introduce outlines of issues (e.g. local tax policy, immigration 
policy and local marketing, etc.) and aim to promote their brands and sell the 
products and services.  These sort of events are still found helpful, because, as a 
senior manager from IC1 subsidiary says that the subsidiary, 
has maintained the relationship with the exist clients, have got to know our 
potential clients, built up our local networks and even have extended the 
number of clients through attending these seminars and events. 
 
In summary, 80 per cent of the subsidiaries participate in local training, seminars and 
conferences (See table 6.3); they send relevant staff to attend the training courses and 
seminars and then require them to disseminate what they have learned through 
meetings and some informal methods.   
6.2.4 Motivations and Mechanisms for Learning in the Organisation 
As Minbaeva (2008) argue, extrinsic motivation can stimulate employees to satisfy 
their needs indirectly through financial rewards and incentives for past performance. 
This section articulates whether the Chinese MNCs motivate individual and 
organisational learning extrinsically and what extrinsic motivation mechanisms.  In 
another word, financial rewards and incentives related motivation mechanisms 
(including provision of incentives, a suggestion scheme for staff, learning as an 
objective of the subsidiary and HQs setting learning goals for its subsidiary) are 
adopted to motivate UK subsidiaries to learn and to transfer knowledge back to the 
HQs (see table 6.4). In addition, some companies also encourage learning and 










Table 6.4: Motivation and Mechanisms for Learning in the Organisation 
 
Note. For sector, B=Banking, C = Construction, Cos = Consuming goods, E = Electronic, ICT = Information and communications 
technology, Pb = Publishing, Td = Trading, Tp = Transport. For types of companies, S = State-owned, P = Private. 
 
Company names B1 B2 B3 C CO E IC1 IC2 IC3 P1 P2 TD1 TD2 T1 T2 Sum Percentage 
Sector B B B C Cos E ICT ICT ICT Pb Pb Td Td Tp Tp N/A N/A 
Types of companies S S S P P P S P P S S S S S S N/A N/A 
Active encouragement of learning Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
Provision of incentives for innovation & 
learning 
Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y N N N 10Y 66% 
Existence of a suggestion scheme for 
staff 
Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y N N N 9Y 60% 
Learning is an objective for its 
subsidiary 
Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 12Y 80% 
HQs setting learning goals for its 
subsidiary 
Y Y Y N N Y N N N Y N N N N N 5Y 33% 
HQs provide online forum for staff to 
share knowledge 
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y 12Y 80% 
HQs organise annually global executive 
meetings 
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y 11Y 73% 
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All the interviewees believe that their entire companies encourage individual and 
organisational learning, however only 66 per cent companies have provision of 
incentives for learning and innovation (refer to table 6.4).  This innovation is 
embodied in new products, new systems, new ideas and even new slogans.  Some 
companies (e.g. B1, B2, B3, etc.) establish innovation targets or awards for 
individuals, teams, departments and affiliated organisations.  
 
For example, a middle manager from B2 HQs has mentioned that the HQs assign 
innovation targets (such as innovate and introduce several new products) to 
individual departments and overseas subsidiaries every year, and offer incentives to 
the organisations that contribute excellent innovations by increasing compensation 
and research funding. 
 
The larger subsidiaries (i.e. having more than 50 employees) including three banks 
(B1, B2 and B3), one construction company (C) and one ICT company (IC2) tend to 
have more systemic and specific motivation mechanisms and their HQs also have a 
suggestion scheme to collect information and feedbacks from staff.  In the three 
banks’ subsidiaries, employees are encouraged to discuss their learning and training 
plans with managers, if it is beneficial to both the staff and the company, the 
company will arrange funding and time.  Annually the Managing Directors arrange 
an individual appraisal meeting with each staff member, discussing their previous 
year’s performance, next year's tasks and objectives, suggestions to the company, 
also their personal development and training plans, etc.  A deputy manager from B2 
subsidiary says:  
Once a staff member wanted to enrol in the Chartered Financial Analyst 
course, we considered that it was work-related training and would enhance his 
capacity of financial analysis, it was also beneficial to our company; therefore 




Company IC2 considers that it is essential to regularly upgrade individuals and 
teams’ skills. Every month it uses an evaluative statistics chart to assess each 
employee and team’s knowledge and skills level, according to the result the company 
provide appropriate training programs for the teams.  In addition, all engineers need 
to pass work-relate certifications and every quarter engineers need take internal 
exams; those who do not pass the exam need to analyse the reason and improve.  
Also, the exam results affect the engineers’ levels.  Each department uses a two-
dimensional skill-match chart to evaluate staff competences (product dimension and 
skills dimension), and those who do not meet the requirements will be sent on 
training courses.   Both certification system and skill-match evaluation have been 
found very helpful with encouraging individual and organisational learning.  There is 
also an online forum project management tool to monitor the progress of the projects 
and all employees are encouraged to post cases and events on the forum. 
 
C subsidiary does not enforce its employees to attend any training courses; however 
its incentives link to the skills level.  For example, a senior manager points out: 
… staff who are qualified in NVQ (national vocational qualification) level 4 
earn more salary than those are qualified in NVQ level 3, our reward system is 
very straightforward.  Payment rises every year, the staffs that do not have any 
capacity increased; they can only receive up to 3% salary increase to cover the 
inflation rate. We believe that this mechanism is very effective.   
 
It also has other incentives such as recognition of verbal encouragement in staff 
meetings and job promotion to encourage staff to learn and to enhance their capacity.  
Sixty per cent of HQs have a suggestion scheme for their staff and often gather 
suggestions, proposals and ideas from employees through reports (mainly via emails) 
and meetings.  The common way is that before HQs implement any new operational 
and management systems or practices and new business plans, they tend to make a 
draft and send it to relevant staff and gather their recommendations through meetings 
or emails.  Sometimes, HQs even send people to the subsidiary to discuss specific 
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issues with UK subsidiary’s employees.  For example, C subsidiary needed a full-
time on-site materials management staff to replace the part-time one.  In the 
beginning, the HQs did not understand the subsidiary’s requirement; later the HQs 
sent a manager to discuss the issue with the on-site employees (workers and 
supervisors) who argued that part-time employees cannot be all-day supervision of 
materials, materials chaos.  Eventually the HQs adopted the staff recommendations 
and hired a full-time materials management staff.  Five interviewees have mentioned 
that the employees are required to directly report any issues to their line managers, 
and only if the line managers cannot solve the problems, they can approach to higher 
managerial staff. 
 
According to the quantitative empirical study, expanding UK and EU market share 
and making profits are the main objectives of the majority of subsidiaries (along with 
supporting the Chinese government’s international strategy of state-owned 
companies).  Eighty per cent of subsidiaries consider learning as one of their 
overseas investment objectives; however only one-third of organisations have clear 
learning goals set by their HQs.  These one-third subsidiaries include three banks 
(B1, B2 and B3), one electronics company (E) and one publishing organisation (P1), 
and only the electronics company is none state-owned.  
 
As a world financial centre, the UK has many of the world’s leading banks that are 
equipped with many advanced practices, experiences and systems.  Compared to 
international leading banks, some domestic banking business is still at an early stage. 
For example, six interviewees from the banks mention that the domestic banks’ 
intermediate business (not a deposit and loan) income counts much less than the 
world leading banks’.  They also think that Chinese banks tend to be behind the 
products and process of leading international banks.  This might be the main reason 
why the banks’ HQs set clear learning objectives for the UK subsidiaries to collect 
 167 
 
local industry information and write several research reports (e.g. local banking 
industry policies, decisions and successful experiences etc.) every year to HQs.  B1, 
B2 and B3 subsidiaries all have dedicated R&D officers who take responsibility of 
conducting research for the HQs.  Every year the HQs raise questions and require the 
R&D officers to conduct research for the questions.  For example, B2 HQs wanted to 
enter the precious metals business; they asked the UK subsidiary to conduct research 
about the London precious metal business procedures and market.  As a result, the 
HQs precious metal business did not simply adopt the report (because business 
environments are different), but has referred to the report.   
 
Another episode shows how B2 HQs has adopted the advanced organisational 
structure from a British leading bank.  This UK bank’s organisational structure is 
divided into 6 organisational departments (i.e. investment banking, cash settlement, 
etc.) based on business segments.  All affiliated organisations report directly to the 
relevant departments in HQs, less hierarchic.  All employees sign the contracts with 
its HQs, so the HQs have convenience to deploy employees and receive feedbacks 
directly.  All of these show a very efficient organisational structure.  In contrast, B2 
HQs’ organisational structure is very hierarchical: HQs directly manage provincial 
branches, provincial branches manage municipal branches.  Therefore, the HQs 
encounter many management difficulties such as cumbersome procedures, the level 
of a filter, and deployment of employees.  B2 not only faces challenge of the world 
leading banks in the domestic market, also encounters difficulties when it invests in 
overseas markets, under these circumstances, B2 decides to change through learning 
from the other leading banks.  B2 HQs starts to study the world leading banks and 
simultaneously requires its overseas subsidiaries to collect the related information 
and conduct research.  When B2 HQs noticed the advantages of the British leading 
bank’s operation and management practices, it required the UK subsidiary to conduct 
a detailed research about it.  The HQs also sent a group of managers to visit the HQs 
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of the British bank to learn about its experiences, after meeting the delegates 
submitted a study report to the HQs.  The UK subsidiary helped with arranging the 
meeting.    
 
After analysed all the materials and evaluated the possibilities, due to the difference 
of business environment and regulations, the HQs did not adopt its entire successful 
experience; however the organisational structure of private banking has drawn on its 
experience.  In addition, B1 subsidiary is the European training centre, responsible 
for delivering some professional courses like financial market derivatives to the staff 
in the whole company.  
 
More than a decade ago, IC2 HQs was planning to become a global firm.  In order to 
increase its competition in global market, IC2 hired a number of world leading 
consultant companies to evaluate and improve its performance.  IC2 signed five year 
contract with IBM for management consulting and underwent significant 
transformation of the management and product development structure, adopting 
IBM’s Integrated Product Development (IPD) and Integrated Supply Chain (ISC) 
management tools.  Since then IC2 continues to restructure its supply chain 
regularly.  Currently as a world leading ICT firm, about three quarter of sales 
revenue for its terminal products come from overseas market.  
  
P1 subsidiary has evolved from the UK representative office that was responsible for 
collect local business and market information for the HQs.  As the Internet develops, 
it becomes more convenient to gather international information, therefore the current 
subsidiary now focus on regularly collecting more specific information and 
conducting in-depth study.  For example, after attending the seminar, it transferred 
the local consultants’ explanation about the latest immigration policy and then the 
HQs can manage UK employees according to the policy.  It also transfers the local 
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publication’s market information, new ideas, new resources and potential 
cooperative projects back to HQs.  Recently the subsidiary has conducted a survey 
on the public’s view of Chinese books during their ‘Spring Festival Book Fair’ and 
has passed the survey report to HQs.   
 
E HQs provided OEM (original equipment manufacturer) and ODM (original design 
manufacturer) services for some world leading electronics firms, therefore its 
overseas subsidiaries are responsible for conveying their clients’ demands and 
feedbacks to the HQs. For example, in the UK customers receive a one-year 
warranty for purchasing dishwashers, as a supplier the subsidiary has to bear the 
maintenance costs.  In the beginning, it took one hour to dismantle and one hour to 
repair, meaning that servicing was costly to the UK subsidiary.  When its 
subsidiary’s Managing Director reflected this problem back to the HQs, the product 
manager sent two engineers who participated in this dishwasher’s R&D to the UK 
for investigation.  The engineers brought the broken dishwasher to the client’s lab to 
conduct an investigation, and eventually they found defects in the product’s 
technique and design and also discovered that the only solution was to change the 
platform. The HQs assigned a project team to make improvements (simplified 
structure, integrated structure, reduce the screws and integrated components).  The 
whole process lasted one year.  The repair rate of the new dishwashers has dropped 
and the maintenance can be done within one hour, significantly saving on costs and 
enhancing our profits.   
 
Another example, in trying to understand why local clients did not buy its air 
conditioners, the HQs sent out technical staff to the UK to attend an installation-
training program and began analysing their installation experience in local markets. 
They detected defects in low temperature operation, due to the product being 
designed for the warmer southern-Chinese area.  Based on the engineers’ 
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investigation, the HQs made improvements – installing a heating module to the 
external machine – thereby increasing sales.  
 
The two third HQs do not set clear learning objectives (see table 4).  However there 
are other objectives such as the completion of sales targets and projects.  In order to 
achieve these objectives, learning plays an important role. Just as the TD1 
subsidiary’s Managing Director says:  
… research and information collection are essential in the marketing process, 
because we need to understand the local market and all aspects of competitors.   
 
Therefore even a sales organisation cannot avoid learning from local firms. The 
Managing Director from T2 points out: 
One of the main reasons why HQs set up two different companies is to increase 
the number of British expatriates, to provide more expatriates opportunity to 
learn new experiences and knowledge overseas. For example, before I became 
the Managing Director, I was the marketing manager in Italy subsidiary, thus I 
was not familiar with the Managing Director’s responsibility and duty. After I 
took over UK subsidiary I read some books about management and also 
discussed my responsibility and duty with the CEO of the EU HQs; while I 
worked and encountered problems and difficulties I often discussed with the 
CEO. Now I am very aware of my responsibility and duty. I have often 
discussed issues with the financial manager and have learned lots of financial 
and accounting knowledge. After attending the first board meeting, I got to 
know the procedure of the board meeting and what issues should be decided in 
the board meetings.  
 
He further explains that though UK container throughput is quite small, 90 per cent 
of world marine insurance, arbitration, consulting is in London.  The UK is the world 
shipping rules maker; its shipping management is extremely advanced.  Therefore 
every year HQs send a delegation with the delegation from China’s Ministry of 
Transport to participate in the Marine rules related meetings in the UK. The 
construction subsidiary’s episode has proved its learning is to strive for greater 
profits.  One of its senior managers says:  
… we did not have very clear learning objectives.  Our work is mainly based 
on projects, if a project needs us to absorb new knowledge, then we learn to 
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complete the project.  We also need to learn (have learned) local laws and 
regulations.  
 
In addition, a senior manager from C subsidiary points out: 
… sometimes, although a project cannot provide us with lots of commercial 
interests, we will still do it if it can promote our brand or advance our 
competitive capabilities (on design, construction, management, etc.), because 
generally speaking, the EU market does not have confidence in Chinese 
enterprises and products. 
 
As shown in table 4, 80 of the HQs provide online forums for employees to exchange 
knowledge and experiences. Seventy three per cent of the HQs organise annually 
global executive meetings that overseas Managing Directors and sometimes with 
other senior managers participate and they are encouraged to share their knowledge, 
practices, experiences and even lessons in the meetings.  In addition, capabilities of 
learning and innovations can also affect individual’s position promotion. 
6.2.5 Overview of Subsidiary Learning 
Chapter two and three reveal that the majority of Chinese MNCs have ownership 
disadvantages and augment ownership advantages through investing in the 
developed countries.  What are the ‘discrepancies’ between the ownership 
disadvantages and advantages?  In order to augment ownership advantages, it is 
important for Chinese OFDI to identify the ‘knowledge gaps in foreign markets as 
discrepancies between the knowledge possessed and the knowledge needed for 
successful business ventures abroad’ (Peterson et al., 2008).   Here the knowledge 
gaps do not always equate to disadvantages; sometimes it simply refers to different 
ways of doing business between in the UK and in China.  Just as five interviewees 
pointed out: ‘When in Rome, do as the Romans do’.  Chinese subsidiaries recognise 
their current knowledge is insufficient to achieve the expected performance in the 
UK market.  In order to compete at local market, they are required to absorb this 




Whilst each subsidiary is expected to increase market share and profitability, as 
figure 3.1 suggests, network building requires OFDI firms to overcome the 
disadvantages of foreignness and to close psychic distance before they can 
effectively learn from host country networks.  The data in section 6.2.2 illustrates 
that Chinese firms learn most not from UK networks or even JV partners, rather the 
local sources of learning are the result of recruitment and hiring local consultants.   A 
significant amount of the subsidiary learning continues to be vertical i.e. from HQ as 
they introduce new products and systems.  This is reminiscent of Deng Xiaoping’s 
slow evolutionary approach to economic change metaphored as ‘crossing the river by 
carefully stepping on stones’, as opposed to risk-laden large steps forward.  HQs are 
not investing heavily in UK networking; instead they are edging their subsidiaries 
forward within the Chinese MNC culture and product portfolio (noting the 
importance of expatriate managers) towards a point in the future when the 
subsidiaries will have learned sufficiently to clash in head-to-head competition with 
UK firms. 
 
The evidence suggests (section 6.2.2) that at the current stage of Chinese OFDI into 
the UK, relational networking and learning is less important than transactional 
networking and learning, the latter taking the form of hiring local staff and 
consultants.  Some of the Chinese firms (section 6.2.3) benefit from local networking 
and interactions with suppliers and customers.  However, the results suggest this is 
most pronounced when local staff are in positions of authority (a minority of cases) 
and where expatriate managers and more fully enculturated into the UK context 
(again a minority, since these staff turnover on average each two-years). 
 
Chinese firms are building the capability to learn from networks by improving their 
absorptive capacity explains the seeming contradiction highlighted in sections 6.2.3 
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and 6.2.4.  Chinese MNCs state that learning is a major motivation for OFDI into the 
UK, they then constrain such learning by denying long-term investments in 
networking, appearing to ignore recommendations from subsidiaries and insisting 
that practices emanating from HQs are adhered to.  However, this is not completely 
the case and section 6.2.3 records several examples of HQs embedding learning by 
subsidiaries into company practices.  It is interesting to note (section 6.2.2.2) that 
despite the short-termism of HQs in early adaptation of learning from subsidiaries, 
they also have a long-term perspective of building up the capabilities of their 
subsidiaries to learn, by focusing upon capabilities in the ‘softer’ function elements 
of their businesses rather than the capture of ‘harder’ codified knowledge.   These 
subsidiaries are ‘learning how to learn’ (Argyris and Schön, 1978), rather than 
primarily learning how to imitate UK products and operational systems. 
 
6.3 Knowledge Exploitation and Capabilities Development in UK Subsidiaries: 
to Address Research Question Three  
 
Chapter three discussed firm’s absorptive capacity explaining how firms assimilate 
and exploit knowledge and commercialises it to develop capabilities.   The previous 
section has revealed the results on how Chinese subsidiaries assimilate knowledge 
from internal and external networks.  This section addresses the research question 
three (e.g. how do UK subsidiaries exploit learning and develop capabilities) through 
presenting the qualitative data about the second stage of capabilities development in 
a MNC (shown in figure 3.2): how the capabilities are developed through the 
subsidiaries’ exploitation of knowledge and what are these improved capabilities (i.e. 
marketing, management, human resource management, product diversification, 
research and development and finance) (see table 6.5).   
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6.3.1 Knowledge Exploitation in UK Subsidiaries 
All the subsidiaries are required to regularly write reports about their performance, 
change, difficulties, etc. and send them to the HQs.  Several subsidiaries’ managers 
mention that their companies try to record and codify individuals’ knowledge, skills 
and experiences mainly through reports and hope this codified knowledge can 
contribute to the operational and management systems.  A deputy manager from B2 
subsidiary says:  
We are required to record and summarize every project and case that we 
complete and to upload the files to our company intranet.  There are also 
internal rules and regulations, industrial and market information, etc. on the 
intranet.  All staff has access to the intranet and look for useful knowledge and 
experience from it.  
 
B1 subsidiary created a technical support knowledge base and encouraged staff to 
share typical technical cases, common problems and solutions encountered in daily 
work. However, due to the staff’s low enthusiasm for learning and sharing 
knowledge, the result was unsatisfying. Later the subsidiary decided to recruit a 
quality assurance officer for the knowledge base, and also required individual 
department heads to support and monitor their staff to post cases on the knowledge 
base.  Now the knowledge base is running smoothly.  A senior manager from B1 
subsidiary says: 
Initially we discovered the level of the technical staff was uneven, so this made 
job rotation very difficult. This technical support knowledge base has turned 
individual knowledge into organisational knowledge, and has also helped the 
staff to learn and share knowledge. This is beneficial not only to job rotation 
and also to new staff training program.   
 
When T2 Managing Director began to work in the UK subsidiary, there were no any 
written operating procedures in the organisation; it was difficult for him to 
understand the operations.  In order to grasp the subsidiary’s business operations, he 
first required each employee to write a report on their daily working and requested 
General Manager and supervisor to explain the organisational operations to him face 
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to face.  He also spent two month working together with the front line workers 
(operators), observed their working and let them explain the operation processes 
(from receiving clients’ orders, inputting the orders into the computer system, 
looking for appropriate suppliers, to finally delivering the goods) and also completed 
tasks together with them.  At the end of these two months, the Managing Director 
drafted a five-page Inland Transport Procedure (which covers its major business, 
‘Inland Transport FCL’ at that time), discussed about it with the General Manager 
and the supervisors and modified it and distributed it to all staff.  The Managing 
Director says: 
There is not a systematic training mechanism for expatriate staff in our entire 
company, so all the expatriates need to learn and accumulate through working. 
The HQs have a slogan: ‘learning at work, learn to work.’……If I did not know 
about the business operations and procedures, I would not be able to do the 
management work. Only if we understand the whole business procedures, we 
can find out what problems might come out, how to solve the problems and use 
written rules, regulations and working procedures to preclude these issues 
happening in future……these procedures are also beneficial to staff training, 
just like the LCL Working Procedure case that I mentioned.  
  
As new issues continue to emerge, the new terms will be added to the file. For 
example, the company often used both rail transport and road transport for long 
distance delivery, because it was considered cheaper than using only road transport. 
However, once the Managing Director found the cost of the combined transport 
(from Felixstowe to Leeds) was higher than the road transport.  He called the 
General Manager and the supervisors to meet and discuss the solutions, and then they 
decided to add a Cost Accounting term (i.e. calculating all the different modes of 
transport costs and choosing the most economical way) to the Inland Transport 
Procedure, and then distributed the new version to all the employees. This new 
procedure has helped with cost savings.   
 
Another example, once the Managing Director looked at the financial statement and 
found a client had owed £2000 for a few months.  He mentioned this many times in 
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the monthly meetings, however this problem was still not solved after six months.  
He investigated the problem and found out the consequence of poor communication 
between the Financial Manager and the General Manager, therefore he added Credit 
Control term (i.e. Financial Manager is required to submit a monthly financial report 
to the Managing Director and the General Manager) to Inland Transport Procedure. 
The Managing Director explains the benefit of this term: 
Before we made this provision, the Financial Manager only submitted the 
monthly reports when I asked for it, but I sometimes forgot it. Now the GM and 
I can receive the monthly reports on time, so we can timely grasp and monitor 
the financial situation and prevent the similar issues happening.   
 
Fifty three per cent of the subsidiaries are small enterprises with less than 10 
employees.  The majority of these small organisations have only one office where all 
employees including the Managing Director share the same office, and they do not 
arrange any formal training programs within the organisations, instead they tend to 
learn, diffuse and exploit knowledge informally.  An episode from company P1 gives 
the explanation: an editor encountered an unfamiliar Chinese character while she was 
editing a book list, and she immediately showed the character to all the colleagues in 
the office and asked for help, unfortunately nobody knew it, and then they looked for 
and found the answer on the internet and shared the answer straight away.   
 
In contrast, the larger size subsidiaries with more than 10 employees often organise 
internal training courses and seminars.  According to table 6.2, 53 per cent 
subsidiaries organise any in-house training courses.  The people who give training 
courses could be within the whole company and from the local, depending on the 
situations.  In those subsidiaries that provide internal training, experienced managers 
(including expatriates and local talents) are usually required to giving training 
courses and share their knowledge and experiences.  For example, a senior manager 
from IC1 subsidiary says:  
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As a Director I am responsible for mentoring novice employees. I teach them 
the organisation structure, business operation processes, products knowledge, 
business knowledge and even British etiquette, through training courses, daily 
communication and taking them to participate in business negotiations.   
 
The companies from transport and construction sectors have relatively high mobility 
of employees; therefore regularly providing training programs especially for new 
staff is crucial.  The data does not indicate that high-tech sectors (e.g. ICT) offer 
more internal training than other sectors (e.g. construction).   
 
There are also examples such as T1 subsidiary’s general manager starting a new 
project and E subsidiary’s marketing manager changing the design of inductions 
showing how the firms exploit the knowledge of local talent (in section 6.2.3 Local 
Talent).  Similarly some episodes from like E subsidiary and C subsidiary indicate 
how the exploitation of knowledge occurs (in section 6.2.31 Local consultants).   
6.3.2 Capabilities Development in UK Subsidiaries 
As mentioned in chapter three, a synthesised definition of capabilities from Winter’s 
(2000) and Prahalad and Hamel (1990) is used and looks at a certain level (could be 
high or low) of routine that generalised from learning, confers upon an organisation’s 
management a set of decision options for better performance.  This also echoes 
Grant’s (1996b) hierarchical levels of integrated capabilities.  All the interviewees 
from subsidiaries have witnessed certain level of capabilities development in their 
subsidiaries and they believe this improvement should be related to learning.  
 
Generally speaking, the majority of subsidiaries claim that their sales and profits 
have been increased as their organisations develop.  Some subsidiaries have also 
witnessed their organisational structures have become more mature i.e. from one 
sales organisation to a more sophisticated organisation with various departments.  
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For example, a senior manager from C subsidiary has points out, in the beginning 
there were only three departments (i.e. marketing, purchasing and project 
management departments) with three expatriate staff in the subsidiary, and now the 
company has eight departments (e.g. administrative department, accounting 
department, etc.) with over 50 employees.  A senior manager from T1 subsidiary 
mentions that the working conditions have been dramatically improved since they 
moved into the new building (the subsidiary invested to construct), which has 
improved staff motivation.  The interviewed managers from B2 and B3 subsidiaries 
have pointed out that the Chinese expatriates and the local employees have become 
closer and closer and better understand each other.  The Managing Director from B3 
subsidiary says:  
… our subsidiary started from scratch and has experienced many changes and 
improvement and so far has achieved a good result.  There were lots of 
conflicts and argument not only in between the expatriates and the local staff 
and also among the expatriate employees who came from different departments 
and organizations that formed their own working methods and practices.  It 
took us a period of time to go through the continuing controversy and conflicts 
to achieve mutual understanding and it was also a mutual learning process for 
all employees.   Now we can see many capabilities improvement in every area 
(e.g. the process management, board operation, project management, new 
product approval and the main business of the regulatory processes, risk and 
compliance and so on). The whole improving process is also a learning 
process. 
 
The factors in table 6.5 are corresponding to the classification of knowledge gaps in 
table 6.1.  Since the majority of UK subsidiaries have witnessed their sales and 
profits increase, it is reasonable to believe that 87 per cent has developed its 
marketing capability (e.g. better understand the local market and customers’ needs, 
having improved tender skills through practices.). All the subsidiaries ever 
encountered doubts in their products, services and even overall capabilities from UK 
market and have proved their abilities in varying degrees.  This can be explained by 
the following several episodes.  Company P1 has opened its new book store in 
London.  Company B2 has established a new retail branch at local.  B1 subsidiary 
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has successfully expanded its customer composition, and now its 50% customer 
equity is local firms.  C subsidiary’s projects amount has increased five times.  
Company TD1 has passed certification of some global big oil companies and now is 
able to directly supply their global subsidiaries and even compete with the world’s 
big companies in the industry.  
 
Seventy-three per cent of the affiliated organisations have experienced operations 
management capability improvement (see table 6.5).  For example, the Managing 
Director from B3 subsidiary who previously points out the issue that Chinese 
enterprises are prone to emphasise the results in contrast British companies tend to 
pay attention to the processes, has used an evidence to prove his subsidiary’s 
capability development in this area.  He says:   
we have developed an operational procedure including pre-trade, trade 
execution and post-trade three stages.  If we are required to deliver a new 
product that we have never done before, we can use this complete procedure to 
analyse the whole process from the customer’s demand to the product 
outcome.  This procedure has helped us to avoid the situation that the pains 
are likely to outweigh the gains.  We have asked the local auditors to checked 
the procedure and then have introduced it to the HQs.  Emphasis on processes 
is the most important thing that we have learned from the local.  
 
A financial manager from T1 has pointed out that initially lots of information was 
recorded manually (e.g. he needed to prepare about 10,000 invoices by hand each 
year) and currently the subsidiary has computing system to electronically record 
data.  After the Managing Director took over T2 subsidiary, he has experienced 
many business capabilities development such as a new operating manual system and 
improved land transport processes.  A deputy manager from B2 subsidiary mentions 
the expatriates and local employees have become closer and closer; learning more 
and more from each other.  He explains that its subsidiary has one-third expatriates, 
one-third local Chinese and one-third local non-Chinese, there were many conflicts 
between the expatriates and the local employees, both thinking their own business 
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approach to be the best way.  Through a long period cooperation, communication 
and negotiation, currently both sides have agreed that each side has both advantages 
and disadvantages and they should not be fully in accordance with either Chinese 
practice or British one.  Therefore they have integrated the two approaches to reach 
the middle ground.  He further mentions, 
.. learning is a process of continuously transforming knowledge structure.  The 
UK subsidiary has become more mature and successful, partly because we 
have learned many good business practices and new ideas from the local 
context. 
 
As shown in table 6.5, 53 per cent of affiliates have experienced capability 
development in HRM in particular in recruitment, distribution, training and 
development.  Four interviewed managers point out that previously due to the limit 
number of personnel, the division of employees was not clear which led to one 
employee had to do several different jobs; currently the organisation structure has 
been improved and everyone has their clear individual duties and responsibilities.  A 
senior manager from C subsidiary mentions that they can now manage a dozen 
projects at the same time compared to previously only working on one project at 
once.  A senior manager from IC2 subsidiary says that they have employed more 
local staff and have also appointed some local staff on managerial positions, the local 
staff has the advantage in culture and language, thus some work (such as presenting 
for bids and marketing products) needs to be done by local staff.  Currently the 
middle-level client managers are all local staff, who are responsible to lead their 
teams to complete sales objectives (in the processes of completing products 
proposals, cargo delivery, R&D support, etc.).  The Managing Director from P1 says:  
previously expatriates were all over 40 years old, whereas recently HQs send 
younger staff.  HQs believe that young people are more motivated to learn and 
to change.  The fact has proved this to be true.  Previously the UK subsidiary 
dealt only with HQs purchasing order, now the bookstore is responsible for 
local sales.  Although HQs made the decision to open the bookstore, the 





Table 6.5: Capabilities Development in UK Subsidiaries 
 
Company names B1 B2 B3 C CO E IC1 IC2 IC3 P1 P2 TD1 TD2 T1 T2 Sum Percentage 
Sector B B B C Cos E ICT ICT ICT Pb Pb Td Td Tp Tp N/A N/A 
Types of companies S S S P P P S P P S S S S S S N/A N/A 
Existence of overall 
organisational capabilities 
development 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
Organisational capabilities 
development relating to 
learning 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
Capabilities development in 
marketing 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y 13Y 87% 
Capabilities development in 
operations management 
Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 11Y 73% 
Capabilities development in 
HRM 
Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N N N N N 8Y 53% 
Capabilities development in 
product diversification 
Y Y Y N Y N N N N Y N N Y N Y 7Y 46% 
Capabilities development in 
R&D 
N Y N Y N N N Y N N N N N N N 3Y 20% 
Note. For sector, B=Banking, C = Construction, Cos = Consuming goods, E = Electronic, ICT = Information and Communications 
Technology, Pb = Publishing, Td = Trading, Tp = Transport. For types of companies, S = State-owned, P = Private. HRM = Human 





As seen in table 6.5, 46 per cent of subsidiaries have experienced product 
diversification, however only 20 per cent of them have witnessed R&D development. 
This might be explained by the fact that some subsidiaries tend to purchase new 
technology and even products instead of developing them.  
 
 
6.4 Knowledge Transfer and Capabilities Development in the HQs: to Address 
Research Question Four 
 
This section addresses the last research question (i.e. how do UK subsidiaries 
transfer the knowledge and developed capabilities to the HQs).  Based on Andersson 
et al.’ (2001) three level of capabilities development in an MNC, the third stage is 
corporate level, therefore sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 explains knowledge transfer from 
the UK subsidiaries to the HQs and capabilities development in the HQs.   
6.4.1 Knowledge Transfer from UK Subsidiaries to HQs 
Chapter three discussed how reverse knowledge transfer (from subsidiary to HQs) 
plays a significant role in capabilities development in a MNC, this knowledge 
transfer is not measured by the quantity of information flows, rather the qualitative 
impact of knowledge transfer on capabilities development in HQs.  In order to 
explore the process of knowledge transfer it is important to ensure the existence of 
knowledge transfer.  Derived from Easterby-Smith et al.’s (2008) mechanisms of 
knowledge transfer (e.g. training, personnel movement and social interactions), the 
key codes (i.e. HQs organise annually global executive meetings; UK subsidiary 
regularly sending reports to HQs; UK subsidiary regularly sending emails and 
making phone calls to HQs; HQs sending staff to visit UK subsidiary; and existence 
of managing directors’ visit HQs) are identified (see table 6.6).  This section presents 
interview findings about whether the UK subsidiaries transfer learned knowledge and 




According to table 6.6, all subsidiaries take the responsibility of collecting useful 
information and practices from the UK market and transferring back to the HQs 
through reports, visitors, emails and phone calls.  For example, the three banking 
subsidiaries have dedicated research staff to collect information and conduct research 
(in Chinese) for the HQs.  Emails and phone calls are considered the most frequent 
and convenient communication methods between the subsidiaries and the HQs.  The 
Managing Director from P1 noticed wide gaps (e.g. technology, coverage of 
publishers and clients) between the domestic online-information market and the UK 
market after he visited the local online-information exhibitions, and then 
immediately reflected this phenomenon to the HQs via phone calls and sent the 
relevant documents (e.g. online-information index brochures) through emails; 
currently its HQs has started to pay more attention on online-information.  
  
As seen in table 6.6, 73 per cent of the HQs annually organise global executive 
meetings, which provide a formal platform for overseas affiliates’ Managing 
Directors to share knowledge, practices, experiences and even lessons in the 
meetings.  All the Managing Directors need to return to the HQs to report either to 
the CEO or the executive teams at least once per year.  They are frequently 
approached by colleagues (in the HQs) who are interested in the UK subsidiary’s 
performance and expect to hear some news, experiences, and even to clarify some 
information heard before; these normally happen personally and informally.  Other 
expatriates (including managerial and non-managerial staff) meet their HQs’ 
superiors and colleagues, and share their experiences and stories with them, when the 
expatriates take vacation in China.  These communications are often informal and 
occur within small groups.    Simultaneously all the HQs send managerial staff to 
visit the subsidiaries and exchange ideas with the relevant employees and then they 





Table 6.6: Knowledge Transfer from UK Subsidiaries to HQs 
 
 
Note. For sector, B=Banking, C = Construction, Cos = Consuming goods, E = Electronic, ICT = Information and Communications 
Technology, Pb = Publishing, Td = Trading, Tp = Transport. For types of companies, S = State-owned, P = Private. HRM = Human 
Resource Management, R&D = Research and Development. 
 
Company names B1 B2 B3 C CO E IC1 IC2 IC3 P1 P2 TD1 TD2 T1 T2 Sum Percentage 
Sector B B B C Cos E ICT ICT ICT Pb Pb Td Td Tp Tp N/A N/A 
Types of companies S S S P P P S P P S S S S S S N/A N/A 
UK subsidiary is responsible 
for collecting information at 
local 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
Existence of knowledge 
transfer from UK subsidiary 
to HQs 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
HQs organize annually global 
executive meetings 
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y 11Y 73% 
UK subsidiary regularly 
sending reports to HQs 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
UK subsidiary regularly 
sending emails and making 
phone calls to HQs  
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
HQs sending staff to visit UK 
subsidiary 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 15Y 100% 
Existence of Managing 
Directors’ regular visit HQs 




All subsidiaries regularly send reports to their HQs (see table 6.6) and are also 
required to submit a detailed annual report on performance, development, new ideas, 
problems and lessons to their HQs, and also need to write specific reports on certain 
issues irregularly.  The Managing Director must approve all the annual reports before 
sending to the HQs and all the reports are written in Chinese.  Apart from the 
previously mentioned five subsidiaries that submitted study reports, the other 
organisations rarely send specific learning reports, but mentioned change and 
improvement in the reports, and can also share learning via other channels (e.g. 
meetings, emails and phone).  For example, the Managing Director from T2 
subsidiary says:   
Every year, I meet the European Lines Division’s directors two or three times, 
reporting our performance and talking about learning e.g. what we learned, 
how we learned.   
In addition, the majority of the UK subsidiaries have relatively low autonomy and 
are prone to share and discuss issues with the HQs frequently.  For instance a senior 
manager from IC2 subsidiary points out:  
… the UK subsidiary shares and discusses many things with HQs e.g. change 
management system, customer issues management system.  When we deal with 
clients, we observe and listen to them, and then we transfer what we have 
learned back to HQs.   
6.4.2 Capabilities Development in HQs 
As discussed in Chapter three, the outcome of knowledge transfer is measured by the 
impact of capabilities development in HQs rather the quantity of knowledge flows.  
In other words, the willingness and ability of HQs assimilate and exploit transferred 
knowledge is as important as the willingness and ability of subsidiary send 
knowledge.  In order to examine to what degree knowledge is successfully 
transferred from subsidiary to HQs, it is crucial to explore how the HQs process and 
exploit the knowledge transferred from the UK subsidiaries (i.e. is there a formal 
review of the UK subsidiaries’ reports in the HQs? do the HQs disseminate UK 
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subsidiaries’ experiences to their other subsidiaries? and do the HQs give feedbacks 
about the reports to the UK subsidiaries?), whether the UK subsidiaries have helped 
the HQs with the capabilities development, and what these improved capabilities are. 
 
As shown in table 6.7, 87 per cent of the HQs have a formal review of the reports 
and tend to disseminate the particularly successful and failure cases within the entire 
companies and expect employees and organisations to analyse and learn from the 
cases.  However, only 53 per cent of the HQs give feedbacks about the reports to the 
subsidiaries.  A senior manager from B3 HQs says:  
we share individual subsidiary’s good practices within the entire bank.  After 
our International Business Department has categorised overseas reports into 
such as business operation, risk management, products innovation, etc., HQs 
will share the reports within the entire bank.  HQs ask their each department to 
comment and give feedback on the contents and quality of the reports and then 
according to this feedback HQs will make requests to subsidiaries (e.g. asking 
certain subsidiary to conduct further in-depth research on certain topic) 
Though the HQs do not easily adopt the UK subsidiaries’ advanced practices and 
experiences, they often diffuse these to other overseas affiliated organisations for 
learning purpose.  Sixty per cent of the UK subsidiaries have helped with enhancing 
the HQs’ capabilities.  A senior manager from B3 HQs points out: 
The entire company definitely benefits from the subsidiaries’ reports, but it is 
difficult to tell how much exactly they contribute to the company’s 
development.  Probably the overseas subsidiaries’ reports have made totally 
10—20% contribution to the entire company’ capabilities improvement.  The 
influence from overseas subsidiaries to HQs tends to be subtle (tacit), not only 
in the formal content of reports.    
 
In addition, an R&D officer in B1 subsidiary also says: 
When we received the research topics from the HQs, we did our best to 
complete the research reports……. The best result was that the HQs’ CEO 
gave an instruction and required the related departments to implement our 
research results; however, very few reports can receive an instruction from the 
CEO…….often the CEO might find some reports useful and put them into 











Note. For sector, B=Banking, C = Construction, Cos = Consuming goods, E = Electronic, ICT = Information and Communications 
Technology, Pb = Publishing, Td = Trading, Tp = Transport. For types of companies, S = State-owned, P = Private. HRM = Human 
Resource Management, R&D = Research and Development. 
 
Company names B1 B2 B3 C CO E IC1 IC2 IC3 P1 P2 TD1 TD2 T1 T2 Sum Percentage 
Sector B B B C Cos E ICT ICT ICT Pb Pb Td Td Tp Tp N/A N/A 
Types of companies S S S P P P S P P S S S S S S N/A N/A 
HQs have a formal review of the 
UK subsidiary’s reports 
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 15Y 87% 
HQs disseminate UK 
subsidiary’s experiences to other 
subsidiaries  
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 15Y 87% 
HQs give feedbacks about the 
reports to the UK subsidiary 
Y Y Y Y N Y N Y N N N Y N Y  8Y 53% 
UK subsidiary has helped the 
HQs with the capabilities 
development  
Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y N N N N 9Y 60% 
UK subsidiary is significant to 
the HQs 
N N N N N N N Y N N N N N N N 1Y 7% 
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Some cases show that the subsidiaries transfer knowledge to the HQs that have 
helped the HQs to develop their capabilities. Other examples indicate that the 
subsidiaries’ and UK even international market’s demands have encouraged the HQs 
to improve their capabilities in order to compete in global market.  All three banks’ 
HQs have ever purchased some banking software from western companies, some 
software can be used directly and others need to be adjusted before application.  
 
All the interviewees from B1, B2 and B3 subsidiaries think that compared to UK 
banking regulatory, the domestic banking regulatory is less mature and still 
developing, so normally the domestic regulatory requirements follow the 
international banking regulatory standards.  They also mention the UK subsidiaries 
sometimes encounter the new banking regulatory requirements earlier than the HQs; 
therefore overseas subsidiaries’ experiences can be helpful to the HQs.  For example, 
B1 subsidiary has optimised some processes and rules through preparing and passing 
the SAS70 audit (a disaster recovery testing system), and then reported it to the HQs.  
Although the HQs did not directly adopt SAS70, they referred to the UK subsidiary’s 
report in designing their own disaster recovery program and they also introduced 
SAS70 to other subsidiaries.  In addition, the three banks also have helped their HQs 
to improve products diversities and management practices. For instance, B1 
subsidiary once developed a new product and introduced the product with the 
relevant knowledge and system to the HQs; now Asia-Pacific overseas subsidiaries 
are selling this product and more subsidiaries will soon start to sell it.  A senior 
manager from B3 HQs mentioned that their risk management policy, implementation 
of the Basel-2 and the overseas subsidiaries’ risk management department standards 
are all based on the overseas subsidiaries’ and the UK subsidiary’s learning.  The 
three banks also believe that the UK (and overseas) subsidiaries have trained the 
expatriates an international perspective and business capabilities and these expatriate 
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staff have been proved extremely helpful with setting up more overseas subsidiaries, 
in addition these contributions are more concrete than the reports. 
 
In order to meet the client’s needs, IC2 subsidiary initially developed ‘Problem 
solving management system’ and then transferred the system to the HQs and now the 
entire company uses it.  E subsidiary has helped its HQs to improve the products 
design and technique.  This can be explained by three examples.  First, the subsidiary 
recommended changing the induction cookers design from varied patterns with 
buttons to black with knob.  Second, the subsidiary found the defects in the 
dishwashers and suggested to simplify the structure, reduce the screws and integrate 
components, which made significant saving on maintenance.  Third, the subsidiary 
detected the air conditioners’ defects in low temperature and recommended installing 
a hearing module to the external machine.   
 
Six banking managers mention that the world leading banks tend to develop and 
produce their own unified operating systems.  In contrast, previously Chinese 
overseas banks used outsourcing systems that were different from the HQs’ systems.  
According to UK and also other overseas subsidiaries’ demands, the three banks’ 
HQs have spent time developing their own unified systems and have also introduced 
them to the global affiliated organisations, which is extremely beneficial to their 
international business development and management.  The Managing Director of 
TD1 subsidiary says:  
Sometimes, the solutions (such as new products or services demands) help with 
enhancing the capabilities of the entire company.  For example, once we 
supplied pipelines for a refinery company, which required many specific 
details in production process and advanced logistic service.  Since such a large 
project contains many sub-projects, affecting products, amount and deliver 
time.   HQs production line was designed for mass production.  In order to 
meet this client’s needs, HQs made some improvement on production line and 
logistic service.  The client was satisfied with our products and services.  This 




A senior manager from C subsidiary mentioned that UK is very strict with wood 
packaging; therefore in order to meet the need of using steel packaging instead, the 
HQs upgraded the manufacturing equipment.  Another example, the UK subsidiary 
helped the HQs to find an appropriate equipment and used it to complete one project.  
A middle manager from B2 HQs tells a story that shows that a subsidiary’s demand 
can help with enhancing the capabilities of the entire company.  Once Japan 
subsidiary encountered a ship finance project that the entire company never did this 
sort of project; the HQs used the consultants and also consulted with international 
experienced peers, eventually complete the project.  Afterwards, HQs summarised 
the whole process to a report and archived it for future use. 
 
Generally speaking, 93 per cent of the UK subsidiaries are insignificant (in size and 
turnover) to their HQs. The data also show that the HQs tend not to consider 
changing or upgrading the entire companies’ operational systems and management 
practices, unless the majority overseas subsidiaries encounter the similar issues or 
difficulties.  As several managers mentioned, their HQs consider the new knowledge 
and experiences from the overseas subsidiaries because they expect to learn to 
improve capabilities, but it is difficult to implement it.  However, UK is a relatively 
important market particularly in banking; therefore the banks’ HQs pay relatively 




This chapter has presented the results of interviews with 28 people in fifteen Chinese 
UK subsidiaries (table 6.1) and 12 interviews with seven Chinese-based HQs.  
Guided by the conceptual framework (represented in figure 3.2), these forty 
interviews have built upon the conclusion from Chapter Five: that Chinese 
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subsidiaries intentionally and purposively privileg learning as an important goal of 
OFDI into the UK.   
 
Referring again to the contradictions between the policy of Chinese MNCs wanting 
subsidiaries to learn as opposed to the practice of inhibiting learning or not acting at 
HQs-level upon learning; section 6.6 shows systematic two-way knowledge flows 
between HQs and subsidiaries.  Whereas Dunning and Narula (1996) predicted that 
OFDI would grow as location advantages strengthen, the evidence suggests that 
Chinese OFDI is growing to enable the learning of new competences: new ways of 
learning how to learn and that this better explains the pattern of Chinese OFDI than 
Dunning’s stages model.  Since learning can only occur by cognisant thinking 
individuals (in Chapter 3), its unsurprising (section 6.4.2) that OFDI into the UK 
provides Chinese managers with learning opportunities that inspire and intrigue them 
as they make sense and (re)-interpret situations and practices in the light of their 
previous Chinese experience.   
 
Section 6.2 presents the interview findings of how learning occurs in Chinese 
subsidiaries, which addresses research question two.  Generally speaking, the 
subsidiaries know that their systems and products are often technological and 
systematically inferior to host country firms.  However, their focus is not upon 
capturing codified (product) knowledge, rather they are engaged in a process of 
understanding and emulating the systems used in British firms to interact with one 
another and their networks.  In short the Chinese companies are building up the 
absorptive capacity systems and knowledge base that will enable them at some future 
point to compete in products and service standards with the UK firms.   
 
Section 6.3 addresses research question three: how Chinese subsidiaries exploit the 
learning and develop capabilities.  In summary, the subsidiaries intend to exploit new 
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knowledge, however only few of them have systematic mechanisms that enable them 
to exploit new learning efficiently.  All the subsidiaries have developed their 
capabilities in certain level such as in product or service quality, marketing 
strategies.  
 
Section 6.4 presents the empirical evidence of how the subsidiaries transfer the 
knowledge and developed capabilities to the HQs, which addresses research question 
four.  In summary, all the UK-based subsidiaries are responsible to collect 
information and knowledge and transfer these back to the HQs.  New knowledge and 
capabilities are transferred both via technological tools (e.g. emails, phone calls) and 




Chapter Seven: Analysis and Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter analyses the qualitative interview data, discussing the findings in 
relation to the general literature and the theoretical framework (figure 3.2).  It also 
addresses the second research objective of this thesis: namely, to explore and 
examine the learning and capabilities development in Chinese MNCs in the UK.  The 
research questions two, three and four will be addressed through analysis and 
discussion comprised of major categories of themes and the conceptual framework.  
 
The structure follows the sequence of research questions.  Section 7.2 addresses the 
research question two: How does the learning occur in Chinese MNC’ subsidiary in 
the UK?  Section 7.3 illustrates the research question three: How do UK subsidiary 
exploit learning and develop capabilities?  Section 7.4 examines the research 
question four: How do UK subsidiary transfers the knowledge and developed 
capabilities to the HQs?  Finally section 7.5 summarises the conclusions of the 
analysis. 
 
7.2 How Learning Occurs in Chinese MNC’ Subsidiaries in the UK 
7.2.1 Knowledge Gaps in UK Subsidiaries 
Numerous researchers, such as March (1999) pay attention to the importance of 
MNC subsidiaries filling corporate knowledge gaps, which Peterson et al. (2008) 
define as follows: ‘knowledge gaps in foreign markets as discrepancies between the 
knowledge possessed and the knowledge needed for successful business ventures 
abroad’.   Peterson et al. (2008) go on to argue that filling knowledge gaps is a major 
motivation in learning by subsidiaries. This study explores to what degree 
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subsidiaries identify knowledge gaps (sources of knowledge or capabilities) to fill 
perceived gaps and strengthen competitive advantage.  The research reveals the main 
knowledge gaps that Chinese subsidiaries perceive are fourfold: operational 
management, HRM, marketing and R&D.   
 
The survey results echo Child and Rodrigues’ (2005) finding, that most Chinese 
MNCs continually consider internationalisation as the means to absorb knowledge 
and gain competitive advantage.  The survey shows (table 5.15 and 5.16) that 
market-seeking is the paramount motivation of investment in Britain, followed by 
strategic asset-seeking (including seeking managerial skills, local talent and 
technology).  These MNCs often identify their knowledge gaps during their 
internationalisation processes, even before they started to invest overseas.  Scholars 
such as Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Almeida, 1996; Pearce, 1996; Cantwell and 
Piscitello, 1997; Blanc and Sierra, 1999; Kuemmerle, 1999; Niosi, 1999; and Lee et 
al., 2001 focus on subsidiaries enhancing technological resources, whereas this study 
reveals firms identifying knowledge gaps in other functional areas such as marketing, 
operation management, and HRM.  In this the results are close to the findings of 
Pahlberg (2001) and Schlegelmilch and Chini (2003), learning occurs not only in 
technological areas, it is also important in other business functions such as 
marketing.   
  
Eighty per cent of the subsidiaries in this study identified knowledge gaps in 
operations management between themselves and their indigenous counterparts; 73% 
of subsidiaries notice gaps in their marketing knowledge, and 46%, and 40% 
respectively of subsidiaries find knowledge gaps in HRM, and R&D.  Whilst 
sometimes these knowledge gaps are disadvantageous; at other times the knowledge 
gaps simply reflect different ways of doing business in the UK compared to China, 
indicating that cultural differences lead to different business practices.  Peterson et 
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al. (2008) point out that knowledge gaps indicate the current knowledge is 
insufficient to achieve the expected objectives in the current situation, just as some 
interviewees pointed out: ‘When in Rome, do as the Romans do’.  If reduced psychic 
distance enhances the ability of subsidiaries to learn from host country firms, then 
this too becomes a strategic asset for them.  However, this study concludes that these 
Chinese subsidiaries continue to suffer wide psychic distance from host country and 
the local firms: the Chinese firms are failing to invest in host country networks or to 
replace expatriate managers with local managers. 
 
Knowledge gaps between Chinese subsidiaries and UK companies in the sphere of 
operations management are profound.  Some cases show that the Chinese companies 
rely on human memory to retain information whereas UK companies will 
systematically record contacts.   For example, the managing director of P2 subsidiary 
pointed out that the absence of an operational procedure caused him difficulty to 
understand the operations of the organisation when he took over the position.  The 
Chinese companies are much more informal and dependant on people, whereas in the 
opinion of the Chinese subsidiary managers (see section 6.1) the UK companies rely 
more upon systems and their approach of knowledge capture is more systematically.  
This may overstate the case and will require further research to validate the opinion 
of these Chinese managers.  What is clear is that these Chinese subsidiaries are less 
endowed with systems and systematically codifying information.  Chinese 
companies often discard learning that is not of immediate use, whereas their UK 
compatriot companies are more likely to store knowledge for potential future use: a 
result of learning being in the heads of managers, rather than systematically stored 
for future use.  In short, the Chinese subsidiaries pay less attention to the procedures 
and processes they are shorter-term rather than long-term; their operational and 
management systems are immature, lack of effective integration and are less 




Additionally, some cases (for example the new recruited General Manager of P2 
subsidiaries suggested a new project of warehouse construction, which was 
immediately rejected by the Managing Director who believed the HQs will not prove 
this project since it would be large amounts of investment, eventually an alternative 
project with small amounts of investment was implemented.) also show that the HQs 
are concerned about financial investment.  They prefer small amounts of investment 
offering short-term returns, often rejecting larger and longer-term investments, 
demonstrating short-term rather than strategic thinking in some large Chinese 
companies and contrasting with the longer-term strategies pursued by (especially) 
Japanese companies.  Some researchers (for example Chow, 2007) comment upon 
the short-term nature of Chinese business.  Whilst this study has not compared the 
time horizons of Japanese and US firms to Chinese firms, the data supports Gilboy’s 
(2004) finding that Chinese firms tend to favour short-term gains over long-term 
investments. In the Chinese financial firms this is clearly seen in terms of data for 
regulatory compliance: they point out that this is a core centralised function in British 
banks, whereas the Chinese firms have no such function.   
 
Knowledge gaps in marketing mainly show in three areas: dealing with contracts, 
tendering and marketing strategy, indicating that Chinese firms lack institutional 
market knowledge in Johanson and Vahlne’s (2009) term i.e. knowledge about 
language, laws and rules.  Johanson and Vahlne (2009) further argue that a lack of 
institutional market knowledge results from psychic distance and constitutes the 
liability of ‘outsidership’ from the local networks.   Contracts in China tend to be less 
legal bundled, as the contracts are renegotiable at any stage of the implementation.  
However, for UK firm’s contracts are treated strictly legally with literal scrutiny, less 
negotiable once the contracts are signed.  This phenomenon could be explained by 
Luo’s (1997) observation that in the Chinese context, even if the government has 
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enacted numerous laws, rules, and regulations, almost none are completely enforced 
since personal interpretations are often used in lieu of legal interpretations.  This also 
indicates the cultural and institutional differences between the two countries.   
 
Whilst filling this gap is essential to success in UK markets, due to the cultural and 
institutional difference, even when subsidiaries become aware of the gaps, they 
receive little resonance from their HQs.  For example, tendering procedures too are 
often influenced in Chinese firms by cultural issues such as Guanxi (Chinese 
networking): it is a harsh lesson for many Chinese subsidiaries that UK tendering 
relies on competitiveness of capabilities rather than personal connections.  In section 
6.1 some Chinese managers mention this difference and it is one of the reasons that 
they rely upon detailed guidance from local consultants.  It is worth noting that this 
reliance upon consultants is a break with Chinese business tradition, since the use of 
external consultants is relatively new.  
 
It is further noted that until recently western consulting firms operating in China face 
some of the same wide psychic distance issues as the Chinese subsidiaries face in the 
UK, mainly disconnection from business networks and an inability to deeply engage 
with host country business.  Again, as Chinese subsidiaries learn to adopt the British 
approach of tendering procedures, these lessons fail to transfer to their home market.   
This phenomenon can be explained by Luo’s (1997) finding that personal 
connections are often more important than legal standard, in addition unlike many 
western countries where commercial law is ingrained, traditionally commercial law 
barely existed in China.  Marketing strategy is a further area of knowledge gaps: this 
research illustrates that the Chinese subsidiaries often lack market research, market 
analysis, understanding of customers and competitors.  For example, each of the 
three banks located a subsidiary in the UK to follow their Chinese customers; none 
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have systematically surveyed the market potential of non-Chinese customers, 
including UK firms that trade in China. 
 
The data indicates that knowledge gaps in HRM appear principally in two areas: a 
lack of a clear division of labour (for example, a senior manager of C subsidiary used 
to be responsible of some jobs that needs more than one person to do) and retaining 
Chinese HRM styles (for instance, expatriation is the most often adopted method for 
staff recruitment): the evidence for which is reported in section 6.2.3 above.  Due to 
the limit of operation and budget, small subsidiaries tend not to have a clear division 
of labour i.e. one person has to take responsibility of several jobs; clear lines of 
responsibility are only created as the subsidiaries grow.  In the early period, it is 
often unclear who has what responsibility.   
 
Chinese HRM styles are rooted in a culture of personalised decision-making, in 
which senior managers often disrespect technical expertise: it is often a hire-and-fire 
culture.  Retention is therefore a major issue: the culture in Chinese firms is one of 
offering bonuses to ‘steal’ staff from competitors, rather than long-term investing in 
training and personal development.  Additionally, some functions (such as sales) are 
privileged above others (especially technical functions).  These findings could be 
addressed by Shen and Edwards’ (2004) argument that Chinese MNCs have large 
freedom on making decision on recruitment and selection, so they encounter 
difficulty abroad since they lack international HRM experiences.  This research finds 
that Chinese firms abroad work with the same HRM ethos as they would back in 
China, which results in problems recruiting and retaining British staff.  For example 
several subsidiaries point out they do not fully trust and rely on the local employees, 




Though few of the Chinese subsidiaries have an explicit R&D function, 40% 
perceived the knowledge gap of R&D.  This is especially amongst the financial 
firms, who perceive British competitors as more sophisticated and have an explicit 
remit from HQs to report on innovative ideas.  From the examples of the Managing 
Directors of E and P2 subsidiaries who pointing out the HQs only would agree with 
small amount of investment either in product development or service development, 
additionally these subsidiaries appear insignificant to their HQs.  This implies a 
frustration for subsidiary managers who are not resourced to create long-term 
product development based on their learning from UK competitors, nor do they see 
evidence of their HQs acting upon their innovation suggestions.  In short, subsidiary 
managers are asked to investigate knowledge gaps but unable to act upon what they 
learn. 
 
In order to survive and compete at local market, the Chinese subsidiaries need to fill 
up these gaps and to learn the UK way of doing business.  All the interviewed 
subsidiaries have been established for at least five years and some have even grown 
in the UK for a few decades.  They find themselves continually noticing knowledge 
gaps and absorbing new knowledge to fill up the gaps in order to survive and 
compete in the changing environment.  This echoes Penrose’s (1959: xii) resource-
based view of the firm: growth ‘is essentially an evolutionary process and based on 
the cumulative growth of collective knowledge, in the context of a purposive firm’.  
However, constraints upon innovation by subsidiaries set by HQs means that little 
innovation occurs as a result of the subsidiary’s learning.   
7.2.2 Subsidiaries Learn from Their Internal and External Networks 
McEvily and Zaheer (1999) argue that each subsidiary has a unique and idiosyncratic 
network, exposing it to different new knowledge and opportunities.  Chinese 
subsidiaries have a looser relationship with their HQs that often act as a command 
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and supply centre, they also actively interact with the local stakeholders and 
communities.  Phene and Almeida (2008) suggest that subsidiaries can learn from 
various sources within and outside MNC.  The subsidiaries undertake learning 
through the interactions with the sources within and outside MNCs.  The UK-based 
Chinese subsidiaries absorb knowledge through the learning from such as the HQs, 
local consultants, local communities and stakeholders (for instance, the B1 
subsidiary has developed a new product through learning from its local peers) and by 
absorbing ideas from the local talent who have knowledge the subsidiaries did not 
have (for example, P2 subsidiary has expanded its business scope through recruiting 
a local general manager who has the expertise that the subsidiary did not have).  This 
supports Simon’s (1991:125) argument that organisations learn both through the 
exist employees and recruiting new talent.   Based on Phene and Almeida’s (2008) 
six exhaustive and mutually exclusive learning sources, these partners are divided 
into two groups: internal network source and external network source. 
 
Knowledge Transfer within Internal Networks 
The interviews show regular interactions between all the subsidiaries and their HQs 
with subsidiaries actively sending employees to attend training programs, seminars 
and conferences arranged by the HQs.  In contrast, only 53% of the UK subsidiaries 
regularly interact with the other subsidiaries (within the companies).  This result 
supports Phene and Almeida’s (2008) argument: the vertical ties (between the 
subsidiary and the HQs) are more direct and stronger than the horizontal ones 
(between the subsidiary and other subsidiaries).  The banking and ICT companies 
tend to have a relatively mature training centre regularly providing training programs 
and seminars.  Only three HQs recently have started to design specialised training 
programs for the local employees in the UK subsidiaries and aim to provide those 
staff with a general overview about the parent company.  These training programs 
are expected to develop more specific and business-related.  In short, from the 
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viewpoint of HQs, vertical knowledge flows remain much more important than the 
horizontal flows – section 6.2.2 illustrates that these vertical flows are better funded 
and seen as much more important by HQs and subsidiaries than are horizontal flows 
of knowledge (some of which are discounted by HQs and into which they resist 
investment. 
 
T2 subsidiary’s Managing Director uses a simple episode (see section 6.2.2) to 
explain expatriates bridging daily communication between the HQs and the local 
employees, in particular when the HQs’ documents are written in Chinese.  Phene 
and Almeida (2008) emphasise the positive impact of inter-organisational networks 
on learning by suggesting that ‘the presence of a unified organizational context 
provides a set of processes and routines within the firm that enable the smooth flow 
of knowledge from different parts of the firm and its utilization’.  Not only at the 
early stage of the subsidiaries’ establishment, have expatriates always played a 
crucial role in facilitating the implementation of HQs policies, culture, requirements 
etc.  Both survey data and interview results show that the senior and middle 
managers in the subsidiaries are primarily composed of expatriates.  As Bjorkman et 
al. (2004) suggest, an expatriate-dominated managerial team might draw attention of 
the subsidiary’s activities more on inter-firm processes than on developing 
relationships with the local firms, and then the subsidiary could eventually fail to 
take advantage of the resources in the host country to develop capabilities.   
 
Additionally the majority of expatriate managers are involved in mentoring new staff 
and/or providing training courses, therefore expatriates’ learning (e.g. motivation, 
capacity and willingness) are pivotal. Scholars (Penrose, 1959; Rubin, 1973; 
Wernerfelt, 1977 and 1984) have found that both developing new resources and 
exploiting the existing resources are equally important to sustain a firm’s competitive 
advantage.  Firms and individuals act in the ways to which they are habituated, 
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therefore unsurprisingly Chinese subsidiaries and expatriates bring the ways-of-
working from the HQs to the subsidiaries.  The example of ICs indicates this (as the 
interviewee mentions: ‘Dedication and diligence make IC2 a unique culture’.); for 
example expatriate staff are prepared to work longer hours and during vacations, take 
more responsibility and tend not to leave the firms in difficult situations.  It can be 
concluded that Chinese MNCs tend to highly use expatriates; it is due to the issues of 
control, communication, unwillingness to employ local employees in key positions 
(including trust issue), management development, training local staff and culture 
diffusion (Shen and Edwards, 2004).  
 
Each of the fifteen Chinese HQs companies interviewed send expatriates to UK 
subsidiaries; these tend to be experienced staff and all the subsidiaries’ Managing 
Directors had minimum five year work experiences in the HQs before appointment 
to the subsidiary.  Expatriate staff have a positive influence on their UK subsidiaries 
and also bridge communication between the HQs and subsidiaries; if there are no 
expatriates, it is difficult to implement the HQs policies, culture and requirements in 
the subsidiary and difficult for HQs to understand the subsidiary’s demands and 
difficulties.  This study therefore confirms the findings of Hocking et al. (2004) and 
Harzing (2001) who argue that the most important reason for MNCs to send 
expatriates is to transfer knowledge among the internal units: ‘forward’ (from 
headquarter to subsidiary) and ‘reverse’ (from subsidiary to headquarter).  Only half 
of the subsidiaries share knowledge with the other subsidiaries within the firm, the 
practices and experiences of the subsidiaries is often transferred back to the HQs and 
then disseminated by the HQs to other subsidiaries.  
 
Knowledge Transfer within External Networks 
The survey shows that absorbing external advanced skills and practices is a major 
motivation for Chinese MNCs establishing subsidiaries in the UK.  Andersson, Holm 
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and Holmstrom (2001) for example argue that ‘80 per cent of the most important 
relationships have been identified as being external to the MNC’.  The majority of 
the subsidiaries are wholly-owned organisations.  The others are JV subsidiaries that 
report disappointment at the failure of their partner firm’s contribution to long-term 
knowledge transfer; in most cases deep cooperation ended after the partners helped 
the subsidiaries establish.  Instead, the subsidiaries learn through recruiting local 
talent and interacting with local consultants, local customers, local competitors, local 
policy makers, local business and industrial communities: these external network 
partners become increasingly significant resources for developing subsidiary’s core 
competences.  These results support the findings of Andersson and Forsgren (1996) 
and Andersson and Pahlverg (1996), the latter’s survey of 98 companies suggests 
that subsidiary’s gains from JVs correlates with the resources they invest: in the 
Chinese case as it has been shown, these resources as limited by HQs.   
 
It is significant that the data shows 93% of the subsidiaries recruit local talent and 
use this as a way of gaining indigenous learning.  Also, interaction between the 
expatriates and the HQs tend to be informal, many important issues are discussed via 
phone calls and many decisions are made also through phone calls reflecting 
informal systems: the Chinese subsidiaries are not systematically codifying and 
accumulating learning, making sense of it for their business and building upon earlier 
learning.  Much of the learning by the subsidiaries is informal and initiated without 
the agreement of HQs, though if significant costs are involved (such as attending 
conferences or hiring consultants), given the tight budgets of the subsidiaries (for 
example as the Managing Director of P1 mentioned in chapter six), they then have to 
seek permission.  The ability of UK subsidiaries to participate in longer-term or risky 
initiatives from which they may learn, is further constrained by a short-term 
mentality and (especially in SOEs) risk-aversion for fear of losing state assets, for 
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example, given his previous experience, the Managing Director of T1 subsidiary 
prevented the General Manager’s plan to invest in long-term warehouse building.   
 
A further factor inhibiting learning by Chinese subsidiaries is the fact that they are 
mainly wholly-owned subsidiaries.  In contrast in jointly-owned subsidiaries, as 
Andersson and Forsgren (1996) found, there was more incentives for both parties to 
learn from the other and to adopt a long-term perspective.   
 
Given the absence of systematic codification of learning, short-term perspective, 
absence of R&D resources and wholly-owned nature of the subsidiaries; it is 
unsurprising that recruitment of local talent is seen as one of the important ways in 
which Chinese subsidiaries can learn about local markets and technologies and 
reduce psychic distance, when other avenues seem closed. 
 
One model for recruiting and learning from local talent is the use of consultants.  For 
Chinese businesses this is innovative: there is no tradition in China of hiring 
consultants either to help with projects or improve business operations.  All of the 
Chinese subsidiaries interviewed use local consultants reflecting a perception that 
consulting firms, taken advice from which is superior to internal knowledge sources 
especially about ‘softer’ functions.  Advice on local ways-of-working is necessarily 
superior to internal knowledge sources, since the consultants are locally based and 
immersed in local ways-of-working.  As the evidences shown in C and E, the 
subsidiaries use consultants for specialist matters, such as guidance on labour or 
patent law; however, they also make use of consultants for everyday issues such as 
advice on computing systems and marketing campaigns.  Many of the subsidiaries 
(such as B1, P1 and C) commented upon high levels of learning from consultants, 




To conclude, in the absence of long-term learning relationships with local 
companies, the Chinese companies instead rely upon the intermitted (and costly) 
hiring of consultants sometimes for specialist advice but also over everyday matters.  
Much of this learning would otherwise be gained simply from creating open learning 
relationships with UK companies.  The example of C subsidiary is instructive; the 
company was using its consultants to educate staff on record keep and archiving.  
Had the company created close working relationships with local companies, it might 
have identified and transferred these practices at nil cost.  Instead, relying upon 
consultants means the subsidiary is paying for learning and will pay again in future 
when other learning gaps become identified.  The cost of short-term savings as 
participants in knowledge networks and closely partnering local firms is the long 
term of learning about basic practices from expensive consultants. 
 
In other areas of specialist or technical knowledge the subsidiaries use consultants to 
better effect, for example accounting and legal issues (when the subsidiary is too 
small to recruit an in-house lawyer or accountant).  Other examples from the 
interviews include banking liquidity evaluation, building security assessment and 
public relations.  In these instances, the subsidiaries are careful to try and codify 
learning, archiving documents.  The regulatory environment and professionals 
judgements made such issues today may result in quite different advice tomorrow, 
meaning that the value of learning has limited time validity, since the regulatory 
environment may be fast-changing such as in areas of tax.  It is not possible to codify 
professional judgement.  The subsidiaries fail to capture knowledge relating to 
everyday business issues and repeatedly pay for it, but try to capture knowledge 
(professional judgements) that is less prone to being codifiable.   The episodes from 
the publication firm and the construction company show they learned little from the 




The research illustrates that whilst Chinese subsidiaries may benefit from JVs on 
long-term projects such as new products and processes.  As Makino and Inkpen’s 
(2003) and the earlier work of von Hippel 1988 predicted, internalising lessons for 
how to do business in the UK, the everyday business processes involving tacit 
learning, is a greater challenge, requiring investment of time and an openness to 
adopting business practices of the host country.  This is learning tacit new-ways-of-
working (i.e. altering attitudes) will always be more difficult than importing codified 
learning, especially if it is embodied in technology. 
 
Eighty per cent of the subsidiaries are members of the CEA in Britain and actively 
participate in the events (such as training courses and seminars) regularly organised 
by the Association, membership of which is encouraged by the Chinese Embassy.  
Through these events, the subsidiaries receive updated information about 
immigration policies, local tax policies and even market trends.  They socialise with 
the other members (mainly Chinese companies and consultant firms).  Eighty per 
cent of subsidiaries actively participate in local events (i.e. seminars, conferences, 
fairs etc.) often organised by the industrial societies or local peers (including 
customers and competitors).  In the events they have opportunities to meet local 
competitors, potential customers to receive and exchange business market 
information and they also believe they have learned from their local competitors.  
These information are codified knowledge, can be easily transferred.   
 
Fifty-three per cent of affiliates (from banking, ICT, construction and transport 
sectors) are also members of local industrial associations that provide more 
professional and specialised training, seminars and conferences within certain 
industry; including local Chambers of Commerce.  Mainly these are the larger 
Chinese subsidiaries, which are not simply sale organisations, which may have 
expanded their range of operations and investments.  Such firms like the banking 
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subsidiaries and construction subsidiary provide the Chinese subsidiaries with both 
formal and informal learning.  In particular, the three bank HQs often send 
delegations to London to meet local policy makers and communities in order to 
conduct research; these research reports are not only useful for the parent companies 
and also draw Chinese government’s attention.  
 
In summary, as Chinese subsidiaries grow in size, they grow in confidence to interact 
in on wider (non-Chinese) stages, absorbing learning from local companies.  Fifty-
three per cent of subsidiaries claim they benefit knowledge and confidence through 
dealing with customers; simultaneously the clients’ demands and expectations have 
motivated the subsidiaries to learn and to develop capabilities.  As Grant (1996) 
pointed out, the most significant learning for OFDI companies is learning-by-doing: 
exchanging contacts, discussing business processes, phoning contacts who have 
faced similar challenges.  Gradually, it appears, subsidiary staff have develop 
personal relationship with the local peer firm’s employees, these informal, social ties, 
as Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) mentioned, have become superior channels for 
knowledge transfer and also helped to alleviate corporate and national cultural 
differences.   
7.2.3 Motivations and Mechanisms for Learning in the Organisation 
Both examples of C and IC2 subsidiaries (in section 6.2.4) indicate that employees’ 
learning can be stimulated by extrinsic motivations that satisfy their needs indirectly 
through financial rewards and incentives for their past performance as Minbaeva 
(2008) suggests.  Though all interviewees agree that their firms encourage learning, 
only one third of the companies have provision of incentives for learning and 
innovation (e.g. new products, new systems, and new ideas).  In the larger 
subsidiaries (i.e. B1, B2, B3, C and IC2), employees are encouraged to learn (for 
example attending training courses, discussing training plans) using more systematic 
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motivation mechanisms, such as recording on file notes and in reports points they 
learn from interacting with host country firms and regulators.  The subsidiaries of 
B1, B2 and IC2 mention the use of online database for knowledge dissemination.  
The example of initial failure and later success of adopting database in B1 subsidiary 
indicates the significant impacts of the quality assurance manager and further implies 
the importance of systematic motivations and monitor mechanisms.  
 
Sixty per cent of HQs have a suggestion schemes for their staff and eighty per cent of 
subsidiaries consider learning as one of their overseas investment objectives, 
however only one-third of organisations have clear learning goals set by their HQs. 
 
Thus, at a formal level both subsidiaries and HQ have adopted some of the 
techniques used in western firms to capture the ideas and other learning by staff; 
however, these appear to be formal systems not intended to disrupt hierarchic 
decision-taking. 
7.2.4 Summary of Discussion Regarding Research Question Two 
The survey results show the motivations of Chinese OFDI in the UK are market-
seeking, followed by strategic asset-seeking (managerial skills and local talent). 
These subsidiaries have also identified knowledge gaps in marketing, operation 
management, HRM, and technology.  Although there are also other reasons (such as 
Chinese government policy) that motivate these firms to invest overseas, learning is 
one of the main objectives and Chinese MNCs expect to lessen and even fill up these 
knowledge gaps through investment in Britain.  The minority of the subsidiaries 
(three banks and one ICT company) have R&D functions, however, only the ICT 
Company has established a formal R&D facility.  Learning occurs everywhere in the 
subsidiaries, however the majority of firms are involved in sales and marketing, the 
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categories of knowledge are mainly restricted to market knowledge and managerial 
skills.  
 
These conclusions support Simon’s (1991) findings that all the firms learn both 
through the learning of their employees, recruiting new talent and in internal and 
external networks. The subsidiaries are all tightly associated to these internal 
network actors with their particular HQs, with expatriates management teams and 
regularly interactions (training programs, documents exchange, etc.).  Expatriates 
play a significant role in knowledge transfer from the HQs into the subsidiaries.  
Compared to the internal network, the external network is looser, the firms do not 
have close long-term partnerships with local peer-firms, and even JV subsidiaries do 
not collaborate closely with the JV partners.  Learning mainly takes place in the 
events organised by associations (e.g. CEA, local industrial associations) and 
learning-by-doing whilst dealing with customers.  Subsidiaries have absorbed 
enormous resources through hiring local consultants and recruiting local talent.  
Subsidiaries are constrained in their learning by the lack of importance attached to 
this activity by HQs in the sense of limiting budgets and adopting short-term 
perspectives on the value of learning relationships. 
 
7.3 How UK Subsidiaries Exploit Learning and Develop Capabilities 
7.3.1 Knowledge Exploitation within and by UK Subsidiaries 
Exploiting knowledge requires, as Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue, an 
organisation to successfully internalise and socialise the learning.  As Spender (1996) 
and Zahra and George (2002) note, the manner in which these processes occur will 
vary across sectors and between business cultures.  Each subsidiary required the staff 
to write annual reports about their performance, change, difficulties, plans, etc.  
Some subsidiaries exploit individual and group’s knowledge through developing 
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operating procedures and/or knowledge database, which are shared and used within 
the companies in staff training and/or to support job rotation.   
 
Another mechanism of exploiting individual knowledge is to require the experienced 
managers and staff to share their specialised knowledge (often explicit knowledge) 
through training courses or seminars.  Managers often act as mentors, training junior 
staff and even taking them to participate in business negotiations, where the 
managers are able to disseminate some tacit knowledge.  Junior staff are mainly 
recruited at local, and as mentioned the majority of managers are expatriates, thus the 
results support Shen and Edwards’ (2004) finding that training host country nationals 
is one of the reasons for Chinese MNCs to use expatriates.  Therefore, absorptive 
capacity of these expatriate managers becomes of great importance for the 
subsidiary’s learning and capabilities development.  Vance and Paik (2005) found 
that disseminating learning among non-expatriates might make a significant 
contribution to increased absorptive capacity.  In summary, the subsidiaries intend to 
exploit their learning: the question is how successfully they achieve this intention.  
 
All interviewed subsidiaries have recruited local talent and tend to exploit their 
professional capacities and advantages in UK languages and culture, often allocating 
them into legal, commercial or customer relations work.  T2 subsidiary’s Managing 
Director draws from his own experience to suggest that local talent have advantages 
(e.g. language, culture) over expatriates; local talent also play important roles in 
business development, particularly when the subsidiary wants to develop new 
business beyond the current range supported by the HQs.  
 
Some episodes (for example T2 recruiting the new General Manager, and E 
recruiting the marketing manager) indicate the subsidiaries have a clear objective to 
source local talent and tend to exploit the expertise of the new recruits in new 
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projects (e.g. T2 subsidiary’s General Manager started LCL project) or solving the 
existing problems (e.g. E subsidiary’s marketing manager changed the induction 
design).  The locally-recruited marketing manager of E subsidiary used his 
knowledge to solve the product design problem, using tacit knowledge unavailable to 
expatriate staff.  These examples support Grant’s (1996b) finding that specialist 
knowledge embodied in individuals is critical to successful subsidiary operations.  It 
also, suggests that if new learning is framed as a make-our-own or buy-in decision, 
that in the short-term at least Chinese subsidiaries have little choice but to buy-in 
local expertise, especially relating to complex regulatory systems or tacit knowledge 
relating to products or customer relations.  
 
Five subsidiaries deliberately assign one or two local staff as assistants to the senior 
(Chinese) managers and expect them to provide useful knowledge and suggestions.  
Fifty-three per cent of subsidiaries have local talent in managerial positions (such as 
supervisors, department managers and less often general managers).  These people 
helped the subsidiaries to improve the product design, to expand the business scope, 
to solve the long-lasting problems and so on.  These all indicate that Chinese 
subsidiaries hope to efficiently exploit the knowledge of local talent on a frequent 
basis as part of normal working, since the Chinese companies are aware of the need 
for subsidiary-level decisions to be informed by a knowledge of local culture and 
ways-of-working in the same way that the every western business operating 
successfully in China with have local partners guiding the way the business conducts 
its affairs. 
 
The data shows all the subsidiaries exploit the skills of the local consultants in 
problem-solving: this is continuous since as one set of problems is solved a new of 
appears.  The subsidiaries rely continually on consultants, attempting on each 
occasion to attach their own staff to learn from the consultant.  However, in key areas 
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such as HR regulations, tax law such is the fast-changing nature of the regulatory 
environment or nature of professional judgement, the subsidiaries are unable to 
internalise the competences of the consultants.  Some episodes from such as C 
subsidiary and P1 subsidiary (in section 6.2.3), illustrate this learning from 
consultants have been successfully integrated into task-specific capabilities; 
supporting the findings of Grant (1996b).  The work illustrates that the Chinese 
subsidiaries continue to rely on western consultants for specialist knowledge and in 
areas of professional judgement, emphasising the wide psychic distance between the 
Chinese and UK business cultures.  A similar gap may be found between UK firms 
in China, however the difference is that in China consulting firms tend to be western 
in origin and to recruit and train local people specifically to act on behalf of western 
OFDIs into China.  Comparing these different scenarios may prove a useful area of 
future research. 
 
Fifty-three per cent of subsidiaries are small organisations, the majority of which 
have only one office, they tend to learn and to exploit knowledge informally, being 
co-located and as Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) found, informal social ties between 
members of same organisation can be superior channel for knowledge transfer.  
However, Zahra and George (2002) suggest that even though informal mechanisms 
are useful in exchanging ideas, formal mechanisms are more systematic.  The 
example that P1 successfully organising a spring festival book fair emphasises the 
small organisation’s capacity of absorbing and exploiting learning from consultants.  
 
Using knowledge databases can be a useful and effective approach to integrate 
individual knowledge into organisational capabilities.  However, only the minority of 
the subsidiaries have knowledge database that records project procedures, technical 
cases, common problems and solutions – a knowledge available to socialise learning.  
One reason for this absence of formal knowledge management sites could be that 
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over half of the subsidiaries are small organisations with less than employees 
working in one office; informal means of knowledge sharing such as informal 
communities of practice is preferred.  Informal approaches to knowledge sharing are 
flexible; however, this approach relies on people taking knowledge sharing seriously 
and can have disadvantages compared to formal knowledge captured.  For example, 
when the Managing Director of T2 subsidiary took over the position, there were no 
any written operational procedures left from the previous Managing Director; this 
causes difficulties for the current managing director in terms of understanding the 
operations and being familiar with the new organisation.  In the Chinese cultural 
tradition, businesses do not formally capture, codify and socialise learning: they 
prefer inter-relational and informal transmission of learning in un-codified formats.  
This can have advantages for agility and flexibility, however, it has the disadvantage 
of embodying knowledge in people, who may leave or become unavailable.   
 
Whilst the majority of the subsidiaries have recruited local employees, 27% of which 
have local Chinese staff (some of whom may be UK resident, however all are of 
Chinese origin).  It seems that this is not simply a question of cost, rather as the 
example of IC1 subsidiary indicates, recruiting people of Chinese origin can be 
preferable since it is more difficult for a single westerner to fit in to an organisation 
where the dominant culture (e.g. working language and working practices) remain 
entirely Chinese.   Given the evidence that only half of the subsidiaries allocate local 
employees in management positions, the results may support Shen and Edwards’ 
(2004) finding that the most frequently reported reason that Chinese MNCs 
experience difficulty in attracting and retaining local talent is the lack of career 
advancement opportunities: Chinese companies privilege Chinese staff. 
 
Subsidiaries take responsibility to scan the local marketing environment, collect the 
relevant information and knowledge and send it back to the HQs.  Sometimes the 
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subsidiaries are asked to collect the information and knowledge about specific issues 
(e.g. B2 subsidiary was required by the HQs to conduct the research about the 
operational system of a local leading bank).  At other times the firms transfer the 
information that the HQs may be interested in.  There may be a tension between the 
knowledge capture initiated by HQs and that which local subsidiary managers feel is 
important.  For example, amongst the three banks: HQs are interested in issues such 
as firm-level liquidity ratios, whereas the local managers are more concerned to learn 
about western customer relations management systems. This leads to some 
information and knowledge acquired by the subsidiaries but not exploited in the 
subsidiaries.  Such tensions are expected and over time may change, if subsidiaries 
gain greater autonomy. 
7.3.2 Capabilities Development in UK Subsidiaries 
In each of the subsidiaries have developed new capabilities; all (to a degree) are 
better able to operate in the host environment.  The majority have increased sales, 
and some have altered from being a single small sale organisation into a larger firm 
with a clear division of labour.  It is difficult to say these achievements are 
attributable only to learning; however, it is also clear that learning has played some 
role in these changes.  Additionally, presuming learning is important it is not 
completely clear where the subsidiaries are learning.  Zaheer (1995:360) argued that 
overcoming a liability of foreignness is a result of HQs sharing capabilities that were 
previously denied to the subsidiary, rather than subsidiaries learning from peer-
companies in the host country.  Miller and Parkhe’s (2002) research similarly 
confirms the existence of a liability of foreignness, however, they suggest that 
learning to overcome this liability may come from interaction with host country 




The majority of UK subsidiaries have increased their sales and profits since the 
initial establishment, and 87% of the affiliates have developed marketing capability 
measured by market share, sales, better understanding the local market and 
customers’ needs, having improved tendering skills.  This study shows Chinese 
subsidiaries learning little about innovative products and processes from their HQs.  
Some learn little from UK firms; instead, their source of learning is local recruits and 
consultants.  If this assumption is accepted, then this is a new model of learning: 
relatively ‘closed’ Chinese subsidiaries learning little from HQs or from UK firms, 
rather they learn mainly from ingesting relevant knowledge from recruiting staff or 
consultants.  Testing this assumption suggests the need for further research.   
 
These subsidiaries faced market uncertainty over their products and services at the 
point when they were established; they also face UK market perceptions that Chinese 
products are low cost and inferior quality, evidenced by the low number of 
successful Chinese companies in global markets; Huawei and Lenovo being counter-
examples.  Such perceptions are invisible entry barriers to Chinese firms seeking to 
internationalise.  Overcoming such perceptions is a major achievement of these 
Chinese subsidiaries.  For example, after several years’ investment into the UK, TD1 
HQs have successfully passed the industrial certificate and become a competitive 
supplier for the world leading oil firms.  Such examples support the view of Zaheer 
(1995) and Miller and Parkhe (2002) above, and generally the Uppsala and LLL 
schools of thought, which overseas subsidiaries learn and can overcome the liability 
of foreignness. 
 
Seventy-three per cent of subsidiaries report improved capabilities in operations 
management.  Many mention shifting from short-term and informal processes to a 
longer-term emphasis upon formal systems and processes.  For example B3 
subsidiary identified the gaps, absorbed the knowledge and developed a detailed 
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operation procedure consisting of pre-trade, trade execution and post-trade three 
stages, implemented the procedure leading to smoother operation and also avoiding 
potential problems.  Such learning is from UK sources, in the case of B3 consultants 
and recruited local staff, not the result of changes in outlook and practices from its 
HQs. 
 
Fifty-three per cent of affiliated organisations have experienced HRM improvement, 
(often recruitment of local talent is emphasised), as the subsidiaries grow, more local 
employees are recruited including some into managerial posts.  Again, this suggests 
strategies overcoming the liability of foreignness based upon knowledge flows from 
UK rather than Chinese sources.  B2’s case is interesting, demonstrating an ability to 
integrate local and expatriate talent over a long period to create formal processes and 
systematic training for all staff.  However, the survey results show that expatriation is 
still the most often-used recruitment method especially for senior and middle level 
managers.  This supports Shen and Edwards’ (2004) finding that though recruitment 
and selection in Chinese MNCs is more progressive than domestic Chinese HRM in 
adopting contemporary HRM concepts, Chinese MNCs still lack formal and 
systematic recruitment and selection methods.  
 
Forty-six per cent of subsidiaries diversified their products, for example, the B1 
subsidiary observed the local peer’s product and modified it and sold it in lower price: 
further example of local learning rather than transfer of capabilities from China.  
Only 20% of the firms have undertaken formal R&D, which corresponds to the 
survey result that compared to managerial skills and local talent, technology seeking 
is a less important motive of OFDI.  This result might be explained by the fact that 
only a minority of subsidiaries are involved in R&D activity: more of them purchase 
rather than develop new technologies.  Although a weaker form of learning from UK 




In summary, whilst further research is required to trace causal linkages, it seems that 
Chinese subsidiaries are overcoming the liability of foreignness and doing so more 
by learning from local sources, than from capabilities transferred from China. 
7.3.3 Summary of Discussion Regarding Research Question Three 
All the interviewed companies exploit managerial staff knowledge through 
mentoring and training.  The firms tend to exploit knowledge of local talent through 
allocating them in positions where they have advantages.  However, compared to 
expatriates who tend to take senior positions, only 53% of subsidiaries have local 
talent in their management team. This restricts the knowledge sharing since 
managerial staff have more opportunities (training, mentoring) to disseminating their 
knowledge and skills.  
 
The minority of firms have R&D functions; these have adopted knowledge databases 
to exploit individual and organisational knowledge and skill, which all employees 
can access to seek solutions from.  These knowledge databases are found to be 
effective for knowledge sharing amongst staff and particularly helpful in problem 
solving.  Researchers such as Takeuchi and Nonaka (1995); Dixon (2000); Nonaka 
and Takeuchi (2004) argue that in order to gain competitive advantages, firms need 
to widely distribute knowledge to their all internal units and employees rather than 
only to relevant managers and experts.  Distributing knowledge is not sufficient for 
capabilities development; motivation and absorptive capacity are also pivotal.  Apart 
from introducing databases, these firms adapt varied performance assessment 
mechanisms to encourage employees to learn and to solve problems.  In contrast, the 
majority of subsidiaries (mainly SMEs) do not have knowledge database and tend to 




7.4 How UK Subsidiaries Transfer the Knowledge and Developed Capabilities 
to the HQs 
7.4.1 Knowledge Transfer from UK Subsidiaries to HQs 
Each of the subsidiaries send regular reports to their HQs covering performance, 
change, difficulties and they gather local industrial information and business 
practices, transferring them to the HQs through reports, visitors, emails and phone 
calls.  This is similar to Easterby-Smith’s (2008) findings on mechanisms for 
knowledge transfer that also include training programmes, social events, transferring 
experienced staff and providing documents.  The majority of subsidiary’s reports, 
including all the annual reports are written in Chinese; the annual reports must be 
approved by the Managing Directors and other reports are reviewed and sent by the 
relative expatriate managers.  Thus it is expatriates who are responsible for 
knowledge transfer; codification in Chinese language indicates that the subsidiary’s 
main concern is information sharing with HQs.  As Minbaeva and Michailova (2004) 
emphasise ‘sharing depends on the ability of the source to communicate his/her 
knowledge in a way the receiver can understand’.  However, if local staff were more 
closely involved in the process, this might enrich the content of the reports and 
provide opportunities to reflect upon how the subsidiary’s practices and systems 
differ from UK businesses.   
 
Expatriate managers share their practices and stories with superiors and colleagues 
during their annual visits to the HQs, further confirming that information and 
knowledge dissemination are channelled through expatriate managers as Downes and 
Thomas (1999) suggest from their earlier study of Japanese firms.  Later research 
(such as Downes and Thomas 2000; Dunning, 2003; Riusala and Suutari, 2004) has 
similar findings.  Expatriate managers therefore play a critical role in both ‘forward’ 
knowledge transfer and ‘reverse’ knowledge flows from learning by the foreign 
subsidiary.  Further research may reveal how prepared these expatriate managers for 
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this important role and to what extent they have been prepared (e.g. in competences, 
training) for the role. 
 
Whilst learning from host country sources is an explicitly acknowledged aim of 
Chinese inward investors, of the subsidiaries which are charged with collecting and 
transferring knowledge and information for the HQs, only one-third regularly submit 
learning reports to HQs (including three banks who conduct R&D).  Informal 
methods such as emails and phone calls are the most frequently used communication 
channels between the subsidiaries and HQs.  Knowledge transfer features during 
personnel visits, in particular when expatriates managers share their knowledge and 
experiences with their colleagues.  As it has been mentioned above in Chinese 
companies these processes are unsystematic, short-term and informally 
communicated, thus there is no systematic codification of lessons from the host 
country of benefit to the HQs.   
 
Chinese MNCs tend to assign expatriate managers overseas long-term (three to five 
years); the majority of the interviewed expatriate managers have worked abroad 
more than five years and all expatriates have worked in the subsidiaries more than 
one year.  Bjorkman et al. (2004) found that extensive use of expatriate managers 
over time may negatively impact on knowledge transfer from the subsidiary to the 
HQs.  Some episodes indicate that the expatriate managers began initially to 
frequently gather information and knowledge and send it back to the HQs.  This 
supports Minbaeva and Michailova’s (2004) finding that early in their career abroad 
(one year or less) expatriate managers are willing and eager to transfer knowledge 
back to HQ.  However, the longer the expatriate manager remains abroad, the less 
time and effort they spend on knowledge transfer.  In part this may be as Minbaeva 
and Michailova (2004) suggest because after a time the managers experience greater 
autonomy and responsibility for employees’ performance and exhibit greater 
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commitment and willingness to perform better.  This study reveals that once a pattern 
of inattention and inaction by HQs becomes established, expatriate managers begin 
to feel the effort is wasted, especially when there is no feedback received from the 
HQs.  Where subsidiary managers are given little autonomy to act upon their 
learning, they may over time be less and less likely to keep HQs informed of what 
they learn.   
 
The most difficult knowledge to transfer is ‘sticky’ tacit learning: ways of doing 
things that are not easily codifiable (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).  Such learning is 
particularly important for Chinese companies given the wide psychic distance 
between ways of working in China compared to western markets.  The main way in 
which sticky knowledge is transferred between Chinese subsidiary and HQs is by 
staff transfers.  Clearly the problem with this is that dissemination is limited to those 
with whom the transferees come into contact.  Since transfers occur at the most twice 
a year, the cycle of sticky knowledge transfer within Chinese companies become 
haphazard and unreliable.  It can be concluded that in this most important area of 
knowledge transfer, Chinese companies perform poorly and fail to gain advantages 
that a more systematic approach would offer.  
7.4.2 Capabilities Development in HQs 
Eighty-seven per cent of the HQs formally review the subsidiary reports and tend to 
disseminate learning (relating either to success or failure) within the entire company, 
however, only 53% of HQs give feedback to the subsidiaries.  HQs expect to receive 
new knowledge, innovation, practices and experiences, but they do not easily adopt 
the UK subsidiaries’ advanced practices and experiences.  This might be attributed to 
the difference of business environment in China (and other subsidiary locations) and 
the fact that 93% of UK subsidiaries are insignificant in both size and turnover to the 
parent company.  This does not mean that the HQs do not benefit from the 
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knowledge transfer, rather that it is difficult to measure it impact.   As a senior 
manager from B3 HQs said:  
 
The entire company definitely benefits from the subsidiaries’ reports, but it is 
difficult to tell how much exactly they contribute to the company’s 
development.  Probably the overseas subsidiaries’ reports have made totally 
10—20% contribution to the entire company’ capabilities improvement.  The 
influence from overseas subsidiaries to HQs tends to be subtle (tacit), not 
only in the formal content of reports.   
 
HQs tend to disseminate those practices and experiences offering advantage to other 
subsidiaries.  The data shows that sixty per cent of UK subsidiaries have helped with 
enhancing the HQs’ capabilities.  Some cases show that the subsidiaries transfer 
knowledge to the HQs that have helped the HQs to develop their capabilities or 
understand trends in UK and international markets, encouraging the HQs to improve 
their capabilities in order to compete in global market.  
 
As the leading state-owned banks in the domestic market, each of the three banks 
that were interviewed are motivated by the government and also the domestic market 
to grow to world-class status.  This is a major motive to learn from the leading banks 
in London as a world financial centre.  Each of these subsidiaries was established in 
the expectation of significant learning from the subsidiaries.  The findings indicate 
the banking HQs tend to show significant interests in the UK subsidiary’s new 
learning and development; B1’s SAS70 disaster recovery testing system being an 
example.  It may be that further research will reveal that knowledge transfers are 
greater in those sectors in which HQs expect/plan to occupy globally competitive 





Supply-linkages too are a source of learning.  For example, if subsidiaries learn about 
a superior supply source than that currently used by HQs, Zahra and George (2002) 
suggest this may become an ‘activation trigger’ for MNC restructuring of supply 
linkages exploiting the new connection.  As Walsh and Ungson (1991), Winter 
(2000) and Zahra and George (2002) point out, such beneficial results only occur 
where the HQ responds to the stimuli from the subsidiary and has the agility (double-
loop learning) to put the suggestion into practice. 
7.4.3 Summary of Discussion Regarding Research Question Four 
Chinese subsidiaries adopt both formal and informal mechanisms of knowledge 
transfer (mentioned by Easterby-Smith, 2008); in particular regularly providing 
documents (for example annual reports, research reports, etc.) and informal approach 
of sending emails and phone calls.  These are all effective tools of transferring 
explicit knowledge, codifying the knowledge into words and share it.  However, only 
a minority of them (for instance B1 subsidiary is the training centre of EU area) 
provide training programs for the parent company.  Sammarra and Biggiero (2008) 
argue that this reduces the degree of knowledge transfer.  Addersson et al. (2002) 
point out the difficulty of transferring tacit (non-codified) knowledge and identify the 
three problems as separating the knowledge form the entities, receiver’s ability and 
willingness to absorb new knowledge.  Chinese firms tend to transfer knowledge 
through transferring personnel, mainly by sending expatriates and visitors. The 
rotation of expatriates is often 3-5 years (sometimes longer), and the frequency of 
visitors is about two times per year, therefore tacit knowledge transfer seems limited 
and less effective.  
 
In contrast, the HQs are more interested in information such as local industrial 
trends, new policies, new products, etc.) and frequently require this information.  The 
majority of the UK-based subsidiaries are insignificant in terms of market share and 
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turnover, and their HQs highly reply on the domestic market. Unlike technology, 
both managerial and market knowledge are context-specific, thus many knowledge is 
found not be applicable to the home market. According to Easterby-Smith et al. 
(2008), the absorptive capacity of the HQs can restrict the importance of inflow 
knowledge transfer.  Therefore, high capabilities development in the subsidiaries and 
effective explicit knowledge transfer do not lead to manifest enhanced capabilities in 
the HQs.  The findings support, the degree of knowledge transfer depends on not 
only the senders’ willingness to share the knowledge also the receiver’s willingness 





Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
As China’s economy develops, researchers have studied both inward and outward 
FDI with numerous studies over the last two decades focusing on the 
internationalisation of Chinese firms especially their strategy, motivations and 
determinants of OFDI and IFDI.  One of the significant findings is that Chinese 
OFDI into the industrial economies is driven mainly by the desire for strategic asset-
seeking in terms of such as advanced technologies, advanced managerial skills and 
local expertise.  However, there has been no study of how Chinese OFDI subsidiaries 
absorb these strategic assets, exploit them to create new capabilities affecting 
performance.  Aiming to fill this gap, the main research objective is to explore and 
analyse the learning and capabilities development by UK-based Chinese subsidiaries 
and their HQs.  In order to explore the learning in the subsidiaries, it is crucial to 
ensure that learning actually occurs in the subsidiaries.   
 
Another research objective is to identify and investigate the characteristics and 
motivations of Chinese OFDI entry into the UK, building a platform from which to 
investigate the main objective.  This research objective is translated into the research 
question: what is the pattern and main motivations of Chinese OFDI in the UK?  A 
quantitative survey method is adopted to answer this first research question.  Having 
identified 100 Chinese OFDI in the UK (see the company list in Appendix I), from a 
self-administered questionnaire 30 completed questionnaires were returned and 
analysed using SPSS.  The findings show that seeking strategic assets in particular 
seeking the advanced managerial skills and local talent is one of the main motives of 
Chinese OFDI into the UK and also one of the main overall benefits.  In summary, 




Turning to the main research objective, this study addresses three research questions: 
first, how does the learning occur in the UK-based Chinese subsidiaries; second, how 
do the subsidiaries exploit the learning and develop capabilities and third, how do the 
subsidiaries transfer the knowledge and developed capabilities to their HQs?  To 
answer these three questions, a qualitative case study method was initially adopted.  
Based on the responses of the questionnaire, a number of subsidiaries and their HQs 
were selected for in-depth case studies.  However, given the difficulty of access, the 
author failed to do so, and an alternative in-depth interview approach was used.  In 
total 40 interviews were conducted including 28 interviewees from 15 subsidiaries 
and 12 interviewees from seven HQs.  The interview data was presented in chapter 
six and an exploratory approach was adopted for data analysis.  The thorough 
analysis has enabled to address the answers of the four research questions.  
 
8.1 Evaluation of the Study 
 
Validity and Reliability of the Findings 
 
Whilst access issues constrained the research design, the data gathered is honest, 
repeatable and all the interview data is coded based on the same criteria, therefore the 
risk of inconsistency in the coding of these data has been reduced.  Since this study 
had both elements of quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis, as well 
as different sources of data; thus the author is comfortable with the validity of this 
research as it conforms to triangulation methodology.  The analysis is also reliable in 
terms of replicability (Bryman, 2008), since the coding and procedures have been 




When evaluating the significance of the contributions of this study, it is important to 
comprehend its limitations.  As with much research into Chinese companies, the 
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main limitation of this study arises from limited access and depth of access from 
companies.  The original research design, exploring knowledge flows between 
subsidiaries and their HQs would have revealed much richer data than it was 
eventually gathered, lending further weight to the results, particularly the author had 
been able to use observation method in addition to the interview method the author 
was allowed to employ.  However, the quantitative dataset assembled is the largest 
survey the author knows of and the author obtained to interview 15 subsidiaries and 
seven HQs.   
 
This research is carried out on a relatively new context (i.e. learning and capabilities 
development occur in UK-based Chinese subsidiaries and their HQs) with little 
previous research to build from and therefore few guiding studies against which this 
study can be benchmarked.  There is little tradition of access to academics in Chinese 
companies.  The original research design was case studies using data from interviews 
at HQs and subsidiary in the same MNC.  This proved impossible because of access 
difficulties.  Further research, by the author self and/or others, may in some small 
ways be easier once companies, such as those being interviewed, become sanguine 
about allowing access.  
 
Understanding Guanxi (networking) plays a significant role in building trust, this 
study started with survey aiming to building a foundation stone for the main research 
objective and also contacts for further study.  It was succeed, since 15 subsidiaries 
were interviewed later.  Nonetheless, given the insignificant position of the majority 
subsidiaries to their HQs and entrenched hierarchical culture in Chinese firms in 
particular the state-owned ones, it was unable to interview sufficient HQs through the 




This study does not take an industry specific angle as it explores firms from varied 
sector backgrounds, the main criteria being that the subsidiaries undertake learning 
and transfer knowledge to the HQs, irrespective of their industrial backgrounds.  The 
initial survey results indicate that the 30 responses spread across 14 industrial 
sectors, as there are not sufficient cases for individual sectors, carrying out an 
industry specific study is proved difficult.  Given the difficulty of access to the 
Chinese MNCs, the approach of this study had to alter from a limited number of case 
studies to a large number of in-depth interviews, adopting this sector specific study 
becomes even more difficult.  The sample size, with 40 interviewees from 15 
subsidiaries and 7 HQs, whilst larger than previous studies, is open to bias and is of 
limited generalisation.   
 
8.2 Summary of Findings 
 
This research finds (table 5.15 and 5.16) that Chinese OFDI targets filling knowledge 
and competence gaps once they located abroad.  However, some researchers such as 
Peterson et al. (2008) emphasise the technical and scientific content of these gaps, 
whereas this study supports Pahlberg (2001) and Schlegelmilch and Chini (2003) 
who emphasise softer areas of knowledge seeking such as marketing, HR practices 
and operation management.  Section 7.2.1 shows that in filling these gaps Chinese 
subsidiaries act quite differently from earlier generations of Japanese firms, whose 
practices are interpreted in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) knowledge cycle.  Unlike 
this approach, the Chinese firms are less systematic, more informal.  It highlights a 
particular difficulty for the Chinese subsidiaries; they rely on learning from local 
talent, yet find it difficult to attract and retain this talent, since they maintain a 





Unlike the earlier generation of OFDI by Japanese and US companies where often 
manufacturers with significant technological superiority, the Chinese subsidiaries are 
often technological inferior and are service providers (see section 7.2.2).   Few of 
these firms located in the UK learned significantly from their HQs and few learned 
from (JV, supply) network partners.  Learning tends to take place in transactional 
relationships with locally recruited talent and consultants.  As Phene and Almeida 
(2008) suggest, Chinese subsidiaries have strong vertical relationships, however, 
where there is knowledge flow it is upwards rather than downwards and the main 
content of the relationship is downward control: Chinese subsidiaries act with little 
autonomy.  As section 7.2.2 notes, exchange of expatriate staff between HQs and 
subsidiary is an important knowledge conduit and control mechanism, few of the 
subsidiaries have placed local talent in important management positions.   This study 
supports Hocking et al.’s (2004) and Harzing’s (2001) findings, the most important 
reason for MNCs to send expatriates is to transfer knowledge downwards from HQs, 
this knowledge is found about systems and processes, not new productivities.  
 
Since most Chinese subsidiaries are wholly owned, there is little learning from JV 
partners, instead, the dominant source of knowledge about local practices, 
regulations, markets and products are from consultants and locally recruited talent.  
Hiring consultants is an expensive way of absorbing tacit knowledge about UK 
business practices.  Grant’s (1996) argument that significant learning for OFDI 
companies occurs in learning-by-doing, the daily interactions with host-country 
companies and customers appear insignificant in the case of Chinese OFDIs, either 
their customer base is often other Chinese MNCs or their network link with local 
firms sparse.  
 
The interpretation of findings (section 7.3) is to view Chinese subsidiaries as not 
wholly open to learning opportunities in the UK.  Learning is constrained by the 
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ability to retain locally recruited staff within a Chinese HR environment, by the 
insistence of HQs on using their systems and processes and by lack of long-term 
investment by HQs in systematic knowledge capture and knowledge transfer.  In 
part, this is the Confucian tradition: learning should be of immediate practical use 
and verbally transmitted.  Perhaps many of these subsidiaries have been in the UK 
less than five years; this is not a long time to overcome (Miller and Parkhe, 2002) the 
liability of foreignness.  Longitudinal research over time may reveal different 
patterns.  At present, the Chinese subsidiaries learn little from competitors and 
partner firms.  
 
Section 7.4 indicates that the Chinese firms do learn and improve local capabilities, 
these are often transferred to the HQs, though as the research suggests, expatriate 
managers decline in the depth of their knowledge sharing with HQs after a year or 
so, becoming disenchanted that their suggestions are rarely acted upon.  Both 
subsidiaries and HQs face challenges in the absorptive capacity to systematically 
learn from their foreign locations.  
 
8.3 Answers to the Research Questions 
 
Answering Research Question One  
This question asked what the pattern and main motivations of Chinese OFDI is in the 
UK. The study found that the pattern of Chinese OFDI in the UK cannot be 
addressed by any single theoretical framework of the three mainstream theories i.e. 
Dunning’s eclectics/OLI paradigm, Uppsala model and Mathews’ leverage-linkage-
learning (LLL) framework, though they are often used to explain a country’s 
internationalisation.  As argued in section 5.3.1 of chapter five, Dunning’s (e.g. 
1981a, 1981b, 1986) eclectic theory and his accompanying ‘investment development 
path’ presumes OFDI from advanced economies by firms with technological and 
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systems superiority. Whereas the Chinese subsidiaries broadly have technological 
and operation systems inferiority, and are motivated by ‘Go Global Policy’ from 
their government and a desire to build networks from which they can learn.  This 
justifies the view that to explain patterns of OFDI from the Chinese emerging 
market, a theoretical framework acknowledging the characteristics of these firms, not 
found in Dunning’s work, is necessary.   
 
A similar position was argued in relation to the Uppsala school also in section 5.3.1.  
In this case, the argument was that the nature of the learning networks the Chinese 
OFDIs are building are not with JVs or other local companies, rather they are with 
consultants, disputes the Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), which predicts that overcoming psychic distance and 
forming business networks for learning purpose explains patterns of OFDI.   
 
Third, section 5.3.1 argued for the limited applicability to the case of Chinese OFDI 
motions of Mathew’s (2002a) work, summarised as the LLL model.  Not only are the 
learning networks predicted by Mathews absent in the Chinese case, the exploitation 
of the transferred knowledge by HQs, is also absent.  For these reasons, section 5.3.1 
concludes that to explain patterns of Chinese OFDI a new synthetic model is 
necessary, building from the insights of the three models mentioned whilst 
acknowledging the different position of OFDI which is in its operational systems and 
its technologies inferior to competitive companies in their host countries.   
 
The major motives of Chinese OFDI are explained by both push factors i.e. the 
influence of Chinese government policies, and pull factors consisting of market-
seeking and strategic asset-seeking.  Dunning’s four classification of motivations, 
which are only comprised of pull factors of motives, are claimed insufficient to 
explain the OFDI from China.   
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Answering Research Question Two 
 This question asked how learning occurs in the UK-based Chinese subsidiaries.  The 
study found  that subsidiary’s perception of the knowledge gaps between themselves 
and the local market mainly relates to functional activities in the subsidiaries such as 
operations, HRM, marketing and R&D.  To address these gaps, the subsidiaries learn 
through the existing employees who absorb new knowledge and practices, learning 
from local employees and from consultants.  As the triangulation between data, 
previous research and the interpretation in section 7.2 demonstrates, Child and 
Rodrigues’ (2005) findings can be supported: Chinese companies are seeking to learn 
more advanced ways-of-working and functional skills.  The survey, for example 
shows 80% and 73% of subsidiaries hoping to learn how to improve their operations 
and marketing capabilities respectively.   
 
However, for various reasons new learning by the Chinese subsidiaries is limited.  
Important reasons for this are the absence of formal and systematic learning and 
knowledge creation mechanisms, expatriate managers characterised by foreignness 
who find knowledge networking with JVs or local firms difficult, become 
disheartened that over time transferred knowledge is not acted upon by HQs. In 
addition, the limited investment in local knowledge networks as a result of low 
priority by HQs.  Much of the learning undertaken by the Chinese subsidiaries is 
expensively gained from commissioning consultants and hiring-in local staff, as the 
example presented in section 7.2 of tendering processes and HR regulations 
demonstrates.   
 
It has been argued from closely analysing these experiences that one explanation is 
the short-termness of Chinese managers’ ideology.  Unless learning gives immediate 
bottom-line impact, they tend to avoid investing in the learning and default from 
external knowledge flows in the host country, towards internal knowledge flows 
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from the HQs in China.  The interviews in China at seven HQs confirmed this view.  
Hence, whilst Andersson, Holm and Holmstrom (2001) suggest that some 80% of the 
most important relationships of MNCs are external; this seems not to be the case for 
Chinese MNCs.  Expatriates are crucial for the forward (from the HQs to the 
subsidiary) knowledge transfer.  Compared to the limited learning from the local 
firms (such as competitors, customers, even JV partners), the majority amount of 
learning is undertaken through hiring local consultants and recruiting local talent.   
 
In concluding that Chinese MNCs learn in quite different ways from other MNCs 
(short-termism; reliance on local recruitment and consultants and internal knowledge 
flows), however Nobel and Birkinshaw’s (1998) argue that everyday business 
practices and functions are much more difficult to capture, because they involve tacit 
learning not formalised knowledge transfers.  The extent to which this situation 
persists over time requires further research.  It may be that if subsidiaries appoint 
more local managers and if HQs pays more attention to learning from foreign 
subsidiaries, then they will better achieve their stated goal of learning via OFDI.  
However, such changes are unlikely in the short-term to alter the Confucian approach 
to knowledge, which emphasises it immediate pragmatic utility.  Taking a longer 
view of the benefits of investing in knowledge networking will require Chinese 
MNC HQs to alter some deep-rooted cultural predispositions. 
 
Answering Research Question Three  
This research question asked how the subsidiaries exploit the learning and develop 
capabilities.  The study has found that the majority of the subsidiaries do not have a 
systematic approach to exploit specialised knowledge; only the minority of Chinese 
subsidiaries use knowledge databases to formally disseminate knowledge among the 
employees.  As the evidence in section 7.3 shows these Chinese subsidiaries 




One reason may be that over half of the subsidiaries are small organisations, which 
prefer informal ways of knowledge capture, evaluation and exploitation.  Whilst the 
subsidiaries tend to exploit individuals’ specialised knowledge through reports and 
problem-solving in daily work.  They also tend to exploit the expertise of local 
employees through allocating them in the positions where they leverage their 
knowledge advantages.   
 
All of the subsidiaries have an expatriate in the management team; only half of them 
have the local employees in the managerial positions.  Since (Chinese) management 
staff have opportunities (such as training and mentoring) to disseminate their 
specialised knowledge, the knowledge exploitation of local talent is less powerful 
and deemed less important than knowledge disseminated from the HQs.  All 
subsidiaries exploit to some extent the practices of the local consultants in problem-
solving, and tend to integrate their knowledge for future use.  The capabilities 
development mainly shows in operation, marketing, HRM and product 
diversification.   
 
In contradistinction to the work of Takeuchi and Nonaka (2004); Dixon (2000); 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) relating to formalised knowledge cycles operating in 
(more technologically advanced) Japanese and US OFDI companies; the conclusion 
suggests that because of cultural traditions (pedagogy, rigid hierarchy) Chinese 
companies exploit knowledge in a less systematic manner.  When they do exploit 
learning from local host-country practices, it is because of the individual managers 






Answering Research Question Four  
This question asked how the subsidiaries transfer the knowledge and developed 
capabilities to their HQs.  The study has found that all subsidiaries transfer 
knowledge back to their HQs, and both formal and informal methods are used 
including annual reports, research reports, re-expatriate, sending visitors, emails, 
phone calls and expatriates visiting HQs.  However, Chinese MNCs emphasises 
‘forward’ knowledge transfer over ‘reverse’ knowledge transfer.  The majority HQs 
adopt all possible methods (in particular providing training programs for the 
subsidiary’s staff and using expatriates as a great knowledge transfer conduit) to 
ensure knowledge is flow into the subsidiaries.    
 
In contrast, only the minority of subsidiaries are authorised to provide training 
programs for their subsidiary company, and expatriates are considered as a channel 
of knowledge transfer only from HQs to subsidiaries.  As Gupa and Govindarajan 
(2000) mention, the richness of transmission channels to share knowledge is 
positively related to the degree of knowledge transfer, thus the level of knowledge 
transfer from subsidiary to HQs is reduced. 
 
All reports to HQs are written in Chinese and must be approved by (Chinese) 
Managing Directors before sending to the HQs; this is more restrictive than if a more 
open method was used (for example local employees are involved in knowledge 
transfer).  Informal transmission of knowledge means emails and phone calls are 
more frequently used than the formal methods.  Only one-third subsidiaries are 
required to send learning reports to the HQs.  The longer the expatriate are assigned 
in the positions and the more often the HQs do not response to the transferred 
knowledge, the less motivated the expatriate managers are to transfer knowledge.  In 
short, the processes of knowledge transfer between the subsidiaries and the HQs tend 
to be unsystematic, short-term and informal.  Given the fact of insignificant size of 
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the subsidiaries to their HQs and also the psychic distance between the domestic and 
the UK market, the new knowledge and practices of the subsidiaries are rarely 
adopted by the HQs.  The capabilities development in the HQs reflects the slow long-
term response and influence of the transferred knowledge and capabilities rather than 
immediate exploitation of the new learning.   
 
These conclusions support the earlier research by Minbaeva and Michailova (2004) 
stressing the importance of absorptive capacity by HQs to these exchange processes.  
Subsidiary managers of Chinese MNCs in the UK have little confidence that HQs 
will act upon their suggestions.  Instead, subsidiaries are expected to pay attention to 
expatriate managers from China conveying new ideas to the subsidiary, the ‘reverse’ 
knowledge flow highlighted by Downes and Thomas (1999; 2000) and Riusala and 
Suutari (2004).  Is this then a story of hierarchy suppressing innovation, especially in 
state owned enterprises?  Going global is much more than the location of a 
subsidiary: rather, it is a mindset.  Beyond formal reporting, over time, Chinese 
MNCs may see greater return in terms of knowledge flows from their overseas 
investments, however, currently this return is limited by the strength of hierarchic 
management and lack of absorptive capacity at HQs to appreciate the value of 
systematic knowledge flows. 
 
8.4 A Revised Conceptual Framework 
 
Towards the end of the literature review, in figure 3.2, a conceptual framework is 
presented to capture the processes by which firms such as these Chinese companies 
from an emerging market might learn, develop capabilities and create knowledge 
flows with their HQs.  Having argued in Chapter three that the three dominant 
models of internationalisation (Dunning, Uppsala and Mathews) inadequately 
capture the position of companies from emerging markets in developed economies 
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and their knowledge flows, figure 3.2 suggested a framework that illustrated the 
position of Chinese subsidiaries.  Taking guidance from this conceptual framework 
to interrogate the data and make sense of it in relation to previous research, now a 
revised conceptual framework is presented in figure 8.1.  Like figure 3.2 and unlike 
Dunning and Uppsala the 8.1 framework is designed to apply to companies from 
emerging markets i.e. with inferior technologies and systems.  Unlike Mathews 
(2002b) the figure does not presume learning results from overcoming the liability of 
foreignness, instead as the middle box on the top line indicates, it incorporates the 
finding that learning in Chinese subsidiaries is often the result of continued liability 
of foreignness resulting in learning mainly from recruited staff and consultants 
 
The revised conceptual framework (figure 8.1), like the initial framework (figure 3.2) 
flowchart starts from the top-left with knowledge gaps: the subsidiaries identify or 
form informal benchmarking against local firms become aware of disadvantageous 
knowledge gaps between the host country and the domestic market.  
 
Similarly, as Peterson et al. (2008) suggest, knowledge gaps in foreign markets are 
discrepancies that firms need to bridge to conduct successful business abroad.  Each 
of the subsidiaries was established using expatriate staff who bring the business 
practices from the HQs to the subsidiaries.  Thus, the knowledge gaps are also the 
discrepancies of knowledge between the HQs and the local firms.  The knowledge 
gaps that the subsidiaries perceive relate mainly to their current functional activities 
such as their operation systems (less systematic and sophisticated), or different 
approaches of tendering procedures and signing contracts.  Based on Grant’s (1996b) 
hierarchical classification of capabilities, these knowledge gaps are classified into 






Figure 8.1 The Revised Conceptual Framework 
 
Building from figure 3.2, the empirical results show that the relationship between the 
subsidiary and their local external network tends to be weak and that learning from 
the external network (local customers, competitors, etc.) is very limited.  This finding 
disputes those of Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) and Nohria and Ghoshal’s (1997) 
findings that a MNC is considered as a ‘differentiated network’, where emphasises 
the ability of subsidiaries actively learning from internal and external networks and 
creating new knowledge and transferring it to other inter-related units.   Instead the 
majority of learning is undertaken through recruiting local employees and using local 
consultants.  The empirical results show that the subsidiaries send staff to attend 
training courses and activities both at the local and in HQs.  They allocate staff to 
assist consultants for learning purposes, encouraging employees to learn new 
knowledge.  They provide funds for their training, staff also learn by interacting with 
local customers and other local firms.  Recruiting local talent is another way of 
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learning undertaken by subsidiaries, ninety-three per cent of which have recruited 
local employees and consider them to be an important means of local learning.   
 
Therefore in this revised conceptual framework, the second stage ‘learning from 
internal and external networks’ has been altered to ‘learning in two ways: through 
learning of the employees and through recruiting local talent and consultants’.  This 
result supports Peterson et al.’s (2008) finding that knowledge gaps motivate the 
subsidiaries to take actions to fill up the gaps.  The subsidiaries absorb new 
knowledge not only because they are willing to perform well, also because the HQs 
expect them to collect useful information and practices for their own use.  Therefore, 
the motivations of the HQs are crucial in terms of stimulating the subsidiaries to 
learn new knowledge and overcome psychic distance.  
 
Another significant revision in the conceptual framework is an arrow is added 
between phase two (learning) and phase five (knowledge transfer) showing that 
without exploitation some information and knowledge is directly transferred to the 
HQs.  This indicates some learning by the subsidiaries ends at absorbing specialised 
knowledge: this occurs when the new information and knowledge is acquired to 
collect for the HQs and irrelevant to the subsidiary’s operations.  Expatriate 
managers especially become less motivated to initially transfer new learning and 
capabilities over time.  In summary, at the stage of OFDI there is a dissonance 
between the stated intention of HQs to seek learning from OFDI and its actions in not 
investing in such learning or paying attention to it when it is transferred. 
 
Although other learning does not end up as (redundant) absorbed specialised 
knowledge; the subsidiaries tend not to have systematic integration mechanisms to 
exploit knowledge. Knowledge exploitation is prone to be informal and 
unsystematic, in particular communication among the members who share only one 
 239 
 
office in some small subsidiaries.  Formal approaches of knowledge exploitation 
such as using knowledge database are only adopted in very minority of the 
subsidiaries.  As Van den Bosch et al. (1999); Peterson et al. (2008); Zahra and 
George, 2002; and Zahra and George (2002) suggest, integration mechanisms 
facilitate knowledge dissemination and the eventual exploitation of knowledge.   
 
Though much new learning maintains in individual level within the subsidiaries, this 
study endorses Grant’s (1996b) finding that specialised knowledge can be embodied 
in new capabilities.  The new knowledge is either integrated into task-specific 
capabilities (such as P1 subsidiary exploiting the learning from the local consultant 
then organizing a spring festival book fair independently), or even broader functional 
capabilities (such as B3 subsidiary developing a detailed operation procedure leading 
to increased operation capability).  These functional capabilities include operation 
capability, marketing and sales capability, HRM capability and R&D design 
capability.     
 
The capabilities development at Chinese corporate level is more complex than 
Andersson, Forsgren and Holm (2001) suggest, since Chinese HQs are not only 
interested in the newly developed capabilities, they also want to receive information 
and knowledge collected from the UK market and integrate it into new capabilities in 
the HQs. Hence the UK-based Chinese subsidiaries transfer the developed 
capabilities as well as the unexploited raw information and practices.  Information 
and practices collected for the HQs may not be used in subsidiaries and, HQs may 
not use capabilities developed by the subsidiaries.  Most of the subsidiaries are 
insignificant (in size) to their HQs; also given the psychic distance between the UK 
and China the developed capabilities of the subsidiaries tend not fit into the HQs’ 
operations and often require adaptation.  Thus it may be more beneficial for the HQs 
to develop their own capabilities.  The findings show that the majority MNCs don’t 
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have formal and systematic processes for learning and capabilities development, 
which has deducted many useful knowledge/learning.  Capabilities development in 
the HQs affects the perception of knowledge gaps, given the limited data collected 
from the HQs, given limited interview data generated from the HQs, a dashed arrow 
is inserted in figure 8.1 indicating this result need further research to verify.  
 
In summary, figure 8.1 captures these findings in a revised framework (revising 
figure 3.2 in the light of the research findings).  A new arrow is inserted between 
learning from internal and external networks and knowledge transfer, indicating that 
subsidiaries often transfer raw information back to the HQs, which remains 
unexploited knowledge, even when specifically asked for by HQs.  The dashed arrow 
between capabilities development in the HQs and knowledge gaps, demonstrates that 
the new developed capabilities in the parent company impact on the perceptions of 
what constitute knowledge gaps, though this influence is minor.  The reason for 
using a dashed arrow is that given the limited data collected from the HQs, further 
research is necessary to establish the HQs make use of transferred knowledge.  
Compared to the original framework, in this version, an arrow and a dash arrow are 
added: the meanings behind the arrows are of great importance.    
 
Generally the new framework (figure 8.1) shows two learning circles, whilst the 
original framework (figure 3.2) was more linear.   The two learning cycles indicate 
two different approaches of capabilities development in Chinese MNCs.  The 
complete longer circle (knowledge gaps – learning – knowledge exploitation – 
capabilities development in the subsidiaries – knowledge transfer – capabilities 
development in the HQs) broadly supports Andersson, Forsgren and Holm’s (2001) 
processes, apart from the Chinese subsidiaries showing little learning from their 
external network at business relationship level.    
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The shorter circle (knowledge gaps – learning – knowledge transfer – capabilities 
development in the HQs) illustrates a different process of capabilities development in 
a MNC, which treats a subsidiary as an information collector and neglects its ability 
to exploit new learning to commercial ends, over time this may weaken a 
subsidiary’s absorptive capacity.  The difference between figures 3.2 and 8.1 
indicates a major finding from this research: although one of the main motives of 
Chinese OFDI is to learn from the host country and the local companies, the actions 
of these Chinese MNCs debilitate this goal.  They do this by privileging internal 
knowledge flows above external knowledge flows (i.e. low investment in building 
long-term host country knowledge networks and relationships and in overcoming 
psychic distance) and by discounting (not exploiting) knowledge flows from 
subsidiaries to HQs.   
 
8.5 Theoretical Contributions 
 
This work has criticised the applicability of Dunning’s (1986) eclectic/OLI 
framework in particular his five-stage ‘investment development path’ to the case of 
Chinese OFDI.  The majority of the Chinese MNCs have ownership disadvantages 
and are unlikely to gain superior knowledge and technology in the short-term since 
Chinese MNCs intend to learn to overcome ownership advantages.  However, their 
learning actions appear unsystematic and they also lack absorptive capacity.  This 
latter point is evidenced in the work of Easterby-Smith, et al., (2008); Jones, (2006) 
and Zahra and George (2002) and is a clear theme in Chapter six, resulting from 
under-investment in long-term knowledge networking. Without ownership 
advantages and even the ability of developing this advantages in short-term, 
therefore this study indicates though the Chinese OFDIs in the UK is currently 
located in the second stage of Dunning’s IDP they are unlikely to follow the further 
stages that Dunning predicts.   
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Dunning’s ideas on FDI motivations has many merits; the model of strategic asset-
seeking, natural resource-seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-seeking usefully 
explains developed economy OFDI.  However, these four categories of motives 
neglect the importance of the government policy support to Chinese OFDI in 
particular those SOEs, especially when the majority of Chinese OFDI are SOEs.  
Dunning’s development path is applicable only to technologically superior OFDI and 
not the technologically inferior firms from China investing into developed economies 
such as the UK.  Since some firms from some emergent economies can be 
technologically superior, (examples being Tata Steel in the UK and Huawei in 
telecommunications infrastructure worldwide), illustrating that only a minority of 
firms from emerging markets are successfully exploiting technological superiority.  
The criticism of Dunning’s development path relates only to technologically inferior 
firms investing in more developed markets.  The aim in creating a new framework 
that recognises the centrality of knowledge flows from subsidiaries to HQs, resulting 
from learning in host countries is to understand the OFDI patterns of Chinese MNCs 
and the benefits gained from knowledge flows between subsidiaries and HQs for this 
category of firms. 
 
Similarly this research criticised the Uppsala model (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977) as a western-centric approach.  Their idea of network building to overcome 
psychic distance is profound and helps explain patterns of OFDI and 
internationalisation mainly via trade and JVs.  However, the Uppsala model is less 
applicable to the Chinese case, since as the evidence illustrates few of the Chinese 
OFDI into the UK are benefiting from knowledge flows in local networks or even 
from JV partners.  Instead, much of the relationality from which these Chinese 
subsidiaries learned was transactional such as hiring local staff and commissioning 
consultants.  Therefore, it concludes that there is a need for a framework that 
captures such phenomenon for Chinese OFDIs, whilst accepting that for other 
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nationality OFDIs the Uppsala model may suitably explain knowledge flows.  It may 
be that in future as the capabilities of Chinese OFDIs increases, that the networking 
model sheds further light on their activities of Chinese firms as their capability of 
building networks grows, for example by investing in long-term learning purposive 
relationships with local companies. 
  
The research has also criticised the applicability of Mathews’ (e.g. 2002a) linkage-
leverage-learning (LLL) model to Chinese subsidiaries and their HQs, since the 
findings show that Chinese OFDI tend to undertake learning without network linkage 
and resource leverage in the UK, whereas a central point of Mathew’s framework is 
that learning occurs through trading network linkages (for example OEM, JVs).  
Unlike Dunning’s eclectic/OLI model, Mathews identifies the ownership 
disadvantages in the latecomer firms from the emerging countries, adopting the 
resource-based view to explore the ownership augmentation of these MNCs.  This 
perspective is particularly useful since the resource-based view stresses a firm’s 
ability to absorb new resources to enhance competitive advantages.  If it had been 
found Chinese subsidiaries actively embedded in relationships with local UK 
companies, the conclusion would have been to support Mathews’ theory, especially 
since Chinese OFDI invest in the UK mainly for seeking strategic assets.  
Nonetheless, Mathews is found less useful in explaining the case of knowledge flows 
between the Chinese subsidiaries and their HQs, since the data shows the Chinese 
MNCs pay more attention to the internal relationships (between the HQs and the 
subsidiary) than the external relations (between the subsidiary and its local 
stakeholders) leading to the limited network linkage and recourse leverage in the host 
country.  As chapter six reveals, Chinese HQs continue to privilege expatriates 
managers as conduits of knowledge and to discount the innovative suggestions that 




Additionally, as the data shows subsidiary learning is largely from recruited local 
talent and commissioning local consultants and over time the expatriate managers 
cease taking seriously knowledge transfer to the HQs.  In short, although the results 
supports Mathews’ emphasises of the resource-based view and the learning out of his 
LLL framework, there are little evidence showing the Chinese subsidiaries 
undertaken learning via linkage and leverage.  Therefore, Mathews’ framework 
might explain Chinese OFDI in other countries, or it might be as Narula (2006:149) 
point out, the ‘dragon MNEs is the exception rather than the rule’.  Nonetheless 
Mathews’ (2002a and 2002b) LLL framework is not evidenced in this study.  
 
Whist Dunning, Uppsala and Mathews, inadequately theorise the nature and 
motivations of China OFDI into developed countries, figure 8.1 better illustrates the 
learning processes of Chinese subsidiaries in the UK, this is a revised version (a full 
explanation is shown in section 8.4).  The revised conceptual framework begins by 
acknowledging the probability of inferior technologies and business systems and the 
existence of knowledge gaps between the Chinese OFDI firms and the other 
companies in host markets.  This revised framework emphasises the HQs favour the 
raw information and knowledge and discount the created new knowledge and 
developed capabilities by the subsidiaries.  This version also reveals lack of a 
systematic approach of learning and knowledge exploitation and absorptive capacity 
in the subsidiaries and their HQs  
 
In addition, the research suggested a framework  (version one, figure 3.2) that 
explains the processes of learning and capabilities development in Chinese MNCs, 
which in the light of evidence revised and improved into a new framework (version 
two, figure 8.1) and is the contribution to international business theory.  
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8.6 Empirical Contributions 
 
Peng (2012) finds that emerging MNCs going abroad to learn remains an area of 
learning by organisations not yet extensively studied.  The important empirical 
contribution of this research is the largest quantitative dataset of Chinese subsidiaries 
invested in the UK (with 30 out of 100 survey responses) from which to interpret an 
overall pattern of Chinese OFDI into the UK, by for example the year of 
establishment, size, entry modes, industrial distribution, functional activities, 
motivations, overall benefits and the recruitment methods.  This data is presented in a 
new, original database in Appendix I.   
 
Additionally, the research gathered qualitative data from 40 in-depth interviews with 
15 subsidiaries and seven HQs, uniquely these interviews explore the processes of 
learning and capabilities development in the Chinese subsidiaries and their HQs. 
 
The findings of the initial survey supports Liu and Tian’s (2008) findings on the 
main motives of Chinese OFDI into the UK are Chinese government policy support, 
strategic asset-seeking and market-seeking, as well as the characteristics and motives 
of Chinese OFDI found in Taylor (2002) and Liu, Buck and Shu’s (2005) studies.  
Deng (2004) and Buckley et al. (2008) find that strategic asset-seeking is an 
important motive with efficiency-seeking being the least important factors, which is 
also evidenced in this study.  Wu and Chen (2001) suggest that the geographical 
distribution of Chinese OFDI is determined by the motives, to seek advanced 
knowledge and resources drives the OFDI to the industrialised countries, and these 
are also supported in this study. 
 
The results show that the most of the Chinese MNCs admit their ownership 
disadvantages and intend to seek useful resources to overcome their knowledge 
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inferior through their investment in the UK, which supports Child and Rodrigues’ 
(2005) finding that the majority of Chinese MNCs consider internationalisation as 
the means to learn and strengthen competitive advantage.  However, actions by HQs 
not supporting long-term business relationships obtaining knowledge leverage, or 
acting upon learning by subsidiaries, suggests that this intention is not being 
supported in its implementation.  Further, whilst numerous scholars (e.g. Henderson 
and Cockburn, 1994; Almeida, 1996; Pearce, 1996; Cantwell and Piscitello, 1997; 
Blanc and Sierra, 1999; Kuemmerle, 1999; Niosi, 1999; and Lee et al., 2001 
emphasise only subsidiary’s learning of technological knowledge, this study finds 
that learning in the subsidiaries not only takes place in R&D, it also occurs in other 
softer functional areas.  This study supports the findings of Pahlberg (2001) and 
Schlegelmilch and Chini (2003); learning can happen throughout firms, including 
areas such as in operations, HRM and marketing.  This is especially the case where 
Chinese subsidiaries are less involved in technological development i.e. they are 
service or trading concerns.    
 
Miller and Parkhe’s (2002) findings indicate that learning to overcome the liability of 
foreignness may result from interaction with host country companies: this critically 
depends upon how open the subsidiaries are to new ideas and how competent their 
managers (often expatriates) are at networking with local firms.   Some Chinese 
subsidiaries overcome the liability of foreignness through learning from local 
resources rather than their HQs.  However, this study also finds that subsidiaries 
continue to perceive unfilled knowledge gaps they need to address in order to survive 
in the local market.  This supports Penrose’s (1959: xii) resource-based view of the 
firm: growth ‘is essentially an evolutionary process and based on the cumulative 
growth of collective knowledge, in the context of a purposive firm’ since learning 
and the development of capabilities are seen as crucial building blocks in improving 
competitiveness.    Nonetheless, Chinese MNCs are found to pay less attention to the 
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procedures and processes, because they appear short-term and often discard learning 
that cannot be use immediately, which supports Gilboy’s (2004) finding that Chinese 
firms favour short-term gains over long-term investment.  
 
This study indicates that expatriates play a significant role in knowledge and 
practices transfer between the HQs and subsidiaries, which support the findings of 
Harzing (2001) and Hocking et al. (2004).  They argue that the most important 
reason for using expatriates is to implement knowledge transfer between the HQs 
and the subsidiaries. Though the predominant knowledge transfer between the 
subsidiaries and the HQs is downward and vertical, the majority of downward 
transferred knowledge is routines and processes, the new productivity and created 
knowledge are more likely to arise from upward knowledge flows.    
 
Easterby-Smith et al.’s (2008) finds that the informal social ties between the 
employees in the same firm can be a superior conduit for transferring knowledge 
than formal conduits is evidenced in this study.  Although this research is not cross-
country comparative and further research is necessary, this conclusion is sharply 
different from that of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) comments on US and Japanese 
subsidiaries, both of which emphasise knowledge codification cycles.  Further 
research could show Chinese companies to be short-term and pragmatic in their 
learning, reflecting the nature of relevant knowledge in the Confucian tradition, since 
there is little evidence of long-term investment in joining local networks for learning 
purpose and since HQs regularly underplay suggestions from subsidiaries.   
 
Expatriates managers share their knowledge and narratives with their superiors and 
colleagues when they visit the HQs annually, which supports the findings from (such 
as Downes and Thomas 2000; Dunning, 2003; Riusala and Suutari, 2004), who argue 
that expatriates managers are a more important channel for knowledge dissemination 
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than local managers.  Expatriate managers play a significant role in both ‘forward’ 
knowledge transfer and ‘reverse’ knowledge flows, emphasising flows of knowledge 
from HQs rather than from the subsidiaries.  The findings suggest, as Szulanski 
(1996) stresses, that the degree of knowledge transfer depends on not only the 
senders’ willingness to share the knowledge, it also depends upon the receiver’s 
willingness and ability to learn and their absorptive capacity. 
 
8.7 Future Research  
 
This work suggests limitations on the applicability of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, 
the Uppsala model and Mathew’s LLL framework to the case of OFDI by Chinese 
companies.  Further research, especially looking at other BRIC country OFDI into 
advanced economies, will shed light on whether my conclusions are specific to China 
(its Go Global Policy, the Confucian tradition, the particular sectoral spread of its 
OFDI) or whether the criticism also apply to OFDI from other emerging economies.  
If this is the case, then there are wide implications for international business theory, 
as it is currently understood. 
 
A further future questions raised by this study centres upon causally connecting 
learning, capabilities and performance.  Is the case that learning that expands and 
strengthens the capabilities of Chinese subsidiaries results in better performance?  
Can performance simply be evaluated in terms of sales and profit or (additionally) 
can a return on investment be computed for knowledge flows that affect whole-MNC 
competences?  These are wicked issues, since as Neely (2002) shows connecting 
performance with strategy is itself highly problematic.    
 
The most important question for future research, arising from this research is the 
nature and significance of learning in Chinese companies.  It has been assumed that 
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unlike the learning cycles found by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), Chinese 
companies are more short-term and pragmatic in their learning.  The negative side of 
this Confucian tradition is unsystematic learning devoid of strategic linkages, whilst 
the positive side may be in agility and market-orientation.  Research in Chinese 
MNC HQs would reveal more about the practice of Chinese companies learning and 
their ability to absorb and exploit new knowledge. 
 
Once aspect of learning arising from this study is intriguing is the role of consultants.  
The narrative tells of Chinese firms transactionally buying-in soft learning from 
consultants.  Anecdotal evidence reveals a similar story of western consultant firms 
‘buying’ business in their early days in China, until they built up sufficient local 
knowledge (from employing local staff) to add value to (in this case) local Chinese 
firms.  What then is the role of consultants in supporting internationalisation 
processes?   
 
8.8 Implications for Management Practice and Policy 
 
The author’s concern has been to identify practices and understandings that help 
decision-makers in China choose OFDI routes and the practices likely to successfully 
improve their competitiveness.  Whilst earlier generations of researchers investigated 
US or Japanese company practices, identifying behaviour, structures, systems, 
processes, which might be diffused internationally.  The focus is upon those practices 
and policies that Chinese subsidiaries identify as better practices in the host country 
(the UK in this instance) and how these might be transferred back to the Chinese 
HQs and later disseminated and diffused as good practices in Chinese MNCs.  One 
of the key findings is that although Chinese MNCs state they are knowledge seeking, 
as shown in Chapter six, their practices inhibit knowledge gathering and its transfer 
to the HQs.  In short there is dissonance between their intents and actions for 
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learning and capabilities development.   Chinese MNCs therefore, need to develop 
formal and systematic mechanism to incentivise, gather, evaluate and disseminate 
learning from their subsidiaries. 
 
The central recommendation to Chinese MNCs is that in acknowledging their lack of 
systematic knowledge absorption and exploitation (in short, lack of absorptive 
capacity) they take remedial actions.  This may include developing a formally 
systematic approach of knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transmission, 
exploitation and dissemination.  For example by appointing a Knowledge Manager in 
each subsidiary, whose task is to create systematic mechanisms of knowledge flow 
based upon actively seeking learning from interactions with local companies.   
 
Subsidiaries are controlled in the degree of knowledge networking they do by 
financial and strategic constraints from HQs, who in any case privilege learning 
downwards i.e. knowledge flows from HQs, using expatriate managers as conduits 
for knowledge transmission.  This occurs within a pragmatic and short-term 
(Confucian) tradition in which learning is valued by the immediacy of its impact.  A 
key conclusion from this study is that if the stated intention of Chinese companies in 
undertaking OFDI (bridging gaps in knowledge that will improve competitive 
advantage) are to be realised, then Chinese MNCs need to invest in longer-term 
business networks (as Mathews’ (2002a and 2002b) network linkages and resource 
leverage) in the host countries.  They should also encourage the gather and transfer 
of tacit learning by employing more local staff in senior positions and more seriously 
look at exploiting learning from subsidiaries across the firm, thereby incentivising 
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Appendix I: Company List 
 
A Plus International Express Parcels (UK) Ltd.  
Accord Global Environment Technology (AGET)  
Agricultural Bank of China（London） 
Airchina 
Alibaba.com Limited  
APEX 
Apollo Europe 
Bank of China 
Bank of Communications (London) Representative Office 
BEIJING TONG REN TANG CHINESE MEDICINE (UK) 
Bestex Jiangsu Co Ltd  
Better Generation  
Bonny International UK Ltd  
CATIC (UK) LTD 
CCIC LONDON CO., LTD. 
CNOOC Africa (UK) Ltd. 
CTC Electric (London) Ltd  
Chengdu Hi-tech Zone  
China Central Television (CCTV)  
China Construction Bank  
China Eastern Airlines  
China Export & Credit Insurance  
China Insurance Company (UK) Ltd 
China Merchants Holdings (UK) Limited  
China mobile Limited 
China National Tourist Office, London 
China Netcom (Europe) Operations Limited 
China Reinsurance Corporation (London) 
China Shipping (UK) Agency Co. Ltd.  
China Telecom (Europe) Limited  
China Travel Service Group (CTSG)  
China Youth Publishing Group (CYPG)  
CNOOC Africa (UK) Ltd 
CNPIEC London Office (UK) 
Coscon (UK) Ltd 
Ctc Electric (London) Ltd 
CULTURAL TOURS UK 
Cypress Book Co. 
Crystal Digital 
CYP International Ltd 
D-Link  
Elin Marketing (UK) Ltd  
Genertec UK 
Golden Bridge （UK） Ltd 
Golden View  
Greatwall UK Ltd 
Green Valley Group  
Greenland International (UK) Limited  
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Hebei Jingniu Group Co. Ltd  
Hisense UK Office 
Homex Europe Limited  
Honav UK Ltd  
Houlder Insurance Services Ltd (Lloyd's Brokers) 
Huawei Technologies 
HYT Science & Technology Co., Ltd 
ICBC 
Icicle  
Isunte (UK) Co. Ltd  
Kai Turn Enterprises  
Lenovo 
LITTLE LAMB 
London Representative Office 
Marent  
MG Motor UK Limited 
Midea Household Appliance (Europe) Ltd.  
Minmetals (U.K.) Ltd. 
Mindray (UK) Ltd 
New Classic Press Ltd  
Nomona UK Limited  
Nutrintl UK 
PetroChina International (London) Co. Ltd. 
PICC (Europe) 
S&W Handbags  
SAIC Motor UK Holding Co., Ltd 
SOFTOC  
Shanghai Haobo Chair  
Shanghai Herbs Group Ltd 
Shanghai Touchroad International Trading UK Ltd  
Sinochem International Oil (London) Co., Ltd. 
Sinolingua London limited 
SINOTRANS U.K. REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE 
Sleek International  
Star Business Travel Co. Ltd  
Sunry UK 
Susino (UK) Ltd 
T-Storm Limited UK  
TEXMAX(UK) 
Tian Shi UK Plc  
Tianjin Pipe Corporation (TPCO)  
TIENS UK 
Top Glory (London) Ltd 
TPCO UK LIMITED 
Tricor Aldbridge  
UNIPEC UK 
Wenzhou HEC Fashion 
Xinhua News Agency London Office 
Yuanda UK  
ZLWD Solicitors  
ZTE UK Ltd 




Appendix II: Questionnaire 
 





This questionnaire contains a number of questions concerning the characteristics of 
your company, the difficulties that your company faces, your goals and your 
achievements, and the relationship between the operation in the UK and your parent 
company. Most questions simply require you to either circle the appropriate response 
code or give short answers, so the questionnaire should only take about 10-15 minutes 
to complete.   
 
The questionnaire focuses on the questions about your UK operation, and there is one 
small section of questions about your parent company in China. 
 
This questionnaire has been sent to approximately 100 Chinese investment enterprises 
in the UK. All those who complete and return a questionnaire will receive a copy of the 
report of the findings free of charge. All information given in the questionnaire will be 
treated as strictly confidential, and no individual company will be named in any write-
up of the findings. 
 
If you have any queries about the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to contact Yan 
Zhuang by telephone on Edinburgh (0131) 6504606, by mobile phone on 
07837483643 by email on yan.zhuang@ed.ac.uk, or by mail on University of 
Edinburgh Business School, 16 Buccleuch Place, EDINBURGH EH8 9LN. A reply by the 
end of December 2009 would be appreciated.  
  





Please try to answer all questions. If you do not know the precise answer, please give 
your best estimate. 
If a particular question is not applicable to your company or if you are unable to answer, 
please feel free to leave it blank. Your contribution is still valuable even if you cannot 
answer all the questions. 
Your anonymity is assured; all questionnaires will be treated strictly confidential. Only 
the aggregate results from the survey will be reported. 
 
 
Returning the Questionnaire 
 
Please put the completed survey into the prepaid return envelope.  
 
If you lost the prepaid return envelope, please send the completed questionnaire back 
to Yan Zhuang, University of Edinburgh Business School, 16 Buccleuch Place, 







Part I: Background Information  
 
1. Company name in the UK: ____________________________________________1 
 
2. Name of person completing questionnaire (only if you want to): _______________ 
 
3. Position in company (only if you want to): _______________________________2 
 
4. Telephone number (only if you want to): _________________________________ 
 
5. Email address (only if you want to): _____________________________________ 
 
Part II: Your UK company 
 
Section A:  Past 
 
(a) In which year was your company first established in the UK? _____________3  
 
      (b) What was the function of your company at that time?  
 
A. Representative office  
B. Subsidiary  
C. Branch 
      D. HQ of certain region (please specify which region):______________________ 
      E. Others (please specify):________________________________________[4, 5, 6] 
 
(a) What was your mode of entry into the UK?  
 
Greenfield  






     (b) If your company entered in the UK via a JV, who was your partner company? 
      _________________________________________________________________8 
 
     (c) If a JV, please describe the main assets/resources that your company          
      brought to the venture [e.g. Cash, Raw materials, Technology, etc.]  
     (Please list these in descending order of importance, up to three in total). 
 
 1.                                                                                                                             9 
 2.                                                                                                                           10 
 3.                                                                                                                           11 










3   Please indicate the importance of the following reasons for your company   





















































n/a        
14 














n/a       
15 












n/a       
16 
Lower political 


























n/a        
18 
Easier access to 
financial 












n/a       
19 










































n/a        
22 
Sufficient 



























n/a         
24 




























































































Section B:  Present 
 
What is the turnover of your UK company? (in £)_________________________31          
                                                                  Or (in US $) ________________________32 
 
What are the main products or services of your UK company? ________________ 
_______________________________________________________________[33, 34, 35] 
 
What geographical markets does your UK company mainly target? (e.g. UK) ____ 
_______________________________________________________________[36, 37, 38] 
 
4 (a) How many employees does your UK company have? ____________________ 39  
 
   (b) What percentage of your employees are Chinese? _______________________40 
 
5 (a) How many sites does your company have in the UK? ____________________ 41 
 
   (b) Please name their locations (e.g. London): ______________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________[42, 43, 44] 
 
6   How would you describe the current function of your UK company?  
 
A. Representative office  
B. Subsidiary  
C. Branch 
      D. HQ of certain region (please specify which region):______________________ 
      E. Others (please specify):_________________________________________[45, 46]  
 
7   Which of the following activities are performed in the UK?  
   
A. R&D                                                              47                                                                                                                         
B. Sales                                                               48 
C. Manufacturing                                               49 
D. Purchasing                                                     50 
E. Legal                                                              51 
F. Marketing                                                       52 
G. Logistics                                                        53 
H. Service                                                           54 
I. Others (please 














8   Which of the following best characterizes the operation of your UK company? 
 
A. Trade                                                               
B. Manufacturing  
C. Business-to-Business service provider  
D. Business-to-Customer service provider 
E. Other (please 
specify):_______________________________________________ 59                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 
9   What is the main financing method of your UK company? 
A. Overseas enterprise loans 
B. International financing rental 
C. Secured loans  
D. Capital from parent company 
E. Other (please 
specify):_______________________________________________60 
 
10   Please name your UK company’s main customers worldwide (Please list these in 
descending order of importance, up to three in total). 
 
1.                                                                                                                                 61                                                                                                                                                                                     
2.                                                                                                                                 62 
3.                                                                                                                                 63 
  
 
11 Please name your UK company’s main business partners (excluding JV partner) 
worldwide (Please list these in descending order of importance, up to three in total). 
 
1.                                                                                                                                 64                                                                                                                                                                      
2.                                                                                                                                 65 
3.                                                                                                                                 66 
  
 
12   Please circle the importance of the following overall benefits relating to your 









































































































































































































13   Please indicate the relative importance of the use of the following recruitment 
methods in your UK company. 
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81 
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86 
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88 


































































14   What are the major problems that your company faces in the UK? [e.g. personnel, 
language, business culture, competition policy, political and economic environment, 
etc.] (Please list these in descending order of importance, up to five in total). 
 
 1.                                                                                                                                94                                                                                                                                                                                           
 2.                                                                                                                                95 
 3.                                                                                                                                96 
 4.                                                                                                                                97 
 5.                                                                                                                                98 
 
 
15 (a) Have differences in Chinese and British approaches to business caused issues    
      in your UK firm?                                                                                     YES/NO  99 
       












Section C:  Future 
 
1. In 5 years, how many employees does your UK company expect to have? _____ 103 
 
2. (a) In 5 years, does your parent company expect to add any more activities     
    (e.g. R&D, Sales, Manufacturing, Purchasing, etc.) into UK operation? YES/NO  104 
 
    (b) If yes, please name the new activities: _________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________[105, 106, 107] 
 




 Part III: Your Parent Company in China 
 
What is your parent company’s name?_________________________________109 
 
What is your parent company’s turnover worldwide? (in ¥)________________ 110 
                                                                                  Or (in US$) ________________111 
 
What are your parent company’s main products or services? _________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________[112, 113, 114] 
 
What geographical markets does your parent company mainly target? __________ 
 
__________________________________________________________ [115, 116, 117, 118] 
 
What is the ownership of your parent company?  
 
A. State-owned        
B. Private                       
C. Collective   
D.Other (please specify):_____________________________________119 
 
6   Please list the other countries in which your parent company has invested (Please 
list these in descending order of importance, up to three in total). 
 
1.                                                                                                                               120 
2.                                                                                                                               121                                                                                                                                 

















1. Please indicate the degree of decision-making autonomy or influence enjoyed by the 
UK operation with respect to each of the following activities. 
 
Operation activities  Very 
Weak 
Weak Moderate Strong Very 
Strong 
N/A 











5     123 
 
n/a 

























5     125 
 
n/a 









5     126 
 
n/a 











5    127 
 
n/a 











5    128 
 
n/a 
Introduction of new 










5    129 
 
n/a 











5    130 
 
n/a 











5    131 
 
n/a 









5    132 
 
n/a 





























5   134 
 
n/a 
















Thank you very much for your kind help. 
Please put the completed questionnaire into the prepaid return envelope and 







Appendix III: Interview Schedule 
 
Part I: Background Information  
1. Company name in the UK and China: ________________________________ 
 
2. Name of interviewee: _________________________________________________ 
 
3. Position in company: _________________________________________________ 
 
4. Years in position: ____________________________________________________ 
 
5. Telephone number: ___________________________________________________ 
 
6. Email address: ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
Part II: Semi-structured Interview Questions  
 
A: People in UK Subsidiaries 
 
Section I: Organisational Learning 
 
1. What knowledge gaps (between your own company and local companies) have you 
seen? And how do you identify these knowledge gaps which need to be filled, for 
example in finance, marketing, HRM, R&D, operations, MIS, etc.? 
 
2. Do you send subsidiary staff on any training courses (or seminars, conferences etc.) 
to learn from local business environment (general business environment, 
stakeholders)? 
 
3. Do you use any consultants?  If yes, can you give an example of UK practices (in 
finance, marketing, HRM, R&D, operations, MIS, etc.) that you’ve learned from them? 
 
4. Do you think that expatriates bring new knowledge (learning) into subsidiary? 
 
5. Do you recruit local people to bring new expertise into the company that you can 
learn from to help improve products, processes or your business model (in finance, 
marketing, HRM, R&D, operations, MIS, etc.)? 
 
6. Does your subsidiary adopt any other organisational learning methods (for example 
learning from customers, suppliers, partners etc.)? 
 
7. Does the whole company (HQs, subsidiary or both) encourage staff to learn? If yes, 
how?  (For example do you have a suggestion scheme for staff or actively gathering 
ideas from staff) 
 
8. Is learning one of your subsidiary’s main objectives? If yes, have the HQs set any goals 




9. Do you see any organisational change or improvement (in people’s thinking, 
processes, products, policy, etc.) through exploitation of new learning since you started 
to work in the subsidiary? 
 
10. How do you transfer knowledge and capabilities back to the HQs? (Reports? HQs’ 
visitors? Or others?) 
 
11. Do the HQs manage and supervise the learning, improvement and the process of 
change undertaken in the subsidiary? If yes, what do the HQs do? 
 
12. Does the subsidiary make demands or ask for help from the HQs? If yes, what do the 
HQs do? Will the solutions help with enhancing the capabilities of the entire company? 
 
 
Section II: Individual Learning 
 
1. Do you see any change or improvement yourself through learning since you started 
to work in the subsidiary? 
 
2. Can you give me an example (a story) of your learning to improve your work? 
(Training courses, conferences, learning by doing business with stakeholders, 
observing what your stakeholders do, etc.) 
 
3. Now can you go over the story again pointing out: 
 
 What did you learn? 
 What learning methods did you use? 
 What motivated your learning? 
 Did related prior knowledge and skills help with this learning? If yes, can you give an 
example? 
 Was your learning limited within particular boundaries? 
 Did working in English as a second language help or hinder your learning? How? 
 Did you come across any cultural issues (difficulties) through this learning? If yes, 
how did you overcome these difficulties? 
 Did you apply this learning into your work? 
 Did you diffuse this learning to your colleagues? If yes, how? 
 
 
B: People in the HQs 
 
1.  How has your company benefited from investing in the UK? 
 
2. Is learning one of your UK subsidiary’s main objectives? 
If yes, have the HQs set any goals for knowledge transfer from your UK subsidiary? 
 
3. Does the UK subsidiary acquire any knowledge (learning assistance) from the HQs? 
If yes, how (give an example)? Do you send expatriates to the UK subsidiary with the 
intention of learning at local or passing knowledge to the local?  
 
4. Do the HQs monitor the learning (improvement, change) processes in the subsidiary?  




5. How does your UK subsidiary transfer knowledge and capabilities back to the HQs? 
(Reports? HQs’ visitors? Or others?) 
 
6. How do the HQs encourage the UK subsidiary to learn and to transfer knowledge and 
capabilities back to the HQs? 
 
7. Do you exploit and diffuse these knowledge and capabilities in the whole company 
(HQs, other subsidiaries), if yes, how? 
 
8. Does your UK subsidiary ask for favours from the HQs? If yes, how do the HQs help? 
Will the solutions help with enhancing the capabilities of the entire company?  
 
 
 
 
